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SACRIFICE AND SACRED HONOR: WHY THE
CONSTITUTION IS A “SUICIDE PACT”
Peter Brandon Bayer*
ABSTRACT
Most legal scholars and elected officials embrace the popular cliché that
“the Constitution is not a suicide pact.” Typically, those commentators extol the
“Constitution of necessity,” the supposition that Government, essentially the
Executive, may take any action—may abridge or deny any fundamental right—to
alleviate a sufficiently serious national security threat. The “Constitution of necessity”
is wrong. This Article explains that strict devotion to the “fundamental fairness” prin-
ciples of the Constitution’s Due Process Clauses is America’s utmost legal and moral
duty, surpassing all other considerations, even safety, security and survival.
The analysis begins with the most basic premises: the definition of morality and
why nations must be moral. This Article defends deontology: the philosophy that
because moral principles are a priori, they must be obeyed regardless of terrible
outcomes. Such is the sacrifice demanded by morality. As most theorists and politicians
favor some form of consequentialism (the theory that the moral answer is the one that
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produces the most happiness), the defense of pure deontology is thorough. Next, this
Article links deontology directly with the American Revolution by demonstrating that
the Founders were deontologists who asserted in the Declaration of Independence
that government is legitimate only if it governs according to eternal moral precepts.
They pledged the new nation’s “sacred honor” to uphold steadfastly the principles of
moral government.
Aware of their imperfections, the Founders instructed their successors to improve
the moral philosophy underlying the Declaration. The deontology of Immanuel Kant
expresses the best general paradigm of morality. Kant famously explained that all per-
sons and societies share an overarching moral duty to respect the innate dignity of every
human being no matter what sacrifice that duty may entail. Kantian ethics clarify why
moral abidance is more important than life itself. Because it is the superior moral theory
that the Founders sought, Kant’s “dignity principle” must delimit the Constitution
which, as explicated herein, is the legal iteration of the Declaration. This Article’s
concluding discussion of the Constitution, particularly its due process precedents,
explains why the Kantian approach—sacrifice and honor—debunks the Constitution
of necessity, proving that the Constitution is a “suicide pact.”
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INTRODUCTION
To be a true constitution, that which a society calls its constitution must enforce
values so imperative, so fundamental, that the constitution comprises not only a way to
live but more profoundly, a reason to die. Customarily through, for example, military
service, individual citizens or groups of citizens may be required to risk their lives
to preserve their constitution and the nation over which it presides. However, a true
constitution rightfully demands that the entire constitutional order—the whole society
regulated by that constitution—risk its own demise rather than betray the essential
precepts that the constitution embodies. Only principles of such magnitude warrant
inclusion in the supreme document of a particular people.1
1 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (holding that the U.S. Constitution
is the supreme law of the United States); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177–79 (1803). Certainly, it may please drafters to include some particulars not essential to
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Simply believing that a particular constitution is worth dying for, however, is not
enough. To be a legitimate constitution—to actually be worthy of such communal
sacrifice—the given constitution must be moral; that is, both designed to enforce and
actually capable of enforcing the abiding moral duties that demarcate legitimate from
illegitimate governments.
Pursuant to the character of true and legitimate constitutions, the Constitution of
the United States defines who we are, what we are and, most importantly, why we
are. Our Constitution purports to set the governing minima without which no society
may be legitimate. Accordingly, and quite deliberately, while a legal document, the
Constitution is a profoundly moral thesis as well. It could not be otherwise because the
Constitution’s overarching endeavor is enforced morality, specifically “fundamental
fairness” via due process of law2 which, as Justice Felix Frankfurter aptly enthused,
is “ultimate decency in a civilized society . . . .”3 America’s validation stems from
the morality of the Constitution and how steadfastly we maintain it.4
In contravention of our constitutional duty is the long-standing chestnut: the
Constitution is not a suicide pact.5 Of course, no one would argue that the Constitution
is literally a “suicide pact,” meaning the Constitution requires those governed there-
under to kill themselves.6 Nor would reasonable theorists claim it to be a suicide pact
the very definition of their given society. But, a constitution by “[i]ts nature . . . requires, that
only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingre-
dients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.”
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819); see also, e.g., Cnty. of Sacramento
v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
2 See infra Part IV.
3 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that
the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination is not applicable via the Fourteenth
Amendment to state prosecutions), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
4 Of course, within a domain of moral society administered by a moral government, indi-
viduals may indulge their selfish interests and personal preferences. This idea was, as accented
shortly, immortalized in the Declaration of Independence as “the pursuit of Happiness.” THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also Bd. of Regents of State Colls.
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). However,
specific pursuits of happiness do not legitimize a government. Instead, legitimacy stems from
the moral framework in which persons pursue their selected happiness.
5 See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“There
is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it
will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”); see also Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280, 309–10 (1981); Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964); Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) (“[W]hile the Constitution protects against in-
vasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.”); Doe v. Boland, 630 F.3d 491, 496 (6th Cir.
2011) (“If the Constitution is not a ‘suicide pact’ . . . it is not an instrument of crime either.”)
(citations omitted); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002).
6 A “suicide pact” is “an agreement between two or more people to commit suicide
together.” THE SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3099 (6th ed. 2007).
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“in the sense that the Constitution was meant to fail.”7 Rather, commentators apply
the not a suicide pact metaphor to support the Constitution of necessity, the premise
that if circumstances raise significant jeopardy and lesser measures appear unavailing,
government may do virtually anything—abridge or suspend any liberty—both to pre-
serve the nation and to ensure the well-being of its institutions.8
Several critics challenge that theory’s empirical bases arguing, for example, that the
definition of “necessity” is overinclusive.9 Critics further argue that the Constitution of
necessity betrays pivotal American principles of law, rights, dignity and separation of
powers.10 However, criticism usually stops well short of accepting the Constitution as
a metaphorical “suicide pact,” averring instead that necessity is the ultimate “compel-
ling state interest,” overpowering liberty if the exigency is dire enough.11
I join the very few12 who respond that, even if limited to situations of actual
imminent danger to the very continuation of American society, necessity as the
Constitution’s “first principle” defies the Constitution’s true moral nucleus that ex-
plains and justifies our nation: due process of law. While many articles challenge the
Constitution of necessity as anathema to the inherent nature of American government,13
such arguments alone cannot explain why, under sufficiently urgent circumstances,
we ought not to abandon all constitutional liberty if that is what it takes, for however
long it takes, with the earnest intent to restore liberty the very moment the danger
has passed.14
7 Saikrishna Prakash, The Constitution as Suicide Pact, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1299,
1319 (2004).
8 See infra notes 478–83 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 509–16 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Conceiving A Just World Under Law: Panel Summary,
Remarks at the Ninety-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law
(Apr. 1, 2004), in 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 126, 128 (2004).
11 See, e.g., David Cole, No Reason to Believe: Radical Skepticism, Emergency Power,
and Constitutional Constraint, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1333 (2008) (reviewing ERIC A.
POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY AND THE
COURTS (2007)) (“Few constitutional rights are absolute, and civil libertarians widely accept
that as the government’s interests grow more compelling, it has broader leeway to infringe
on liberties.”).
12 See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 10, at 128 (“[I]f that phrase is used to suggest that we
should jettison the idea of the rule of law in exchange for a possibly illusory security, then
I would suggest that perhaps the Constitution was in fact a ‘suicide pact’ of sorts—and so it
should be.”); Prakash, supra note 7, at 1319.
13 See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 10, at 128.
14 Thomas Jefferson, for instance, opined, “[t]o lose our country by a scrupulous adherence
to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are
enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means.” Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 11 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 146
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., Fed. ed. 1905).
292 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:287
Accordingly, this Article proposes a deeper grounding to explain why the
Constitution is a suicide pact. Specifically, morality, the very fabric of the Constitution,
forbids us from abandoning our basic moral-societal precept of due process, even when
faithful abidance is extraordinarily dangerous. We must understand that more than
simple liberty is essential to our constitutional government. Rather, we must appreciate
that government ensures liberty as integral to its unalterable duty to be moral. Liberty
is not an end in itself, but a means; preserving morality is the end, the absolute goal of
government. Thus, in a unique figurative sense, the Constitution must be a suicide pact,
for as the prominent ethicist Immanuel Kant nobly appreciated regarding morality’s
overarching context, “Let justice be done even if the world should perish.”15
The proof takes several steps. Part I undertakes a thorough review of deontology,
the philosophy arguing—correctly, I believe—that morality is transcendent, a set of
a priori principles discernable through reason. Morality, then, does not care what the
possible outcomes of a particular moral problem may be.16 Pursuant to deontological
philosophy, the “sacrifice,” to which the title of this Article refers, is the duty to abide
by morality no matter what the cost.17
Thereafter, Part II argues that this Nation’s originators were deontologists who
declared in the Nation’s founding document that government is legitimate only inso-
far as it safeguards morality derived from “the Laws of Nature and Nature’s God,”
manifested as “unalienable Rights that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit
of Happiness.”18 For the preservation of those moral principles, the Founders pledged
their “Lives,” “Fortunes,” and “sacred Honor,”19 meaning that it is the duty of all
Americans—their “sacred Honor”—to sacrifice, if necessary, their lives and property
to defend legitimate government. We thus discover an interesting, informative and
useful provenance linking the sacrifices attendant to deontological morality with the
birth of the United States.20
The Founders understood that their appreciation of, and dedication to, morality
was incomplete—a confession analysts find apt as evinced by the presence of slavery,
15 IMMANUEL KANT, TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER WRITINGS ON POLITICS,
PEACE, AND HISTORY, 102 n.16 (Pauline Kleingeld ed., David L. Colclasure trans., Yale Univ.
Press 2006). Because due process is the core of American justice, of equal relevance is Kant’s
similar warning, “if justice goes, there is no longer any value in men’s living on the earth.”
Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1535, 1540 (1996) (quoting
IMMANUEL KANT, Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right, in THE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS 33, 141 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797)).
16 See infra Part I.
17 Because most ostensible deontologists believe in a Constitution of necessity if the emer-
gency is sufficiently grave and because arguing that outcomes ultimately are irrelevant sounds
peculiar at the very least, the deontology section is methodical and detailed. See infra Part I.
18 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2 (U.S. 1776).
19 Id. at para. 32.
20 Additionally, for fuller understanding, Part II opens with the abstract idea of honor to
preface the meaning of “sacred Honor” under the Declaration. See infra Parts II.A–C.
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along with several other strikingly unethical political and pragmatic arrangements sur-
rounding both the Declaration and its later legal iteration, the Constitution. Indeed, the
Founders expected future generations to enrich the moral bases of America, includ-
ing repudiating ideas and practices that the Founders themselves accepted.21 Part III
asserts that the ethical theory of Immanuel Kant, as contemporarily understood, pre-
sents the improved moral philosophy hoped for by the Founders. Written shortly after
the American Revolution, Kant’s theory of dignity explains why obeying morality is
more important than life itself;22 a principle applicable not only to persons and groups,
but also to nations and societies. Kantian ethics, therefore, explicate that the highest
principle is not survival but, rather, moral rectitude.
Kant’s ideas should control the understanding of the Constitution, most particularly
the commands of due process of law, as Part IV explains. Although never explicitly
cited as authority, Kant’s dignity principle informs modern due process jurisprudence,
which is sensible because the Constitution was drafted to enforce the moral quest
commemorated in the Declaration. The comfortable application of Kantian ethics to
constitutional due process demonstrates that, in the singular sense described above,
the Constitution should be, must be and is a suicide pact.
I. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN DEONTOLOGY AND CONSEQUENTIALISM
It may seem counterintuitive, indeed strange, to argue that abstract principles
matter but, ultimately, consequences do not. Yet, as explained next, deontology is the
correct approach to understanding both the nature and the functions of morals. There-
fore, consequentialism, the philosophy that morality and its applications depend on and
may be comprehended entirely by the consequences they produce, is incorrect. In fact,
as I attempt to show, the initial oddness and discomfort with discarding consequences
as the paradigm for moral decision-making becomes pleasing, even liberating.23
Doubtless, “[t]he referents of both labels [deontology and consequentialism] . . .
are usually caricatures, used to oversimplify philosophical positions for the sake of
convenience and less innocently to provide people with a plausible pretext for reject-
ing ideas they do not understand.”24 Nonetheless, the fundamental dispute of whether
principles must dominate, or are dominated by, consequences continues to fume among
professed deontologists, avowed consequentialists25 and those who espouse hybrid
approaches.26 To prove that the Constitution is a suicide pact, I must begin by verify-
ing the jarring proposition that ultimately consequences do not matter.
21 See infra notes 303–14 and accompanying text.
22 See infra Part III.A.
23 For simplicity’s sake I use as synonymous ethics and morals, and ethical and moral.
24 ALLEN W. WOOD, KANTIAN ETHICS 259 (2008).
25 See, e.g., id. at 259–73 (describing the dispute between consequentialists and deon-
tologists).
26 See, e.g., SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATION OF THE CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING RIVAL MORAL CONCEPTIONS (1982).
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The pivotal disagreement between deontology and consequentialism concerns
whether morality comprises the right—transcendent, compulsory principles applicable
come what may—or the good—the result that produces the most pleasing outcome.27
Deontologists believe in “the rights of rational beings as ends in themselves,”28 while
consequentialists urge that the good is the right.29 Consequentialism, therefore, avers
moral norms are knowable only by assessing and contrasting the consequences—the
effects—of possible actions in a given situation.30 As Professor Blum summarizes,
“Consequentialists maintain that choices are not morally ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in them-
selves, but should instead be assessed solely by virtue of the outcomes they bring about,
that is, by their consequences.”31 Accordingly, consequentialists aver that the proper
consequence—outcome—of any morally uncertain instance is the one that promotes
the greatest good, meaning the greatest happiness.32 “[O]f all the acts that a person can
perform, the [morally] right act is the one that produces the greatest amount of happi-
ness among human beings, counting everyone equally, and taking into account long-
range as well as short-range consequences of actions.”33
Certainly, the quest for happiness animates utilitarianism, “[t]he paradigmatic
strand of consequentialism . . . .”34 The renowned utilitarian John Stuart Mill notably
avowed that the “fundamental value is the general happiness, pleasure, and the
absence of pain, or what Mill also calls the ‘theory of life’ on which the ‘utilitarian
theory of morality’ rests.”35 Consequentialism, as exemplified by classic utilitarianism,
then, “view[s] people as subjects of desires and inclinations and assign[s] value to
their satisfaction as such . . . .”36 It follows that, pursuant to consequentialism,
27 See WOOD, supra note 24, at 261–62.
28 Id. at 265.
29 Id. at 262.
30 In particular, consequentialists generally believe (as do many deontologists) that
“purposiveness, the setting of ends to be produced, is the most fundamental feature of all
action, but [consequentialists] differ . . . in taking this feature also to determine the nature of
the values grounding ethical theory.” Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
31 Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and the “Lesser Evil,” 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 38
n.166 (2010).
32 See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 24, at 262.
33 William Powers, On the Priority of Justice, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1569, 1569 (1985) (review-
ing MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982)) (footnote omitted).
34 Blum, supra note 31, at 38 n.166. Indeed, commentators usually identify utilitarianism
as the most prevalent type of consequentialism. See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, KANT: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 23 (1994); Bailey Kuklin, The Morality of Evolutionarily Self-Interested
Rescues, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 453, 477 (2008); Powers, supra note 33, at 1569–70.
35 WOOD, supra note 24, at 55 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 7 (George
Sher ed., 2001)).
36 R. George Wright, Treating Persons as Ends in Themselves: The Legal Implications of
a Kantian Principle, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 271, 284–85 (2002) (quoting JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES
ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 198 (Barbara Herman ed., 2000)).
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identifying moral duties is empirical, determined by some measurement of individual
or aggregate happiness.37
Not without aptness, critics aver that rebukes are almost a waste of ink because con-
sequentialism is facially implausible.38 Nonetheless, many profound theorists earnestly
tether their deeply held conceptions of what society should be and how people should
interact to the precept that promoting the “good” engenders not only in what is best,
but also what is moral.39 In fact, the current theory of a “Constitution of necessity,”
criticized in the closing portions of this Article,40 espouses the claimed obligation of
the government to take any measures to prevent not only annihilation, but also signif-
icant harm, such as terrorist attacks.41 Citing revered sources such as Thomas Jefferson
and Abraham Lincoln, these proponents argue either that “necessity” renders actions
moral, or that morality is superfluous during periods of necessity.42 When minds as
profound as Jefferson and Lincoln counsel violating due process of law in the face of
arguably grave emergencies and when contemporary American leaders and commenta-
tors brashly rebuff constitutional morality in favor of security, a thorough repudiation
of consequentialism is necessary.43
Deontology avows what consequentialism denies: that morality exists outside
of a humanly created social context of adopted preferred outcomes. “Accordingly,
from a deontological perspective, certain choices are inherently evil and can never
be justified, even if they would bring about a good outcome.”44 Indeed, deontology’s
remarkably terse yet seemingly unassailable rejoinder is that consequentialism, in
whatever form it takes, strips morality of its moral force because no matter how out-
wardly sensible they seem, personal preferences, predilections and desires cannot
prove anything except that such are what the actor believes will bring aggregate
37 “The task of philosophical ethics then becomes the quasi-scientific examination of effec-
tive techniques for maximizing this value.” MURPHY, supra note 34, at 24.
38 See, e.g., Mark Sagoff, The Limits of Justice, 92 YALE L.J. 1065, 1079 (1983) (reviewing
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982)) (arguing that deontolo-
gists “cannot demonstrate the priority of right simply by debunking a notion of the good based
on sheer preference or inclination, a conception so shallow, arbitrary, heteronomous, and mired
in contingency that no one could defend it in the first place.”).
39 See, e.g., id. at 1066.
40 See infra Part IV.
41 See infra Part IV.A; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity,
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257 (2004).
42 See infra notes 167–82, 483–503 and accompanying text.
43 True, most modern theorists eschew pure utilitarianism for more nuanced, refined con-
cepts of the good. This is predicated on societal rather than personal predilection, purportedly
constrained by some communal acknowledgement of obligatory moral directives—a diluted
deontology, if you will. See infra notes 185–205 and accompanying text. But whatever its form,
consequentialism’s paradigmatic insistence that the good dominates the right remains timely,
significantly seductive and fundamentally mistaken.
44 Blum, supra note 31, at 38 n.165.
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happiness, or at least more pleasure than pain.45 Human desire alone may demonstrate
the good but is insufficient to prove the right unless one simply wishes to define
morality as a state of nature—pursuing whatever one wants by whatever means one
wishes.46 Thus, a consequentialist definition of morality is both unremittingly circular
and distressingly self-indulgent.
If it is not a creature of human partiality, then morality must be transcendent: that
is, based on immutable, timeless, universally applicable principles, derivable through
impartial reason, greater than the wants and desires of any given persons, groups,
organizations, or social orders.47 A moral code and attendant applications to particular
situations can be proved or disproved only by unfastening them from the societal forces
of preferences and predilections that might distort the very reasoning process needed
to discern and verify that moral code. Deontology, therefore, is liberating in two vital
ways. First, it frees us from the methodological distortions that socialization may
instill. Second, even if socialization fortuitously inculcates proper moral principles,
deontology provides an impartial process through which adherents can strive to prove
that their morality is true and not merely the product of even profound and momentous
happenstance. Deontology frees us from the enslavement of our life experience.
Consequentialists are correct that deontology’s “damn the consequences” approach
sometimes requires persons to do things that can cause tremendous harm, particularly
to innocents. Perhaps sadly, or perhaps not, keeping faith with morality does not prom-
ise freedom from sorrow. Indeed, only the mentally infirm, incorrigibly villainous and
woefully uninformed would act immorally if morality engendered no serious costs.
Morality’s sole promise is that the moral are upright and steadfast, faithfully fulfill-
ing morality’s imperatives while resisting consequentialist temptations even when the
morality of the moral enables the immorality of the immoral. Accordingly, the only
acceptable reason to be moral is to promote morality itself.48 Consequentialism’s alter-
native is an often understandable, but nonetheless outright, defiance of morality by
either shunning morality in favor of a popular, albeit immoral, outcome or speciously
conflating morality with whatever promotes self-interest, labeled as the greater good.49
45 See Sagoff, supra note 38, at 1068–69.
46 See id. at 1070–71.
47 See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 24, at 37; Thomas L. Pangle, The Philosophic
Understandings of Human Nature Informing the Constitution in CONFRONTING THE
CONSTITUTION: THE CHALLENGE TO LOCKE, MONTESQUIEU, JEFFERSON, AND THE
FEDERALISTS FROM UTILITARIANISM, HISTORICISM, MARXISM, FREUDIANISM, PRAGMATISM,
EXISTENTIALISM . . . 52–53 (Allan Bloom ed., 1990) (discussing Locke and Montesquieu).
48 See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, Hart avec Kant: On the Inseparability of Law and
Morality, 1 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 21, 39–40 (2009).
49 This is an apt point to note a companion denunciation that deontologists are unyielding,
obstinately imposing their moral values on others while consequentialists are reasonable. This
assertion may flow from the mistaken belief that consequentialists are more apt than are deon-
tologists to compromise. Actually, if the consequences are crucial, substantially affecting thou-
sands of lives and millions of dollars, consequentialists are as likely to cling tenaciously to their
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A. Deontology, the Individual, the Group and the Society
Because this Article avers that constitutional due process is deontological, those
principles must pertain not only to individual human actors, but also to humanly created
entities such as groups, organizations, corporations and, in the case of due process,
governments. At first, this proposition seems uncontroversial as we customarily at-
tribute the moral standards of personhood to both official and private associations via
concepts such as professional ethics, national honor or a state’s moral duty.50
Yet, as Professor Blum observed,
Deontology is premised on the notion of individuals as rational
actors. But the degree to which a state can be personified is ques-
tionable, and so is the degree to which we can or should assign
to a state moral prescriptions. If this is so, one could hold that even
though deontology is a sound moral theory for individuals, gov-
ernment morality should be nonetheless outcome-based.51
The supposition that one cannot properly attribute morally relevant qualities of per-
sonhood to complex associations surely is flawed.52 Furthermore, even if attributing
chosen outcomes as deontologists are to clasp their chosen moral precepts. Correspondingly,
no less than deontologists, consequentialists are happy to compel their preferred outcomes, in
effect imposing their moral principles onto unwilling others.
Similarly, some claim that deontologists tend to be somber and stubborn, deficient in both
humility and a healthy sense of irony. Doubtless, some deontologists are just that and worse.
However, consequentialists too may lack those useful refinements. Adamancy, a common char-
acteristic of believing oneself to be right, can lead to humorlessness and exaggerated self-
importance—if one does not maintain perspective. Especially when the cause is cherished,
surely there are as many consequentialists as deontologists who could win gold medals at any
Olympics where sanctimony is a competitive sport.
50 See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard S. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1514 (2000) (“In conventional discourse, we speak with-
out puzzlement about social groups or collective actors having beliefs, emotions, attitudes, goals,
and even characters.”); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (finding
that corporations have full First Amendment political speech rights); Liam Seamus O’Melinn,
Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public Personality of the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 201, 203 (2006).
51 Blum, supra note 31, at 40–41. Along these lines, Professor Elster opined that although
torn by conflicting motivations, it is possible to understand how a given individual accommo-
dated or harmonized those conflicts in a particular situation. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND:
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 168 (2000). By contrast,
“[t]he reason why societies are non-unitary is very different. They are made up of many
individuals, none of whom or no subset of whom is ‘in charge’. . . . Society has neither an ego
nor an id.” Id.
52 Scholars lucidly explain how “[g]roups . . . have all of the mental capacities needed to
have attitudes toward people.” Anderson & Pildes, supra note 50, at 1519. “Margaret Gilbert
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personhood to organizations is problematic, the improbably short rejoinder is: if
human societies are exempt from equivalent deontological restraints, then individuals
can escape their moral duties simply by forming groups authorized to execute, on their
constituents’ behalf, the unethical acts that the constituents as individuals may not
perform. That simply cannot be right.53 Designating human organizations to be un-
affected by deontological mandates renders morality essentially empty, a nullity.
Especially in our industrialized, mass communications, high-technology world, few
individual acts occur without the assistance of numerous human associations, partic-
ularly corporate and governmental.54 These indispensable associations have become
provides a key insight . . . by arguing that certain collectives should be viewed as ‘plural
subjects.’ A group is a plural subject if its members (1) can properly refer to themselves as
‘we,’ and (2) make normative claims upon one another in virtue of their belonging to that
‘we.’” Id. at 1515 (quoting MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 204–05, 380–81 (1989)).
It is not enough that persons happen to be doing something alike or even that they have agreed
to work together, in concert, on one or more given projects to achieve one or more shared goals.
“To count as a ‘we’ . . . each member of the group must further acknowledge a commitment or
obligation to the others to act in concert with them to achieve that goal.” Id. at 1516. Therefore,
all participants must adopt a generally shared group identity that might place the legitimate
aims and means of the group ahead of any given constituent’s preferences. Id. at 1517–18.
This is not to discount the difficulties of identifying the mix of motives, internal and
external influences, and political compromises underlying why a group took one action in lieu
of alternatives. See, e.g., Richard I. Nunez, The Nature of Legislative Intent and the Use of
Legislative Documents as Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Interpretation: A Reexamination, 9 CAL.
W. L. REV. 128, 128 (1972) (arguing that legislative intent is an arguably necessary legal fiction).
Still, the given action itself and the accounts of relevant actors and witnesses can provide suf-
ficiently reliable explanations. A popular example is legislation. While their perceptions and
intent may differ somewhat, each legislator shares with her colleagues at least a general under-
standing of what proposed legislation means, what it is intended to do, and why a reasonable
legislature would pass such a law. Id. at 132–33. As the Supreme Court recently reiterated,
“‘[l]egislative history’ . . . is considered persuasive by some, not because [it] reflect[s] the
general understanding of [any] disputed [statutory] terms, but because the legislators who heard
or read those statements presumably voted with that understanding.” District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008).
Accordingly, we understand the meaning and purposes of enacted law by reviewing the
legislation’s plain language, legislative history and other sources generally accepted as at least
somewhat authoritatively informative. See, e.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068,
1081 (2011); Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005);
Anderson & Pildes, supra note 50, at 1520–23.
53 See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 50, at 1519 (“There is no reason to think that, in
acting together, we become subject to a fundamentally different kind of moral or rational demand
than applies to us when we act independently.”); Fernando R. Tesón, The Kantian Theory of
International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 64 (1992) (“[T]he constitution of the state, an arti-
ficial creation to serve human needs, must embody and incorporate [human morality] . . . .”).
54 As philosopher David Hume noted, “with his characteristic verve, ‘We can form no wish,
which has not a reference to society.’” Peter Brandon Bayer, Not Interaction but Melding—The
“Russian Dressing” Theory of Emotions: An Explanation of the Phenomenology of Emotions
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essential to enforcing moral norms, which means the associations themselves must
derive from moral norms.55 If human associations are not constrained by moral norms,
there is no meaningful role for morality in human society.56
The same, then, must be true for that grandest of associations, the State. As
Professor Fernando Tesón summarized, “[t]he contingent division of the world into
discrete nation-states does not transform political freedom from an ethical imperative
into a mere accident of history.”57 Of course, in certain ways, the state necessarily is
greater than the sum of its members, particularly given that only the state may construct
law and enforce that law through reasonable coercive violence.58 But, that singular
authority must be subject to the same a priori principles of morality that constrain
human beings if we wish to legitimize the state.59 If the only basis to judge government
and corporate actions is consequentialist, then individuals can construct a social order
as they would a nightclub—for their revelry and entertainment; and, as they would
their coats, check their moral duties at the front door as unnecessary in that context and
circumstance. Thus, the State’s “moral standing” must be that of a social actor, not a
“community . . . hold[ing] a preeminent position at the expense of the individual.”60
Consequently, no government is legitimate that fails to conform to the moral impera-
tives required of persons when interacting with others.61
B. Morality’s Nature and Purpose Is to Oppose Evil
Understanding that morality is both a priori and applicable to all endeavors pursued
by individuals and the groups of which they are a part, we next must discern: What is
and Rationality with Suggested Related Maxims for Judges and Other Legal Decision Makers,
52 MERCER L. REV. 1033, 1053 (2001) (quoting DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE,
BOOK II 112 (Pall S. Ardal ed., 1972)).
55 LESLIE ARTHUR MULHOLLAND, KANT’S SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 304–05 (1990); see also
Tesón, supra note 53, at 64.
56 As Jefferson aptly summarized, “[w]hat is true of every member of the society individ-
ually, is true of them all collectively, since the rights of the whole can be no more than the sum
of the rights of the individuals.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6,
1789), in 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON
AND JAMES MADISON 1776–1826, at 632 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995).
57 Tesón, supra note 53, at 82–83.
58 See infra notes 431–40 and accompanying text.
59 Tesón, supra note 53, at 70–71 (discussing how Immanuel Kant did not “conceive of the
state in a holistic way as a moral person, with rights and duties above and beyond the indi-
viduals who make up the state.”); see also DAVID RODIN, WAR AND SELF DEFENSE 184–85
(2002). In his fascinating, intricate book, Professor Rodin argues that nations are constrained
by Kantian morality, which includes the right of national self-defense that substantially mirrors
individual self-defense. Id. at 107–18.
60 Tesón, supra note 53, at 71.
61 See THOMAS E. HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT’S MORAL THEORY
61–62 (1992); see also infra Parts II.D–F.
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morality? As often occurs, defining primary concepts is as hard, or harder, than explain-
ing how those basic ideas apply in complex situations. Indeed, the noted moral theorist
Professor Bernard Gert lamented, “What is morality? This question seems as if it could
be answered by any intelligent person until he actually tries to answer it. Then a funny
thing happens. If you start by saying, ‘Morality is . . .’ nothing you say afterwards
seems quite right.”62 But in summary: purposeful human action promotes either evil
or morality, the former being inherently wicked and unjust, the latter being inherently
decent and right. Evil is the concept of all things that are wrongful to inflict on others,
no matter whom, no matter where, no matter why we wish to do so. Morality is the set
of principles that alert us to what acts are or are not wicked; that is, evil either immu-
tably or, to borrow a legal term, “as applied”63 in given circumstances.64
Morality, therefore, is exemplified by an anti-consequentialist imperative.65 As
Kant stated bluntly, “The concept of an external right is derived from the concept
of freedom in the external relation of human beings to each other. This concept has
nothing at all to do with . . . a desire for happiness, nor has it anything to do with the
means of achieving such happiness.”66 Rather, morality is the claim one person may
demand of others, based not on that person’s actual goodness, but solely on her status
as a human being regardless of whether her behavior makes her worthy or unworthy of
admiration.67 Professor Korsgaard astutely expressed morality’s anti-consequentialist
confrontation of evil in terms of the subject: “Deontological reasons are reasons for
an agent to do or avoid certain actions. They do not spring from the consequences of
those actions, but rather from the claims of those with whom we interact to be treated
by us in certain ways.”68
Therefore, as the category of principles understood to identify and, we hope, to
prevent “evil,” morality does not maximize or even per se promote the “good” in the
62 BERNARD GERT, MORALITY: ITS NATURE AND JUSTIFICATION 3 (2005).
63 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 893–94 (2010); Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (explaining that “as applied”
means the law is reviewed not for its general meaning, but how it applies to the specific facts
of the particular litigation).
64 Morality’s singular role in human existence is to “prohibit acting in those ways that
cause or increase the likelihood of someone suffering an evil.” GERT, supra note 62, at 344.
“Morality has the goal of lessening the amount of evil or harm suffered.” Id. at 13; see also
id. at 8–14 (discussing morality’s role).
65 Id. at 9 (criticizing the “widespread but mistaken philosophical view that morality is
primarily about what is the best state of affairs.”); see also id. at 17; Blum, supra note 31,
at 38 n.165.
66 MURPHY, supra note 34, at 106. (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, CONCERNING THE SAYING:
THAT MAY BE TRUE IN THEORY BUT NOT IN PRACTICE 289 (Berlin, Royal Prussian Academy,
1793)).
67 Brad Hooker, Griffin on Human Rights, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 193, 194 (2010)
(reviewing JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2008)).
68 CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 291 (1996).
2011] SACRIFICE AND SACRED HONOR 301
sense that “good” means what people want, what makes them happy, what makes them
comfortable or even what precludes their pain. Rather, at its core, morality claims that
in their many and varied social interactions, persons may expect and, correspondingly,
must behave in ways that do not inflict the suffering of evil. Morality, then, does not
promise freedom from harm, but pursues freedom from evil.69
The foregoing definition is deontological in its basic idea that morality must exist
transcending the beliefs or preferences that one or another individual or group would
pronounce as its particular ethics.70 Rather, there is an inevitable eternality attribut-
able to correct moral norms:71 “Since moral judgments can be made about all rational
persons, it follows that morality is universal and that what seem to be different moral
systems are simply specifications or variations of a universal morality or moral
system.”72 As Kant similarly explained, there is “truth in all possible worlds . . . .
[The knowledge of this truth] does not come solely from experience. We do not
discover what is true for all possible worlds merely by observing what is true in one
actual world.”73
Because transcendent ethical precepts cannot be gleaned solely through experience,
morality is comprehensible only through reason, specifically, sensible persons employ-
ing an accurate reasoning process to discern applicable moral norms.74 Furthermore,
because reason demands that individual preferences ultimately be disentangled from the
69 The reader understandably may now be wondering whether there is a definition of, or
some explicating act, which encapsulates or frames the concept of evil so that we might know
what specific acts are or are not evil. As earlier noted, at this juncture I seek to explain the
concept of deontology in the hope that the reader will accept that approach as correct over
consequentialism. Nonetheless, as a very brief preface, I join many others who accept as the
primary moral command, Immanuel Kant’s “dignity theory,” which requires always respecting
the inherent dignity of human beings, whatever the costs. See infra Parts III.A–B.
70 E.g., WOOD, supra note 24, at 5 (discussing Kant).
71 Professor Powers expressed the indispensability of immutability for any theory:
Every theory must presuppose something to get off the ground; no
convention or practice can justify itself. . . . All practices, conventions,
and theories require grounding on a distinct, external convention or
practice, which in turn requires its own justification or presupposition.
Moral discourse is not unique here; all intellectual disciplines are un-
grounded in this sense.
Powers, supra note 33, at 1583.
72 GERT, supra note 62, at 4.
73 MURPHY, supra note 34, at 14 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
1 (Berlin, Royal Prussian Academy 1793)).
74 E.g., GERT, supra note 62, at 3–6, 344; see also infra notes 331–36 and accompanying
text. That is the reason why morality is not religion: “[E]very feature of morality must be
known to, and [can] be chosen by, all rational persons. No religion is known to all rational
persons, and all religions have some feature that could not be chosen by all rational persons.”
GERT, supra note 62, at 6. Commonly, religions espouse that no person can understand God
fully for to do so would make that person as able as God. By contrast, theoretically at least, one
could understand morality completely through reason.
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reasoning process, impartiality—the absence of personal prejudice supporting or oppos-
ing particular outcomes—is essential for resolving moral issues.75 If the moral outcome
coincidentally comports with the actor’s accumulated prejudices and preferences, so
much the better; but, the actor cannot allow her biases to skew the analysis thereby
attaining her preferred result. Thus, the core of consequentialism—choosing among
outcomes based on whatever makes us happiest—cannot validate a purported moral
code because the appeal to “happiness” implies that self-interest, not neutrality, domi-
nates the analytical process.
The foregoing analysis confirms our earlier assertion: while socialization fortu-
itously may indoctrinate pristine morality, proof that such espoused morality is correct
requires eschewing the goals, purposes, and preferences of the individuals, groups, and
organizations that collectively supply the bits and pieces from which consequentialists
select and apply their moral norms.76 Consequentialist explanations are not justifiable
on any basis other than preference and convenience.77 In fact, consequentialism con-
dones, indeed arguably requires, malevolent behavior if evil best fosters happiness.78
To offer, perhaps, too easy examples, if killing Jews because they are Jews is im-
moral, such killing is not evil exclusively within liberal cultures accepting that moral
precept. It simply is evil. If husbands act immorally by violently forcing sex on unwill-
ing spouses, such rape is not wicked only for societies that recognize the personhood
of wives. Rather, spousal sexual assault is morally wrong even if a particular society
75 Id. at 6–7, 130–36. Although partiality will taint analysis whether given acts are moral,
the morally appropriate answer to a particular problem might permit the actor to act partially.
For instance, we generally agree that when grading papers teachers ought not to favor or dis-
favor individual students based on attractiveness or other matters that are extraneous to the
quality of the graded papers. But, we generally approve if teachers spend more of their limited
time counseling weaker rather than stronger students. That form of arguable partiality is con-
sistent with morally acceptable, although not morally obligatory, pedagogy that the weaker
students are in greater need of the teacher’s professional help. Id. at 131.
76 E.g., WOOD, supra note 24, at 48–49 (describing how individuals and groups must weigh
competing principles, values, and considerations of which there is no priority). Certainly, the
case for deontology does not imply that any given individual is preordained to embrace certain
teachings based on that person’s unique confluence of social interactions. Socialization is neither
a unilateral, nor a uniform, nor a harmonious process. Faced with incomplete and contradictory
information from different individuals, groups and organizations, persons weigh and sift, con-
sider and analyze, to discern for themselves which meanings and teachings they wish to accept.
See, e.g., Bayer, supra note 54, at 1053–57.
77 Of course, and of great consequence, preferences and biases are perfectly legitimate
considerations in societal projects and pursuits, so long as they raise no moral predicaments.
Societal accommodation of conflicting but morally acceptable proclivities is one useful under-
standing of the rightly cherished concept “pursuit of happiness,” which is part of the definition
of Americanism. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972).
Indeed, a common deontological tenet is “an individual is free, within the constraints of justice,
to determine for himself what is good and to act in what he perceives to be his own self-interest.”
Powers, supra note 33, at 1570; see also infra notes 438–39 and accompanying text.
78 GERT, supra note 62, at 9–10; WOOD, supra note 24, at 5, 48–49.
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believes that a husband has a societal or religious right to ravage his wife. And, if tor-
turing a terrorist suspect is immoral, then no noble motive, such as saving thousands of
lives, renders torture ethical. In sum, if X is immoral, it is always immoral, no matter
how much a given person or group believes, teaches and wants it to be otherwise.79
For the forgoing reasons, consequentialism is incorrect; morality is deontological.
C. Maxims and Morality’s “Value Monism”
Of utmost importance within any deontological system are discrete maxims,
principles, standards, or edicts that form a harmonious interrelationship.80 “Qualified
moral maxims . . . must satisfy the coherence requirement. That is, the set of adopted
moral maxims must be consistent with one another, so that a person is able to satisfy
them all simultaneously.”81 Thus, morality is a schema or system comprised substan-
tially of distinct yet interrelated and congruous precepts appropriate alone or in com-
bination to discrete situations.82
That morality entails interplay among distinct, specific moral precepts is hardly
contentious. The pragmatic task of ethical norms is to guide personal conduct—to in-
struct not whether possible actions in a given situation are particularly wise, clever,
helpful, or efficient, but, rather, whether they are right, that is whether they are moral.
As Kant prudently explained,
The moral world ‘is a mere idea, though at the same time a prac-
tical idea, which really can have, as it also ought to have, an in-
fluence upon the sensible world, to bring that world, so far as may
be possible, into conformity with the idea. The idea of a moral
world has, therefore, objective reality . . . .’83
That morality as “a mere idea,” the precepts and duties of which are conditional—
depending on given facts one precept may supersede another—neither evinces intrinsic
indeterminacy, nor undermines morality’s transcendence, nor invites consequentialist
solutions. It is perfectly plain that different situations support different moral conclu-
sions. Indeed, as little as one altered fact can change a possible action from moral to
79 E.g., Christine M. Korsgaard, The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil, 15 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 322, 328–30 (1986) (describing universalization of immoral maxims).
80 Kuklin, supra note 34, at 501–02.
81 Id. (footnote omitted); see also, WOOD, supra note 24, at 165 (discussing argument that
certain moral duties are conditional and may be trumped by other moral duties depending on
the situation).
82 Kuklin, supra note 34, at 501–02.
83 E.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 472, 487
n.49 (1987) (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON *A808/B836 (N. Smith
trans., 1965) (1797)).
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immoral or vice versa.84 Morality nicely understands the difference between homicide
and self-defense, the difference between denying full contract rights to minors and
denying full contract rights to African American adults, and the difference between
X and Y. That the moral resolution of a particular dilemma depends on unique facts
accords with, rather than negates, the reality that for every moral inquiry there is a
correct answer, which must be based on eternal principles of right and wrong.
Crucially, any “correct answer” depends on the “harmony” that must exist among
moral maxims.85 Accordingly, there must be some source of harmony; that is, all
separate ethical norms must cohere through one overarching, unifying concept that
serves as the pivot for resolving any moral quandary. Absent such unification, we have
no basis to know whether, or how, moral precepts apply in any given situation. For
example, understanding why murder, but not self-defense, is immoral requires some
paradigmatic idea explaining when taking a life is not evil.86 Thus, managing discrete
moral rules and their functions requires a foundational conception—a paradigmatic
idea, morality’s elementary particle that enables, delineates, invigorates and clarifies the
entire moral philosophy.87 Professor Wood calls this “value monism,” the proposition
that morality ultimately is premised on a single basic value:
An ultimate plurality of values leaves us not only with incommen-
surable values but also with a plurality of values between which
there is in principle no way of establishing any priorities . . . Value
monism is necessary to provide even a context for making com-
parisons between different values, however the comparisons may
come out.88
84 WOOD, supra note 24, at 67–68, 162–65. Kant illustrated by identifying
[w]ide or imperfect duties [that] succumb to strict or perfect duties; for
example, the wide duty to aid a stranger is overridden by the duty not to
let my parents starve . . . and you must testify truthfully in court even if
a lie would help your benefactor (and thus fulfill a wide duty of gratitude).
Id. at 164 (discussing Kantian morality); see also Kuklin, supra note 34, at 501–02.
85 See Kuklin, supra note 34, at 501–02.
86 See RODIN, supra note 59, at 70–99 (describing the story of the Tutsi brothers—one
kills the other with the consent of the killed brother. Rodin uses this story to demonstrate when
taking a life is not evil.). That same overarching concept would elucidate as well, for example,
why abridging contract rights on the basis of race but not on the basis of childhood is unethical.
87 Exactly what is the primary moral principle—the elementary particle—from which other
moral precepts spring is discussed in Part III regarding Kantian honor safeguarding innate
human dignity. Furthermore, we shall see in Part IV that due process is the Constitution’s
primary particle that is becoming, and should be, understood in terms of Kantian morality.
88 WOOD, supra note 24, at 59 (discussing that Kant and Mill agreed that moral theory
requires value monism). Wood explicated, “A moral rule or principle may very well be con-
ditional in other ways without affecting its categorical status. The supreme principle of morality
admits of no conditions or exceptions, of course, because there is nothing higher by reference
to which conditions or exceptions could be justified.” Id. at 67–68.
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D. The Indisputable Value of Experience and of Evaluating Anticipated
Consequences
Contrary to a frequent criticism by consequentialists, deontologists fully appreciate
that contemplating the experience of one’s life is a formative step in the process of dis-
covering and applying moral precepts.89 The pursuit of timeless morality does not re-
quire deontology to ignore “all empirical facts about the world, including all facts about
human beings, as irrelevant to explaining the nature of morality.”90 Certainly, deon-
tologists can, and often do, acknowledge that reflecting on experiences—pondering the
lessons taught through socialization—arouses the search for understanding.91 Kant
likewise recognized that, “Though all of our knowledge begins with experience, it does
not follow that it all arises out of experience.”92 Kant knew that moral imperatives may
be pointless absent choosing goals and means that require moral validation but are in-
fluenced by socialization.93 Professor Murphy put it drolly, “Kant sees that both ratio-
nalism and empiricism have an important story to tell, but that each exaggerates.”94
Accordingly, we may challenge the common critique, directed especially at Kant,
that a priori morality “speaks only abstractly about human conduct. It fails to lay down
determinate principles of moral behavior.”95 Certainly, overarching deontological prin-
ciples are abstract and necessarily so; otherwise, they would supply no basis upon
89 See id. at 261.
90 GERT, supra note 62, at 241.
91 See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 24, at 261 (explaining that “locating basic values in states
of affairs to be brought about does not preclude a method of moral reasoning that places
emphasis on conformity to the right moral rules”).
92 MURPHY, supra note 34, at 14 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
1 (2d ed. 1787)); see WOOD, supra note 24, at 58 (comparing Kant’s and Mill’s perspectives
on the role of knowledge).
93 WOOD, supra note 24, at 68. “Kant sensibly recognizes that the duty of [morality] . . .
cannot be determined by a precise universal rule, because context and circumstance play im-
portant roles. The exercise of judgment is necessary to decide particular cases.” Wright, supra
note 36, at 278 (discussing IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 156 (Mary
Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (1797)).
94 MURPHY, supra note 34, at 9.
95 Powers, supra note 33, at 1573; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS
OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 6–7, 19 (1999); Jason Brennan, Beyond the Bottom Line: the
Theoretical Aims of Moral Theorizing, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 278 (2008) (discussing
Posner’s arguments). Deontologists do not dispute that our chosen preferences and beliefs “give
individuals identity and character; they reflect what they are, not just what they want.” Sagoff,
supra note 38, at 1070 (questioning the humanity of deontology) (emphasis added). Kant and
other deontologists understand, indeed celebrate, that selecting “personal ends,” is integral to
attaining personal identity, uniqueness and satisfaction. See, e.g., HILL, supra note 61, at 47;
Wright, supra note 36, at 280–81. Indeed, Kant never denied that, “purposiveness, the setting
of ends to be produced, is the most fundamental feature of all action . . . .” WOOD, supra note
24, at 259. But, goals and means must be moral; and, morality is prior to the good.
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which to discern specific applications. That one may espouse a paradigm that is both
conceptual and indecipherable is not a condemnation of deontology, but an indictment
of the philosopher. We seek, therefore, common, comprehensible principles to pro-
vide the structure of moral meaning while understanding that only through the inter-
cession of personal experiences and human conditions can we discern the application
of distinct, abstract moral norms and duties.96
E. Can We Reason and If So, Can We Reason Impartially?
We now understand that morality must be discerned, if at all, by a reasoning
process that eschews personal biases and prejudices. Such reasoning requires self-
consciousness coupled with the facility for critical analysis of oneself, of others and
of ideas.97 Accordingly, at this juncture we should confront the apparently limited
capacity of human beings both to reason and to act impartially.98 Of course, deontolo-
gists are not blind to human reality. Immanuel Kant, perhaps the most celebrated of the
deontological rationalists, understood that “human beings are not fully rational beings;
they are, rather, creatures of limited knowledge and self-restraint.”99 Therefore, while
morality exists a priori, many philosophers accept that individuals’ perceptions and
understanding of a priori subjects tend to be distorted by the physical and interpretive
96 Weinrib, supra note 83, at 505–06.
Any conceptual system is necessarily indeterminate. A concept is a
universal, that is, something general that applies to the many particular
instances falling under it. One invokes a concept not to produce a full
enumeration of its instances but to clarify them by reference to the com-
mon category to which they belong. Particulars are what they are because
they present themselves to our understanding in a variety of forms; they
always contain something contingent with respect to their universal.
Id. In this regard, Professor Carlson’s précis is exactly right: if the universal is only realized
in discrete acts, “[t]he particular is never actualized separate and apart from the universal.”
Carlson, supra note 48, at 40.
97 One author succinctly defined that essential capacity as “having the ability and unremitting
drive to reflect upon one’s own existence and place in the world.” Daniel R. Williams, After
the Gold Rush Part II: Hamdi, the Jury Trial, and Our Degraded Public Sphere, 113 PENN
ST. L. REV. 55, 57 n.7 (2008); see also Thomas P. Crocker, Overcoming Necessity: Torture
and the State of Constitutional Culture, 61 SMU L. REV. 221, 269 (2008) (presenting the
view of humans as autonomous individuals possessing free choice).
98 GERT, supra note 62, at 136–37 (describing moral impartiality). I address these concerns
as part of the overall discussion of deontology; however, they are applicable equally to this
work’s specific review of Immanuel Kant’s moral theories. See infra Part III. Therefore, the
resolutions offered here likewise pertain to the upcoming discussion of Kantian ethics and will
not be repeated therein.
99 MURPHY, supra note 34, at 104; see Carlson, supra note 48, at 36 n.64 (“Kant con-
cedes that neither the actor nor an observer can be sure if the action proceeds out of [rational,
unbiased] duty alone.”) (quoting George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 533, 538 (1987)).
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facets of human understanding.100 The potential for mishap always exists when “[t]he
subject adds time and space to . . . [that] which itself is neither temporal nor spatial.”101
In particular, inclinations are the culprits regarding one of the most notorious claims
asserted by many philosophers, a position firmly associated with Kant: human emotions
impede reason.102 The argument goes that regarding things transcendent, emotions
threaten disorder because they stimulate personal inclinations, enticing individuals to
satisfy their purely internal, selfish desires regardless of whether doing so promotes or
confounds their moral duties to others.103 Worse yet, emotions can make us delusional,
mistakenly believing that our choices were grounded in rational morality rather than
sentiment.104 As Professor Carlson summarized, “The problem is that I never know
whether my acts are from the moral law or from some pathological inclination.”105
The issue of whether emotions distort the reasoning process is quite academic,
however, because understanding ideas and ascribing meaning or value to any object,
concept or event is impossible outside of a realm of emotions. That is how human
beings operate. Science and much philosophy establish that persons understand the
worth of things—assign meaning—not by emotions alone, not by reason alone, but by
an immutable interplay of emotions and reason—what we might call an emotional-
rational process.106 Only the tweak of emotions can inform us whether we have prop-
erly employed our rational capacities. Conversely, only reason allows us to construe
our emotions—that is, appreciate why we feel what we are feeling.107 Accordingly,
100 “There is always the danger that some natural defect in the perspectival mechanism—
eyes, ears, etc.—have presented a distorted view of the thing.” Carlson, supra note 48, at 35.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 38–39; see also, e.g., John Lawrence Hill, Exploitation, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
631, 674–75 (1994). In this regard, no person can ever truly know whether she acted from
pure moral duty or whether she allowed her preferences and predilections to distort, to some
degree, her true moral obligation. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 48, at 61–62.
Certainly, emotions are not invariably inappropriate to the entire domain of human
interactions. Deontologists, including Kant, believe that emotions play a significant and legiti-
mate role in the many aspects of human behavior where morality is not problematic. Within the
huge realm of morally satisfactory choices, what in subsequent discussion we will equate with
the Founders’ designation in the Declaration of Independence as “the pursuit of Happiness,”
emotions and the inclinations they inspire suitably influence persons to choose among com-
peting goals and actions. See WOOD, supra note 24, at 35; Bayer, supra note 54, at 1058–76.
103 Kant argued that, “an action from [moral] duty is to put aside entirely the influence of
inclination and with it every object of the will; hence there is left for the will nothing that could
determine it except objectively the law . . . .” Carlson, supra note 48, at 38 (quoting IMMANUEL
KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 4:400 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
1997) (1797)).
104 Id. at 35–39.
105 Id. at 81.
106 See generally, Bayer, supra note 54 (discussing interpretation through emotions and
rationality).
107 Id. at 1046, 1058–76.
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perhaps most famously among others, the philosopher David Hume essentially was
right that absent the interplay of an emotional-rational process human beings cannot
attain understanding.108 Therefore, persons are incapable of pure rationality while
remaining human.109
Indeed, although he rebuffed Hume’s delight over the indispensability of human
emotion, Kant acknowledged that people are not capable of strict rationality.110
Deontologists should understand that passions—emotions—are both essential and
inevitable for the generation of conscious human action.111 This leads some theorists
mordantly to deduce, “We can only hope and flatter ourselves that our narrative about
rule-following is true.”112
108 Id. at 1046, 1058–59 (discussing DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE,
BOOK II 155–56 (Pall S. Ardal, ed., Fontana/Collins 1972)); see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 68 (1995) (“Intellect without
emotion is, we might say, value-blind . . . .”). For example, Hume argued that although a prob-
lem in mathematics may be solvable purely through mathematical reason, neither “the act of
solving [nor] the solution itself could be meaningful to the actor without appeal to passion.”
Bayer, supra note 54, at 1059 (citing DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, BOOK II
155 (Pall S. Ardal, ed., Fontana/Collins 1972)).
A merchant might accurately balance her financial books, but the meaning of such an act
requires the interplay of reason and emotion. She may feel numerous emotions that she under-
stands by reasoning and then tests the validity of her reasoning by her emotional responses and
the meaning she derives therefrom.
Suppose, for instance, the merchant is both happy and sad after balancing her books. She
proceeds to reason why she so feels and concludes that she is happy because (1) she properly
balanced her books, thus she accomplished her task, and (2) she made a profit. She further
deduces that she feels sad, perhaps angry, because, although she made more money than she
spent, her profit margin was less than she expected; therefore, she feels she failed somewhat
as a merchant. Next, she tests her conclusions by her emotional response. If she feels happy,
she may reason that she correctly analyzed her emotions regarding balancing her books. If she
feels angry, depressed or otherwise unhappy, she may conclude that her first assessment of her
emotions was flawed and needs to be revamped.
109 For a discussion of how emotions are physiologically necessary to the thinking process
of the human brain, see ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND
EMOTIONS IN THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1999) and ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’
ERROR (1994).
110 MURPHY, supra note 34, at 104. In fact, much of Kant’s writing was greatly inspired
by and is a rejoinder to Hume. WOOD, supra note 24, at 39, 55–57 (comparing the moral
theories of Kant and Hume). Kant famously stated that Hume woke him from his “dogmatic
slumbers.” Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Contingency and Contracts: A Philosophy of Complex
Business Transactions, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1077, 1125–26 n.236 (2005) (citing Immanuel
Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, in THE PHILOSOPHER’S HANDBOOK 389
(Stanley Rosen ed., 2000)).
111 See, e.g., Bayer, supra note 54, at 1058–76 (discussing the connection between emotions
and reason); Carlson, supra note 48, at 39–40.
112 Carlson, supra note 48, at 61. Professor Carlson continued his lamentation, “reason cannot
logically rule out freedom from reason. Accordingly, the rationality of our acts is ultimately a
fantasy, a story we tell ourselves that can never [be] verified empirically.” Id. at 61–62.
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One may respond forcefully that such theory simply presumes that emotions are
hostile to reason. We might as well similarly argue that the respiratory system is infirm
because breathing properly relies on other bodily functions, such as blood circulation.
Breathing does not exist only as an abstract idea; people breathe because of, not despite,
the reality that breathing requires other physiological systems (just as those other func-
tions likewise depend upon breathing). Similarly, if as part of the emotional-rational
process, emotions can sway us to eschew morality, so too can they press us to spurn
impure desires that otherwise would influence our judgment. The same domain of emo-
tions telling us that we want something can stoutly alert us not to pursue that partic-
ular thing, should either the thing itself or the means to attain that thing be immoral.113
The trick is using our emotional-rational process to recognize and to suppress our
prejudices—our hope for the particular outcome we favor—and to compel us, rather,
to seek only the moral course, no matter how unpleasant we deem that course to be.
Furthermore, even if emotions always initially skew reasoning to at least some
extent, a plausible interpretation holds that persons nonetheless retain a significant
and sufficient “capacity” to reason—a familiar, comfortable idea that experience
teaches rings true.114 The celebrated theorist Ernest J. Weinrib explained, “[T]he pur-
posive being—although affected by inclination . . . is not determined by inclination
and is therefore not in the coercive grip of any particular representation or object of
desire. . . . [Persons can] determine choice by virtue of the ability to universalize and
not by virtue of the particular content of choice.”115
If so stirred, we attain our chosen goals through such means as are permissible
within the bounds of morality. This “characteristically Enlightenment . . . conception
of human nature and human psychology,”116 explains why deontology is both work-
able and, contrary to some criticism, highly reverential towards human beings. It fully
embraces liberalism’s prime directives—that one must think for oneself, one is respon-
sible for one’s “actions and convictions,” and that, while one must consider advice and
counsel, one cannot place the fault of one’s own action on others.117 By demanding and
expecting integrity, deontology accords human beings considerably more respect than
does consequentialism, which in the last analysis encourages persons simply to do as
they like, no matter how ostensibly cloaked in ethics particular consequences may be.118
Liberal deontology’s view of human capacity is completely satisfactory, conven-
tional and roundly accepted, as it should be. Professor Carlson condensed the practical
113 For example, emotions such as anger, unhappiness and desperation might be part of the
reasoning sequence leading a person to consider crime. Yet those or other emotions—possibly
shame and guilt—as part of the same internal emotional-reasoning course might sound a sharp
alarm to warn against trading moral uprightness for some immoral immediate gratification.
See generally Bayer, supra note 54.
114 See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 83, at 483–84.
115 Id. at 483 (emphasis added).
116 WOOD, supra note 24, at 4.
117 Id. at 3.
118 This Article addresses various types of consequentialism. See infra Part I.I.
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competence of deontology—deontology’s constructive applicability to our daily lives—
with fitting humor: “Every human act is smeared with [emotion induced] pathology.
But it is likewise true that every human act is smeared with morality.”119
Of equal importance, whether or not emotions prevent us from reasoning perfectly
is completely irrelevant to whether transcendent morality exists because our inability
to find something does not mean that thing is nonexistent.120 Professor Waldron offered
as a “plausible interpretation” that, “[t]he trouble with the application of . . . principles
is not that, in theory, no right answers exist, but that there [may be] no basis common
to the parties for determining which answers are right.”121 Even accepting that the
human enterprise to understand enduring morality inevitably is flawed, the alternative
of denying morality’s transcendence panders to pure self-indulgence, very possibly well
intended, but informed solely by the happenstance of one’s socialization and genetic
tendencies. Human imperfection neither disproves the everlastingness of morality nor
absolves us from understanding as fully as possible what morality requires.122
119 Carlson, supra note 48, at 40.
120 See Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
277, 312 (1985) (distinguishing the realist from the skeptic); Michael Moore, Moral Reality,
1982 WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1109 (1982) (discussing factual and moral belief). Discussing the
possible legitimacy of torture, Professor Moore noted by analogy “the medieval worry of how
many stones make a heap. Our uncertainty whether it takes three, or four, or five, etc., does not
justify us in thinking that there are no such things as heaps.” Larry Alexander, Deontology
at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 896 (2000) (quoting MICHAEL S. MOORE,
PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 724 (1997)).
121 Waldron, supra note 15, at 1550 (emphasis added). As Cassius explained to his brother,
“The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, But in ourselves . . .” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR act I, sc. 2, ll. 140–49 (Arthur D. Innes ed., 1915).
122 See HILL, supra note 61, at 40–41, 207–08; WOOD, supra note 24, at 67; Tesón, supra
note 53, at 75–76.
It is worth adding briefly that inevitable imperfection haunts consequentialism as well
as deontology. Consequentialist conclusions must be based on conjecture—quite possibly
sincere, informed, thoughtful conjecture, but estimation nonetheless; and, the given conjecture
may be wrong. See Blum, supra note 31, at 44 n.195, 45.
Utilitarianism, which was supposed to be the most precise and hard-
headed of moral arguments, turns out to be the most speculative and
arbitrary. For we have to assign values where there is no agreed valuation,
no recognized hierarchy of value, no market mechanism for determining
the positive or negative worth of different acts and outcomes.
Id. at 44 n.194 (quoting MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR 38 (2004)); see also Cass
R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care? 60 STAN.
L. REV. 155, 181–82 (2007) (discussing how judges’ own beliefs affect their rulings).
Similarly, empirical errors can corrupt a consequentialist resolution. To list just a few: an
investigator may have misperceived what would make any given subject truly happy or sad. Or,
the subject may have misstated her preferences to the investigator. Or, the subject may be un-
aware that her own unconscious drives have distorted her conscious understanding of what truly
would make her happy. Similarly, the investigator may be unaware that her own unconscious
drives have distorted her conscious understanding of what truly would make the subject happy.
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The foregoing rejoinder to the contention that our limited rational capacities
makes moral analysis fatally flawed applies nicely to our capacity to reason impartially.
Society and its system of justice accept that persons bring to their social roles accu-
mulated prejudices which, with human effort, they can appreciate and place in proper
perspective. To cite a familiar example, during the course of any judicial business, we
expect judges adequately to apprehend and ameliorate any improper influence caused
by their respective accumulated predispositions.123
True, human imperfection almost certainly precludes absolute confidence, but
experience and reason show that we can perceive one another’s meanings with suf-
ficient accuracy. Despite infirm or incomplete comprehension, we successfully can
fulfill tasks and projects while trying to avoid past errors.124 With proper effort, we
do well enough.125
F. Why Must We Be Moral?
Understanding that morality is deontological and that morality combats evil
answers the related vital question: “Why should [we] be moral?”126 To ask “why be
moral” is reasonable because, as consequentialists correctly stress, moral systems for-
bid some acts that persons, groups, even societies might otherwise want to perform
to make them happy, to promote their immediate benefit or to avert severe sorrow.127
Selfishness is an inadequate explanation for moral behavior, especially when act-
ing morally contradicts self-interest. This is aside from the too-generalized argument
123 Indeed, the Supreme Court repeatedly admonishes that a judge or jury must “judge a
case, as due process requires, impartially, unswayed by outside influences.” Skilling v. United
States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2913 (2010) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006)
(stating that a judge must disqualify him/herself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.”); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267
(2009) (Roberts, C.J. dissenting) (“All judges take an oath to uphold the Constitution and apply
the law impartially, and we trust that they will live up to this promise.”); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 273 (1941); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 380 (1821).
Of course, the moral judgments that come packaged as immediately felt solutions to par-
ticular problems are not per se incorrect. A “jumped-to” conclusion may be the right one; thus,
our responsibility is to scrutinize such conclusions with particular skepticism, worrying that
they may be more convenient and comfortable than correct. As the Supreme Court explained
in a capital case, “It is neither possible nor desirable for a person to whom the State entrusts an
important judgment to decide in a vacuum, as if he had no experiences.” Barclay v. Florida,
463 U.S. 939, 950 (1983).
124 See FREDERICK L. BATES, SOCIOPOLITICAL ECOLOGY: HUMAN SYSTEMS AND
ECOLOGICAL FIELDS 7–8 (1997); Bayer, supra note 54, at 1053–56 (discussing scholarship
on the process of learning in various societal contexts).
125 In this regard, one is reminded of the Baptist minister who, when asked, “Do you believe
in full immersion baptism?” replied, “Believe in it? I’ve seen it!”
126 GERT, supra note 62, at 338.
127 Id. at 339.
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that, in comparison with other self-interests that may be in play, it always is in one’s
overarching self-interest to be moral. That only begs, not answers the question.128
Similarly, guilt, or the avoidance of guilt, cannot explain morality’s imperative. Not
all wicked persons feel guilt; and, even if they did, feelings of guilt may not be suf-
ficient to prompt morality—especially, if the actor calculates that her remorse is out-
balanced by the benefits of her immoral behavior.129
Rather, the reason morality is essential stems, as it must, from its very nature.130
[M]oral rules prohibit acting in those ways that cause or in-
crease the likelihood of someone suffering an evil. This provides
a ready-made answer to the question why a person should be
moral, namely that he will cause or increase the likelihood of
someone suffering some harm or evil if he is not. . . . [T]his is a
moral answer to the question “Why should I be moral?” As such,
it should apply in all cases rather than merely generally.131
Concurrently, not doing evil “is [the] reason for actually being moral rather than only
seeming to be so.”132 Based on understanding morality, rather than on, say, faith or
hope, we accept that we may not cause, nor even risk, inappropriate injury by placing
others in wrongful harm’s way.133
G. The Essential Aspect of Sacrifice
I now raise a very disconcerting point. Our definition of morality entails, as it
must, minimizing harm through shunning immoral, meaning evil, acts.134 However,
as we now must accept, one may not employ evil to avoid harm either to oneself or
to others because acting evilly is immoral. Consequentialists are correct, therefore, that
deontological morality may extract great human suffering, perhaps greater than would
immoral, but less intimately destructive alternatives.
Many times we feel an outcome—a consequence—should be considered immoral
because innocent persons (sometimes even the culpable) suffer in ways seemingly
disproportionate to the good engendered by the outcome. The innocent may include
128 Id. at 341.
129 Id. at 344.
130 Carlson, supra note 48, at 40–41.
131 GERT, supra note 62, at 344 (emphasis added).
132 Id. at 345 (emphasis added); see also Carlson, supra note 48, at 40–41 (discussing
following moral law for its own sake).
133 Again, the specific meaning of wrongfully subjecting an innocent person to the risk of
unmerited damage is presented in the discussion of Kantian ethics. See infra notes 318–96 and
accompanying text.
134 See Blum, supra note 31, at 38 n.165.
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those who willingly eschewed a favorable consequence by choosing the right course,
thereby suffering due to their devotion to morality. Perhaps even more alarmingly,
some of the innocent sufferers may have had no direct choice, or even notice, that they
would endure anguish in the name of morality. To cite a very popular example, many
consequentialists argue that torturing a suspected terrorist to locate a “ticking time
bomb” is preferable to the probable consequences of not doing so: death, pain, injury,
panic and destruction of property should the bomb detonate.135 These consequential-
ists aver that avoiding undeniably terrible consequences endured by presumptively
innocent people justifies torture, even if torture is immoral.136
As a threshold matter, the conclusion that torture is moral in situation X because
it likely betters more lives than it harms is based on perhaps logical, but speculative,
empiricism. Even when based on evidence, the conclusion that torturing the suspect
will create more happiness than sadness is not empirical proof of the “good,” but
supposition.137 But that is not the basis of my response. Additionally, I will attempt
no argument that, under extraordinarily rarified circumstances, torturing a suspect
could be moral in a deontological sense, fortuitously engendering the outcome con-
sequentialists want.
Rather, I accept, arguendo, that doing what is right may cause considerably more
pain than doing what is good. Accordingly, I employ terms such as “untoward,”
“inappropriate” and “wrongful”—rather than “undeserved”—to demarcate the harm
resulting from evil. I do so because the difficult and heartbreaking, yet ennobling,
mandate of morality is sacrifice; even if, no other moral alternative being available,
the innocent suffer. Sacrifice is the price of deontology’s great, but necessary, irony:
while opposing evil may be a good and right goal, because one always must be moral,
135 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 81 (2006) (mentioning the ticking time bomb scenario among others).
136 Id.; see also ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 215 (2007).
137 See, e.g., Hooker, supra note 67, at 203–05 (discussing the indeterminacy of conse-
quentialism). I mention only in passing that one can envision how successful torture might
cause more harm than it prevented. I have not found the following example in the materials
I have perused; however, I do not presume to be the only person to envision this scenario and
I make no claim of originality. Suppose that because the authorities declined to engage in
torture, a bomb exploded causing death, injury and substantial property damage. Yet, there was
another consequence: the tragedy stirred society from its complacency. As a result, society
improved counter-espionage techniques thereby averting five other planned terrorist attacks
that would have caused much greater loss of life, injury and destruction. Had the original
disaster been forestalled by torturing the original suspect, then, believing incorrectly that its
intelligence gathering methods were adequate, the society would not have implemented im-
proved vigilance. Absent such enhanced police methods, the terrorists would successfully com-
plete their five other, more devastating attacks. Apparently, under a consequentialist paradigm,
torture would not be moral in this instance. See Powers, supra note 33, at 1569 (discussing
consequentialism’s search for the greatest benefit by “taking into account long-range as well
as short-range consequences of actions.”).
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one cannot exploit immorality—evil—to destroy evil regardless whether the quan-
tity of evil destroyed is greater than the amount of evil employed. By definition, even
assuming one could so quantify, one may not exploit evil to avert a larger evil because
avoiding the latter does not per se transform the former from wrongful to rightful.138
Rather, one must show that what generally is immoral, such as racial discrimination,
is moral under a given circumstance such as assigning a Caucasian agent to infiltrate
a violent, anti-minority terrorist group.
The mandate of sacrifices is true because, being moral—abidance with morality’s
a priori principles—is the highest endeavor of human beings. Accordingly, being
moral is a purpose, a reason, indeed a duty in and of itself, not a means to some other
goals such as minimizing injuries of various kinds.139 The impetus to be ethical is
essential to the special quality that distinguishes humanity. The “rational motive” for
moral obedience is attaining that which is a priori an “end in itself” rather than a human
preference or immediate inclination that may offend the intrinsic and the inviolate.140
Deontology reminds us we cannot simply live in the “Now.”141
In that regard, Professor Thomas Pangle identified the basis of deontological sacri-
fice in his criticism of John Locke’s liberal theory that survival is paramount among the
rights which social orders exist to protect.142 Invoking an apt religious analogy, Pangle
explained that the dilemma of Locke’s account is,
the Bible calls us to a life of devotion and sacrifice that lifts us be-
yond our petty obsession with personal security—and thus exalts
us even or precisely through our self-abnegation. It would seem
that any rationalist account of life that is to rival the Bible . . . must
do justice to this self-transcending dimension of our humanity.143
Surely, Professor Pangle’s quote does not aver that we must act morally to meet an
obligation to a creator, although many persons may so believe.144 Rather, like a divine
138 See Blum, supra note 31, at 38 n.165 (citing STEPHEN DARWELL, DEONTOLOGY (2003))
(discussing how under deontological theory certain actions are always evil).
139 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 48, at 41. It is the understanding, “of an objective end in
itself, which is not an end to be produced but something existing that has a value giving us an
unconditional ground for acting in accordance with it.” WOOD, supra note 24, at 55. Therefore,
I join those who disagree with theorists such as Professor Kutz who aver that a theory of moral
absolutism renders morality indecipherable. See Christopher Kutz, Torture, Necessity and
Existential Politics, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 235, 255–56 (2007) (criticizing deontology as incoherent
due to its absolutism).
140 WOOD, supra note 24, at 86.
141 See id. at 55.
142 Thomas L. Pangle, The Classical and Modern Liberal Understanding of Honor, in THE
NOBLEST MINDS: FAME, HONOR, AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 212–13 (Peter McNamara
ed., 1999).
143 Id. at 213 (emphasis added).
144 Indeed, it is worth recalling Professor Gert’s clarification that morality is not religion
because “every feature of morality must be known to, and could be chosen by, all rational
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command, deontological morality, based on reason free from personal prejudices and
predilections, requires adherence if one is to be moral—that is, to be righteous in a sec-
ular sense. If consequentialism is the serpent, morality is the path by which individuals,
and the societies to which they belong, bring to human existence a divine-like devotion
to what is right, what is just and what truly should be honorable.145
Indeed, it is doubtful whether civilized society can exist at all absent the willingness
to sacrifice—to die, if necessary—for causes greater than society’s own comfort.146
“[C]ulture and values are only plausible when there is a possibility of dying for them.
Although convictions arouse our deepest suspicions and represent a great danger to the
human race, we cannot construct worlds of meaning without them.”147 The Weiners
explicated their profound observation, “without convictions we cannot live a life of
meaning. Without a dedication to values neither culture nor religion is plausible, and
our doubts about the purpose of life go unanswered. Without our convictions, we are
less than human.”148
Accordingly, if we are permitted to respond to immorality with immorality—to
respond to evil with evil—we would have no occasion to care, much less inquire, what
morality is and why morality matters. Thus, consequentialism’s irony is that conse-
quentialists need not bother themselves with morality at all; and, in so doing, deny
their own humanity.149 After all, consequentialism tells us that regarding morality and
evil there is no need to consider transcendence; rather, the solution is to discern what
will make us happiest.150 If we conveniently conflate evil with what will make us un-
happy and if it makes us happiest to do “whatever it takes” to avoid such evil—then
“whatever it takes” is moral by fiat because not doing “whatever it takes” makes us
unhappy which, according to consequentialism, is evil. That the morally correct re-
sponse happens to defeat the particular evil would be a fortuity, not a requirement,
because the goal has become eradicating the evil and not being moral.151 Conversely,
persons. No religion is known to all rational persons, and all religions have some features
that could not be chosen by all rational persons.” GERT, supra note 62, at 6.
145 See infra Parts II.B–C.
146 EUGENE WEINER & ANITA WEINER, THE MARTYR’S CONVICTION: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 2 (2002).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 134.
149 This brings to mind an historical illustration.
The Romans, like the Greeks, believed that a man possessed only what
he gave away. Life was a treasure that gained value or power only when
expended. The person who preserved his life at any cost was a miser . . . .
He was a thing of dirt, his spirit caged and contracted.
Carlin Barton, Honor and Sacredness in the Roman and Christian Worlds, in SACRIFICING
THE SELF: PERSPECTIVES ON MARTYRDOM AND RELIGION 26 (Margaret Cormack ed., 2002)
(citation omitted).
150 See, e.g., Blum, supra note 31, at 38 n.166 (describing central tenet of consequentialism).
151 An additional aspect of consequentialism’s irony is the “endless loop” that employing
evil to fight evil may perpetuate evil, which may be confronted by more evil and so on. The
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if it does not defeat evil then, under a “whatever it takes” regime, the morally correct
response is inappropriate.
Thus, if fighting evil is the controlling societal goal, morality vel non becomes a
senseless inquiry; for once we decide that transcendent morality does not matter and
embrace exclusively the realm of preferences and predilections, we really have no rea-
son to make moral judgments. Indeed, the danger of compromising morality in favor
of outcomes “is not merely a question of consistency; rather, it is a deeper metaphysical
question about what remains if you sacrifice everything,”152 which underscores that
consequentialism’s concern is not morality but comfort.153
In sum, we are not morality’s master, but its servants; and, beyond question,
morality is harsh and unsympathetic, demanding that we do what is right whatever the
consequence because, by definition, acting immorally is wicked. As proposed in the
introductory portion of this discussion, morality’s sole promise is that the moral are
upright and honest, fulfilling faithfully their duty to humanity even if others do not—
even when the morality of the moral enables the immorality of the immoral. If the,
perhaps, sad result of adherence to morality is harm to those who, through no fault of
their own, become embroiled in a moral confrontation, then suffering becomes the test
of commitment to leading an upright existence. It is not difficult, after all, to follow the
moral path when doing so renders only pleasure or at least accords the least anguish.
consequentialist might respond that first she will employ less evil to eradicate more evil, then
she will use even less evil to eradicate the originally utilized evil until eventually evil is gone
entirely. However, she cannot know what new evil, and of what quantity, might spawn un-
expectedly simply because she uses evil as an acceptable method to fight evil. In fact, her very
use of evil may inspire greater evil. Moreover, the threat of ever increasing evil stems not only
from the perceptive consequentialist’s misuse of evil, but also from well meaning but inept
others attempting to emulate her example. Thus, even if our first consequentialist successfully
stems greater evil by using less evil, her followers may not be so fortunate. They may blunder,
causing more aggregate evil, specifically the new evil added to the original evil that the new
evil was meant to eradicate. Furthermore, others might commit a different, but equally harmful
error by erroneously concluding that the relevant evil behavior is moral per se, not solely when
it is used to fight evil, and thus employ evil conduct even when it does not reduce a greater evil.
Either way, the ostensibly logical effort to eradicate evil by using less evil could well create
more evil than it cures.
152 Mary Anne Franks, Book Note, Guantanamo Forever: United States Sovereignty and
the Unending State of Exception, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 259, 263 (2007) (reviewing
BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT: HOW A BAND OF YALE LAW STUDENTS SUED
THE PRESIDENT—AND WON (2005)) (emphasis added).
153 Even in the case, if such exists, where the violation of the moral rule almost certainly will
neither cause nor increase the probability of harm, one still must act morally to maintain “moral
virtues,” those attributes which are necessary to make moral behavior immutable. GERT, supra
note 62, at 346–48. These virtues, according to Professor Gert, include honesty, truthfulness,
fairness, dependability, and conscientiousness. Id. at 346; see also id. at 275–309 (discussing
how these basic concepts provide accounts of moral virtue).
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While utilitarian rewards often flow from moral acts, morality itself must be its own
reward. These are the duties of a noble life.154
The idea of the noble sacrifice in the name of fostering a moral social order is
neither novel nor subversive. Indeed, regarding the founding of our Nation, we instruct
our children to believe in both the transcendence of morality and the value of suffering
when morality so requires. American students, and likely many others, are taught to
revere the following homily attributed to Patrick Henry: “Is life so dear, or peace so
sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? . . . . I know not what
course others may take; but as for me . . . give me liberty or give me death!”155 One
might construe Henry’s celebrated avowal to infer personal choice; that is, he would
choose death over tyranny, but would leave others to make their own decisions. A better
understanding is that his preface, framed both ironically and rhetorically, declares as
a factual matter that life and peace are not sufficiently sweet to justify oppression; and,
those who believe otherwise are wrong. Patrick Henry urges the immutable immorality
of literal and, presumably, figurative enslavement as the price of life and security.156
The equally respected patriot Thomas Paine expressed similar views championing
death before immorality.157 Alarmed at the growing despondency after the Continental
Army’s terrible loss in New York, Paine drafted an essay of such force that General
Washington ordered it read to the troops on Christmas Eve, 1776, just prior to the cele-
brated crossing of the Delaware River and surprise offensive against the Hessian mer-
cenaries at Trenton, New Jersey.158 Speaking to the immediate peril with inspiration
pertinent to twenty-first century moral challenges, Paine wrote,
These are the times that try men’s souls. . . . I call not upon few,
but upon all . . . . Let it be told to the future world, that in the
depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive,
154 Carlson, supra note 48, at 41 (“I am moral only if I follow the moral law for its own
sake”); Kuklin, supra note 34, at 477 (using the example of criminal sentencing to explain
that choosing to do the right—the moral—outcome may cause great distress, such as enforcing
a term of imprisonment more lenient than the victim and her supporters would like).
155 OUR SACRED HONOR 35 (William J. Bennett ed., 1997) (quoting WILLIAM WIRT,
SKETCHES OF THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF PATRICK HENRY (1818)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
156 The refrain of Patrick Henry was not ‘Give me liberty only if it means
I’m secure!’ He said: ‘Give me liberty, or give me death!’ Americans
who risked or gave their lives in the Revolutionary War fought for civil
liberties, and they knew that those liberties could never be sacrificed
in the name of war.
Jennifer Van Bergen, In the Absence of Democracy: The Designation and Material Support
Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Laws, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 107, 109 (2003)
(emphasis added).
157 See BENNETT, supra note 155, at 36–38.
158 Id. at 36.
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the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came
forth to meet and repulse it. . . . ’Tis the business of little minds to
shrink; but whose heart is firm, and whose conscience approves
his conduct, will pursue his principles unto death.159
Turning now to jurisprudential sentiment, although explicating the deontological
morality that roots constitutional due process fairness awaits in Part IV, it is appro-
priate to recognize the Supreme Court’s understanding in principle, if not always in
practice, that sacrifice is the price of national integrity. Responding to the undeniable
threat of terrorism which so greatly has shaped the Constitution of necessity arguments
of the George W. Bush and, perhaps, Barack Obama presidencies,160 the Supreme Court
fittingly recognized, “It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our
Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times
that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight
abroad.”161 In support, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld quoted the Federal judiciary’s unequivocal
stance issued four decades earlier:
The imperative necessity for safeguarding these rights to proce-
dural due process under the gravest of emergencies has existed
throughout our constitutional history, for it is then, under the
pressing exigencies of crisis, that there is the greatest temptation
to dispense with fundamental constitutional guarantees which, it
is feared, will inhibit governmental action.162
These powerful admonitions underscore in constitutional terms the more general
irrationality that, in the name of preserving morality, it is moral to destroy morality.163
159 Id. at 36–38 (quoting THOMAS PAINE, THE AMERICAN CRISIS (1776), reprinted in THE
COMPLETE POLITICAL WORKS OF THOMAS PAINE (New York, Peter Eckler, 1891)) (emphasis
added).
160 See infra notes 506–41 and accompanying text.
161 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004) (holding that a U.S. citizen held by the
United States as an “enemy combatant” must have a reasonable opportunity to meaningfully
challenge his detention); see also Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1012 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532).
162 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
164–65 (1963) (invalidating, under due process, provisions of the Nationality Act of 1940
and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 that automatically deprived Americans who
departed the United States for the purpose of evading military service of their citizenship
without a judicial or administrative hearing)).
163 As Professor Prakash asked in the context of American constitutional law, how does one
know when, figuratively speaking, one is sacrificing a legal limb to save the Constitution’s
life rather than slaying the Constitution itself. Prakash, supra note 7, at 1305. “Surely self-
preservation of the nation at all costs is not the Constitution’s end. Nor is Lincolnesque
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As the Court concisely put it, “It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national
defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties . . . which makes
the defense of the Nation worthwhile.”164 We may better appreciate such judicial senti-
ment by closing this part of the discussion with Professor Bowman’s dynamic sum-
mary of morality’s imperative, “Who we are . . . still depends crucially on what we are
prepared to stand up for—and on our willingness to stand up for it.”165 Our morality,
or lack thereof, truly is our definition of ourselves.
H. The Inadequacy of “Threshold Deontology”
Not surprisingly, many purported deontologists balk at deontology’s strict
mandates.166 Of course, that some reject orthodoxy is no disproof of that theory’s
soundness. Rather, recalcitrance evinces that well-intentioned persons, usually under
great stress, are tempted to shun morality when the moral route requires particularly
severe sacrifices.167 As Professor Sunstein observed, “even Kantians typically be-
lieve that moral rules can be subject to consequentialist override if the consequences
are sufficiently serious. If total catastrophe really would ensue, judges should not rule
as they believe that principle requires.”168 This is known as “threshold deontology,”
the assertion
that at some extreme points, one cannot avoid some consequen-
tialist analysis that would require a departure from the absolute
prescription. Threshold deontology responds to the accusation
that pure deontology would allow catastrophic outcomes for the
sake of moral narcissism. For this school, the debate is no longer
preservation of the Constitution at all costs a worthy end, for that would suggest that we may
suspend or discard every constitutional provision to ‘save’ the Constitution.” Id.
164 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532 (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967)
(finding that the Subversive Activities Control Act provisions making employment of any
registered member of the Communist Party at government defense facilities illegal violated
the right of association guaranteed by the First Amendment)). Candor requires acknowledging,
however, that the courts certainly have not sung only one refrain on this matter. See infra
notes 478–81 and accompanying text (discussing when courts have found that security may
dominate liberty interests).
165 JAMES BOWMAN, HONOR: A HISTORY 295 (2006).
166 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 120, at 894; Sunstein, supra note 122, at 165.
167 Professor Brooks, for instance, argued that torture is not rendered morally right simply
because many of its opponents, if confronted with an actual crisis, would use torture to save
one or more lives. Rather, the recourse to torture evinces that human psychology can trump
moral judgment in instances involving “pressures too terrible for most humans to withstand.”
Rosa Brooks, Ticking Bombs & Catastrophes, 8 GREEN BAG 311, 313 (2005) (reviewing
TORTURE: A COLLECTION (Sanford Levinson, ed. (2007))).
168 Sunstein, supra note 122, at 165.
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about the permissibility of lesser-evil calculations, [it is] only
about the terms and conditions for its application . . . .169
Threshold deontology, according to Professor Michael Moore, is like a dam “and
the consequentialist considerations [are like] water building up behind it. Eventually,
if enough water builds up, it will reach and exceed the dam’s height—which is analo-
gous to the threshold of threshold deontology.”170 Arguably, the metaphor of a dam is
odd because, once the dam fails, the unstoppable torrent of water may devastate vir-
tually everything in its way, leaving ruin behind. In that regard, I agree that the flow
of ceaseless consequentialism will devastate morality, but, that is not what threshold
deontologists seem to mean. Rather, the predictable justification for threshold deon-
tology is consequentialist practicality. Indeed, expressing a commonly held view that
this Article contests,171 Professor Levinson wondered, “What if it is a specific limit on
government that is itself viewed as a danger to maintaining the overarching society?
Why in the world would we consider ourselves bound by such a limit, ‘whatever the
consequences’?”172 Or, as Professor Bickel famously opined, “No good society can be
unprincipled; and no viable society can be principle-ridden.”173
True, threshold deontology solves to a degree consequentialism’s irony that moral-
ity is meaningless when the goal is combating evil rather than being moral.174 By
accepting the moral route until doing so causes unquestionably disastrous outcomes,
threshold deontologists render morality important in nearly all instances, although not
under the most trying circumstances where morality matters most and moral commit-
ment is most tested.175 However, threshold deontology satisfies only if one is content
with a partial solution to consequentialism’s dilemma. What is left is embracing evil,
or at least discarding as inconvenient any inquiry into morality, when the incentive
seems strong enough.176
169 Blum, supra note 31, at 43 (emphasis added).
170 Alexander, supra note 120, at 895 (discussing Moore’s interpretation of threshold
deontology and his metaphor of a dam); see also, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME:
A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 723 (1997).
171 See infra Parts IV.C–E.
172 Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA.
L. REV. 699, 729–30 (2006).
173 Sunstein, supra note 122, at 168 (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 64 (1962)).
174 See supra notes 148–52 and accompanying text.
175 See Blum, supra note 31, at 43. Contra Kutz, supra note 139, at 275.
176 My quarrel with threshold deontology, therefore, is not that we can never truly know
exactly when the invitation to evil is strong enough to permit consequentialism to overtake
deontology. As mentioned above, most useful philosophies, especially involving morality and
justice, are based on principles capable of being deeply but not completely understood. They are
abstract in both meaning and application. If adequacy mandated that reasonable people could
not disagree about their exact substance and boundaries, then most ethical and legal principles,
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As quoted above, some threshold deontologists sneeringly posit that unmixed
deontology requires “moral narcissism,” apparently a senseless, fetishistic adherence
to morality.177 But, what is “moral narcissism”? It cannot mean acting morally for nar-
cissistic goals; that is, to promote one’s selfishness or vanity because motive does not
demonstrate whether the proposed moral resolution is either right or good.178 Thus,
threshold deontologists surely are not concerned with moral behavior motivated by
improper goals unless such behavior produces “catastrophic” results in which case,
according to threshold deontology, the actor’s motives simply are irrelevant because
only the consequences matter.
Similarly, “moral narcissism” cannot mean that due to selfish blindness or smug
egotism an actor mistakenly concludes that some sort of behavior is morally required
despite its calamitous results. In that instance, the actor is wrong because the chosen
behavior is inherently immoral (regardless of the intensity of resulting consequences).
In such cases, deontology instructs the actor both to recognize her mistake and to re-
frain from the actually immoral behavior,179 which by fortuity reaches the very result
threshold deontology supports.
The actor, therefore, must be a moral narcissist when threshold deontologists do not
like the outcome of the actor’s forthright, steadfast dedication to a correctly discerned
moral duty. Threshold deontology is essentially ad hominem disguised as philosophy.
Unable to demonstrate that the actor’s chosen behavior is immoral, and equally unable
to justify their preferred outcomes on an objective moral basis, threshold deontolo-
gists castigate the actor for daring to be moral. Such has always been the cry of the
“pragmatist” who prefaces her argument with, “How would you feel if . . . ,” but is
unable to proceed beyond such consequentialist preferences to employ compelling
moral reasoning.
Even less convincing is an alternate explanation of threshold deontology: “[I]f
the positive balance of consequences becomes sufficiently great—especially if it does
so by averting horrible consequences as opposed to merely making people quite well
off—then one is morally permitted, and perhaps required, to engage in those acts that
are otherwise morally prohibited.”180 That argument is breathtakingly circular because,
as we now understand, the transformation of immorality into morality due to conse-
quences would be magic, not philosophy.
including the ones advanced in this Article, would be unenforceable. See Alexander, supra note
120, at 895–96 (discussing Moore); see also WOOD, supra note 24, at 268; Weinrib, supra note
83, at 505–06; supra Part I.E (arguing that we are able to analyze sufficiently if imperfectly).
177 Blum, supra note 31, at 43 (discussing the theory of moral narcissism).
178 See supra Parts I.A–B. As noted therein, persons should obey moral norms solely for
morality’s sake; however, it is possible that an untoward motive might by chance render a
morally correct outcome.
179 See supra, Part I.B (explaining how deontology instructs agents to do, or to avoid
certain actions).
180 Alexander, supra note 120, at 894.
322 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:287
However one parses it, threshold deontology extols evil when morality tests us
most and, as such, is not a theory of morality but an apology for immorality.181 There-
fore, despite Professor Moore’s protests, threshold deontology “collapse[s] deontology
into consequentialism[.]”182
I. Refined Consequentialism Is Consequentialism
One might charge that any criticism of consequentialism is wasteful because, as
earlier quoted, deontologists “cannot demonstrate the priority of right simply by de-
bunking a notion of the good based on sheer preference or inclination, a conception so
shallow, arbitrary, heteronomous, and mired in contingency that no one could defend
it in the first place.”183 For instance, if slavery made a majority of the people in a given
society happy, slavery becomes moral under raw consequentialism.184 Consequential-
ists who believe there must be moral requisites greater than some aggregation of hap-
piness crave deontology to establish that overriding morality, which surely reaffirms
deontology’s verity.
Granted, consequentialism has developed into a number of competing, refined theo-
ries that purport to account for emergent societal moral certainty, such as condemning
181 Professor Blum evinced threshold deontology’s common misapprehension of deontology
by asserting that the only appropriate deontological response to war is pacifism:
War is about committing evils and choosing between evils. No war can be
fought without causing death, long-term injury, suffering, degradation,
and despair. Any war is a violation of numerous human rights . . . [I]f
deontologists are willing to endorse any practical system of laws of war
other than pacifism, they must resign to some degree of evil, even if they
would be loath to accept it in any other setting.
Blum, supra note 31, at 39.
We now know the rejoinder. Professor Blum incorrectly conflates undeserved suffering
with evil per se. Such suffering may be the result of evil, but not inevitably so. Therefore, as
with any other human enterprise, war and war tactics require a priori moral validation or they
are evil. Meaning no insolence toward the magnificent and extensive body of theory and law
addressing the distinctive, unique and intricate quandary that is war, and relying on, perhaps,
an overly simplified dichotomy, morality precludes offensive wars for treasure, power and the
degradation of the conquered. By contrast, sound moral precepts condone engaging in a war of
self-defense by responding to an unwarranted attack, usually including eradicating the attacker’s
willingness or ability to renew its onslaught once the initial assault is repelled and relative safety
restored. See, e.g., RODIN, supra note 59, at 122–40 (discussing the arguable differences between
a moral theory of individual self-defense and a moral theory of collective self-defense in war).
182 Alexander, supra note 120, at 894.
183 Sagoff, supra note 38, at 1079.
184 MURPHY, supra note 34, at 91 n.1 (discussing how utilitarian arguments that freedom
is a good consequence may be challenged by envisioned systems of limited liberty but great
personal comfort where most people are contented).
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inhumane treatment, proscribing slavery and denouncing race, and similar arbitrary
discrimination.185 Indisputably,
[t]he wiser and more circumspect versions of utilitarianism, for
example, ask not merely which actions (considered singly or
severally) produce the most pleasure and the least pain but in-
stead about which set of moral rules, which moral code, would
(if generally taught and practiced) be most conducive to the
general happiness.186
Yet, without deontology these theories, sophisticated as they are, remain mired in
consequentialism’s irony, ultimately basing claims of morality on someone’s, some
group’s, or some society’s preferences that alone provide no verification that the
selected moral precepts are true for all persons and all societies.187 In a way, then,
one might conclude that most consequentialists would like to be deontologists and,
based on threshold deontology, most deontologists would like to be consequentialists.
A short review of modified consequentialism tells the tale. One common nuance
is differentiating act-consequentialism from rule-consequentialism.188 “The former
assesses the outcomes of every particular act; . . . The latter weighs the effects of hav-
ing a particular rule in place (and therefore the average outcome of acts that follow the
rule).”189 Concerned that straight rule-consequentialism is too bold, some analysts argue
185 See, e.g., Powers, supra note 33, at 1569.
186 WOOD, supra note 24, at 260 (discussing Mill’s use of general moral rules, subject to
reform based on utilitarian values).
187 Accordingly, the argument that assigning “large enough” values to abstract moral ideas
will harmonize deontology and consequentialism must fail because such conflating eschews
exactly what deontology expressly requires: not simply setting and prioritizing the value of
“states of affairs,” but conceiving “why we assign those values.” Id. at 265; see also
KORSGAARD, supra note 68, at 82; id. at 309 n.46 (noting that some consequentialists argue
“[i]f justice matters, we can include it among the results.” But, this would allow persons,
“[to] commit injustice if it will bring about more justice.”).
188 See, e.g., Blum, supra note 31, at 45.
189 Id. According to Adrian Vermeule:
Rule-consequentialism counsels that ethical agents follow that set of
rules whose observance will produce the best consequences over an
array of decisions. Act-consequentialism, on the other hand, counsels
ethical agents directly to choose whichever action produces the best
consequences. The rule-consequentialist acknowledges that the relevant
rules may sometimes call for actions that, when viewed in isolation, are
locally suboptimal from the consequentialist point of view. The rule-
consequentialist, then, will sometimes be placed in the awkward position
of defending acts whose immediate effect is, when viewed in isolation,
socially detrimental.
Adrian Vermeule, Three Strategies of Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 607, 627 (2005).
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for incrementalist rule-consequentialism, which requires “abid[ing] by the policies in
the currently accepted morality unless and until we can calculate to a reliable degree
of probability which changes to this morality would result in a net increase in value
in the long run.”190 Others embrace indirect consequentialism inquiring “which rules
and rights are the ones whose establishment would have the best consequences in the
long run, impartially considered?”191
Proposing a delicate crossbreed, Professor Hooker argued:
The best forms of indirect consequentialism focus neither on the
consequences of one individual’s accepting and following policies
nor on the consequences of one society’s accepting and follow-
ing policies. The best forms of indirect consequentialism are more
‘cosmopolitan’. What we might call incrementalist cosmopolitan
rule-consequentialism assesses possible moral rules and policies
in terms of the expected value of their acceptance (not just by one
individual or by one society but) by all societies simultaneously.192
Among many examples, Hooker offered the following:
“[D]o not deliberately kill the innocent, period” has much greater
expected value than “do not deliberately kill the innocent ex-
cept . . . to redistribute body parts from this one person in a way
that would save the lives of other innocent people”. . . . [P]eople
will be much more reluctant to put themselves in the hands of
surgeons if they know that surgeons might redistribute their vital
organs to others. A rule that results in widespread surgeon-phobia
would not have good consequences on the whole and in the long
run.193
Doubtless, Professor Hooker’s concern about “widespread surgeon-phobia” is
appealing—it sounds right—but it is hardly self-proving. What if fear of surgeons
prompts people to take especially good care of both themselves and their dependents,
thereby actually increasing the aggregate good health of their society, even accounting
for lives lost due to refusing surgery? Or, what if more bad people than good people die
190 Hooker, supra note 67, at 203 (emphasis added).
191 Id. (emphasis added). Indirect consequentialism is purely consequentialist if, as it seems,
“impartially considered” means the evaluator determines what would make the relevant per-
son or group happiest regardless of the evaluator’s personal opinion or bias. If, however,
“impartially considered” in any regard means assessing morality pursuant to impartial reason,
indirect consequentialism is deontological.
192 Id. at 204.
193 Id.
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from avoiding surgery? As improbable as these consequences appear, if they occurred
it seems unlikely that reasonable people would bestow a surgeons’ prerogative to
distribute patients’ organs. We understand that, generally at least, it is immoral to force
an unwilling person to donate body parts, even renewable components such as blood
or skin.194 Otherwise, because the bodily components of one healthy person could
drastically improve the lives of many others, society routinely would butcher unwill-
ing healthy persons for the sake of such others.
Perhaps Professor Hooker truly means that if “all societies simultaneously” so
preferred, a surgeons’ prerogative would be moral. One must suspect, however, that
Hooker’s modifying instruction to “assess[ ] possible moral rules and policies in terms
of the expected value of their acceptance,”195 is deontologically grounded. If empiri-
cally the “expected value” turns out not to be what he expected—for some reason, most
persons in all combined societies support surgeons’ discretion to harvest organs—
Hooker would think those persons are so ridiculous that their opinions are worthless.
In that case, Hooker is doing one of two things. Either he is substituting his personal
preferences for those of the greater society (which capsizes consequentialism by defin-
ing morality not as the consequence that makes most people happiest, but as the con-
sequence that makes Hooker happiest), or he believes he has found an overarching
moral truth that must be obeyed regardless of anyone’s preferences, which, of course,
is a deontological declaration.
Similarly, Professors Anderson and Pildes contrast so-called “vulgar deontology”
with their paradigm of “expressive theories.”196 They argue any philosophy of morality
that
somehow requires us to ignore the consequences of action [is]
an absurd position. . . . We cannot adequately express the right
attitudes toward people while ignoring the consequences of our
actions. We express our respect, love, concern, and other favor-
able attitudes toward people largely through the pursuit of conse-
quences that are good for them. To disregard the consequences of
one’s actions is one way to fail to care about people in the ways
we ought to care about them. . . . Expressive theories, therefore,
do not deny that the consequences matter.197
194 For example, “Parents cannot be forced to donate organs to their children, even if the
child’s life is at stake and the parent is the only appropriate donor. One may not be forced to
donate bone marrow to a cousin who is dying of bone cancer.” Julie B. Ehrlich, Breaking the
Law by Giving Birth: The War on Drugs, the War on Reproductive Rights, and the War on
Women, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 381, 395 (2008) (quoting CYNTHIA R. DANIELS,
AT WOMEN’S EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND THE POLITICS OF FETAL RIGHTS 33 (1993)).
195 Hooker, supra note 67, at 204.
196 Anderson & Pildes, supra note 50, at 1508, 1511.
197 Id. at 1513–14.
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However, in the same portion of their article, Anderson and Pildes appropriately
explain, “Expressive theories, therefore, tell us to pursue consequences that are good
for people, provided that pursuing those consequences by the means selected is com-
patible with caring about people in the right ways.”198 This is because, “we are all
morally required to express the right attitudes toward people . . . .”199 Anderson’s and
Pildes’s unspoken deontological hope is revealed by their perfectly reasonable claim
that there are “right ways” to “car[e] about people,” which “we are all morally required
to express.”200 That some observers might find vulgar Anderson’s and Pildes’s “right
ways” to “car[e] about people” does not seem to trouble those authors.
Let me indulge one more example. In an article that is as critical of deontology as
it is of consequentialism, Professor Mark Sagoff embraces the appealing theory of
idealism.201 In brief, “Idealists believe . . . that a person identifies and realizes him-
self not by satisfying every passing desire or by acting from a universal, abstract moral
law, but by forming and pursuing long-term plans that have meaning and value within
a cultural community and can therefore be viewed as achievements.”202 Immediately,
Professor Sagoff assures us that idealism is not “committed to relativism,” rather, “a
person ‘cannot take his morality simply from the moral world he is in’ . . . . [but] ‘must
thus stand before and above [societal] inconsistencies, and reflect upon them.’”203
Accordingly, “individual[s] must be self-critical and must maintain what [Professor F.]
Bradley calls a ‘cosmopolitan morality’ in his or her loyalties, projects, and plans.”204
This requires defining “cosmopolitan morality”:
A cosmopolitan moral perspective . . . depends upon critical judg-
ment, ethical intuition, and human sympathy, rather than upon a
system of philosophical abstractions, such as the one deontological
liberalism provides. We can rely to some extent on a general sense
198 Id. (emphasis added).
199 Id. at 1514 (emphasis added). The authors’ deontological desire rises again in their expli-
cation that, “[e]xpressive theories of action evaluate given actions according to how well they
express attitudes that we ought to have toward people.” Id. at 1513 (emphasis added). Presum-
ably the concept “attitudes” referred to in the quote “attitudes that we ought to have” does not
mean the mindset of authors themselves but rather signifies some overarching moral norm
that should be universally understood and embraced. Id.
200 Id. at 1514.
201 Sagoff, supra note 38, at 1065–66 (discussing the merits of Michael J. Sandel’s idealist
critique of liberalism).
202 Id. at 1067 (citing T.H. Green, Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant: The Metaphysic of
Ethics—The Good Will, in 2 WORKS OF THOMAS HILL GREEN § 119, at 139 (R.L. Nettleship
ed., New York, Cambridge Univ. Press 1886)).
203 Id. at 1067–68 (quoting F. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES 204 (2d ed. 1927)).
204 Id. at 1068. As we now see, both Professors Hooker and Sagoff accent cosmopolitanism
to premise consequentialism on a firmer ethical basis than pure individual or group happiness.
Apparently, higher consequentialism cannot be rustic.
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of moral progress . . . [revealing] a notion of goodness not of any
particular time and country. Grounding the good in a historical
and cultural perspective can save us from both [deontological]
over-abstraction and utilitarian reductionism. . . .
. . . The self has a moral identity only within the political and social
world it inhabits. . . . We develop our identities in communities . . .
within which we share aspirations and a sense of the meaning or
the fitness of things.205
Despite his elegant expression of what societies and their constituent factions can
teach us, idealism is consequentialism, profound, nuanced consequentialism, but still
fated to the “utilitarian reductionism,”206 Sagoff aptly denounces. As with Professor
Hooker’s “incrementalist cosmopolitan rule-consequentialism”207 and Professors
Anderson’s and Pildes’s “expressive theories,”208 Professor Sagoff’s “critical judg-
ment, ethical intuition, and human sympathy,”209 albeit sound, informed and likely
humane, crumble into an apology for sincere, but nonetheless selfish, predilections and
preferences. Unless one is content to base morality on a tautology, Sagoff’s “critical
judgment, ethical intuition and human sympathy” are not self-confirming even if based
on “[g]rounding the good in a historical and cultural perspective,” combined with some
coherent “sense of the meaning or the fitness of things,” and confirmed by “a gen-
eral sense of moral progress.”210 One must assert an independent source to show that
the particular “historical and cultural perspective” one senses based on judgment,
intuition and sympathy in fact evinces not simply the “fitness of things,” informed by
“a general sense of moral progress,” but the correct “fitness of things” informed by a
correct “sense of” properly progressing morality.211 Surely Sagoff eschews embrac-
ing purportedly maturing morality that despite its popularity actually fosters selfish,
immoral outcomes.
For instance, a growing tolerance, indeed empathy, for the dignity and sensibil-
ities of homosexual individuals surely reflects a changing “historical and cultural per-
spective,” resulting in “a general sense of moral progress” established on an emerging
new “fitness of things.”212 Yet, unless we unfasten the moral arguments from both the
rejected and preferred consequences, we cannot know that the new “fitness of things”
manifests the right change, deserving permanence rather than possibly being exclu-
sively the momentary triumph of political and social pressure.213 While socialization
205 Id. at 1068 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
206 Id.
207 Hooker, supra note 67, at 204.
208 Anderson & Pildes, supra note 50, at 1508.
209 Sagoff, supra note 38, at 1068.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
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may have inspired the moral inquiry, we must disentangle the argument from our
socially learned preferences and find timeless principles, the application of which
confirms the arguments consequentialism can only hope are valid.
II. HONOR, DEONTOLOGY AND DUE PROCESS
Having established that morality—whatever its specifics may be—is deontological,
the next step is an explanation of honor because the mandates of honor and sacrifice
enunciated in the Declaration of Independence is the prime American articulation of
deontological morality.
As detailed below, the Founders inspired and justified both the Revolution and
ensuing fundamental principles of American law, especially due process, on the best
applicable precepts of enduring morality they knew.214 Specifically, to assure the new
nation’s commitment to preserving “unalienable Rights,” particularly “Life, Liberty and
the pursuit of Happiness,” the Founders concluded their Declaration by “pledg[ing] . . .
our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor,”215 a vow they intended to obligate
not just themselves, but every generation of Americans then and thereafter. For the
Founders, the legitimacy of government is not simply positivistic; that is, whatever
societal entity is authorized to make and to enforce legal laws is that society’s govern-
ment.216 Rather, legitimacy is substantive, measured by government’s honor—faithful
fulfillment of its affirmative duty to vouchsafe “unalienable Rights.” It is not hyperbole,
therefore, to insist that the Founders birthed the United States in deontological theory.
In subsequent sections of this Article I hope to show that, while not denying its
Magna Carta antecedents,217 American due process of law is a deliberate and inextri-
cable derivative of the national deontology the Declaration implored.218 More than
that, acutely aware of their own imperfectness, the Founders expected that America’s
commitment to moral government would be inspired by, but not shackled to, their par-
ticular moral perceptions.219 Therefore, although informed by standards embraced in
214 See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
215 Id. paras. 2, 32 (emphasis added); see also infra Parts II.E–F.
216 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 50–78 (2d ed. 1994).
217 See, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3090 & n.5 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing additional sources); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds)); Bauer v. Shepard, 634 F. Supp. 2d 912,
942 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Evans v. Thompson, 465 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 2006); McGill v.
Superior Court, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 120, 147 (Ct. App. 2011).
218 See infra Part II.D.
219 Certainly, one may argue that the Founders’ imperfections were glaring and atrocious.
The Declaration and the original Constitution permitted slavery, allowed gender and a myriad
of other invidious discriminations and failed to guarantee “unalienable Rights” at the state and
local levels. Amendments and multiple judicial reinterpretations, often prompted by dramatic
social upheavals, including the Civil War, have rendered substantial transformations to better
approach the truly just America we have yet to attain.
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the late-eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, the principles of the Declaration, and
the Constitution it inspired, are intended to be governed by the best understanding of
morality currently available.220
Because the provenance of constitutional due process derives from the Decla-
ration’s elegant bonding of “unalienable Rights” with “sacred Honor,” we should
grasp the meaning of honor, both abstractly and as used by the Founders. In that way,
we will ultimately understand why due process, in a Kantian sense, is not only the
right approach, but indeed best fulfills the very mandate of America’s founding.221
A. Honor’s Worth
Some may contend that an appeal to honor is like grabbing at the wind, for, as
Bertram Wyatt-Brown succinctly observed, “Ever since man first picked up a stone
to fling at an enemy, he has justified his thirst for revenge and for popular approval
on the grounds of honor.”222 True, at a semantic level anyone can rationalize any act
by claiming it was required by, or at least comported with, some theory of honor.
Indeed, generic honor often is associated with its most notorious manifestations, spe-
cific honor principles now widely and properly held in disrepute.223 Honor has become
No reasonable critic, however, believes that the value of abstract ideas is merely as good
as the espouser’s actual ability or willingness to abide by those concepts. Otherwise, only the
words of bona fide saints would have any weight. Ideas carry their own verification or refu-
tation which may be explicated by, but are not dependent on, the behavior of their originators
and subsequent advocates. Therefore, their imperfection, politicking and pretenses do not
negate that the Founders correctly elevated honor as a national mandate and opened a viable
path for their successors’ better promotion of honor. See David F. Epstein, The Political Theory
of the Constitution, in CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTION 77 (Allan Bloom ed., 1990). The
Founders’ undeniable failure, whatever the reasons, to prohibit behavior they knew or should
have known to be immoral may render their words arguable accomplices to hypocrisy, but
hardly devoid of meaning.
220 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 847–49 (noting that the meaning of “liberty” is not limited to
perceptions of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment nor to the enumeration of specific
protections under the Bill of Rights).
221 This portion of the Article relies on several recent, exciting analyses of honor’s mean-
ing and function. It is appropriate to study the Founders’ perceptions in light of modern
honor theory because current understanding does not distort but, rather, explicates exactly
their attitudes.
222 Cecil J. Hunt II, No Right to Respect: Dred Scott and the Southern Honor Culture, 42
NEW ENG. L. REV. 79, 86 (2007) (quoting BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR:
ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD SOUTH xviii (1982)).
223 A particularly prevalent example is antebellum Southern “honor” purporting to justify
slavery, racism and sexism as natural, genteel and noble. See generally, RICHARD E. NISBETT
& DOV COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH (1996);
FRANK HENDERSON STEWART, HONOR 79 (1994) (noting that Southern honor codes were not
so much codified as enforced informally by culture and tradition); WYATT-BROWN, supra
note 222.
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synonymous with conservative elitism, encouraging combative and selfish behavior
for the aggrandizement of a select, frequently undeserving, few.224 One resulting sen-
timent is, “The ethos of honor is fundamentally opposed to a universal and formal
morality . . . the dictates of honor, directly applied to the individual case and varying
according to the situation, are in no way capable of being made universal.”225 Sympa-
thetic to the assertion that, “[w]e have come to think of honor as a largely obsolete
virtue,”226 some social theorists employ terms such as “respect,” “dignity,” “prestige,”
and “credibility”—anything to avoid using the word honor when describing precisely
what honor signifies.227
Although tarnished by admittedly extensive misuse, it seems peculiar and im-
prudent to discard such an evocative and useful descriptor, one that nobly inspired the
Declaration of Independence.228 Surely, the Continental Congress would not have
closed the Declaration by pledging America’s “sacred Honor” if honor itself is un-
worthy and disreputable.229 Indeed, exploitation is a hazard to which any valuable idea
or wide-ranging concept is vulnerable, particularly those that define Americanism,
such as rights, liberty, freedom, justice, fairness and, yes, honor. One might just as
well say morality is passé because so many persons and groups have invoked specious
moral defenses to rationalize their plainly immoral acts. Indeed, as centuries of philos-
ophy and history remind us, “Honor and dishonor are the matters with which the high-
minded man is especially concerned . . . .”230 Accordingly, pivotal honor sub-concepts,
such as honesty, integrity, decency, and ‘fair play’ continue to inform modern political
and legal morality.231 Indeed, those who would expunge the term “honor” as too closely
associated with religious fanaticism, racism and sexism, self-aggrandizement, and self-
indulgence (often demanding drastic penalties for trivial, personal affronts), habitually
224 See DOUGLASS ADAIR, Fame and the Founding Fathers, in FAME AND THE FOUNDING
FATHERS 10 (1974); see also, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 165, at 28, 38–39; SHARON R.
KRAUSE, LIBERALISM WITH HONOR xi (2002) (“The language of honor smacks of privilege
and exclusion, fixed social roles and frivolous duels.”).
225 Orit Kamir, Honor and Dignity in the Film Unforgiven: Implications for Sociolegal
Theory, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 193, 203 (2006) (quoting Pierre Bourdieu, The Sentiment of
Honor in Kabyle Society, in HONOR AND SHAME: THE VALUES OF MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY
228 (J. G. Peristiany ed., 1966)).
226 Paul Horwitz, Honor’s Constitutional Moment: The Oath and Presidential Transitions,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2009); see also KRAUSE, supra note 224, at 1; Hunt, supra
note 222, at 83.
227 See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 165, at 38; Kamir, supra note 225, at 202–03.
228 See infra Parts II.E–F.
229 KRAUSE, supra note 224, at 104 (noting that the Founders’ invocation of “‘our sacred
honor,’in defense of American independence . . . reveals that honor need not be ‘inevitably
conservative,’ ‘reactionary,’ or linked to the status quo, as often is thought”).
230 ADAIR, supra note 224, at 12 n.8 (quoting Aristotle, Ethics iv (c. 340 B.C.), and Cicero,
De Officiis, Book II, 30ff) (internal quotation marks omitted).
231 See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 165, at 102–03 (discussing the modern laws and con-
ventions of warfare).
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invoke honor-like attributes to explain why some act, particularly some communal
behavior, is rightful or wrongful.232
As the Founders realized, we need the idea of “honor,” which encompasses the
blend of noble impulses and moral precepts about which other terms-of-art fail to
suffice. If we did not have the watchword “honor,” we would need to invent a new
term as no other existing noun quite fits.
B. How Honor Works
A brief description explaining the mechanics of honor provides a useful frame-
work to understand both honor itself and the inextricable connection between honor,
legitimate revolution and the basic precepts of Americanism. At one level, honor is a
social process—a social dynamic.233 Therefore, its prominence in the realm of psycho-
logical, sociological and historical theory is appropriate because, properly understood,
honor “control[s] and animate[s] virtually every aspect of [the adherent’s] public life
and his private concerns.”234 In fact, honor is the “centerpiece of societies that evaluate
their members and rank them according to adherence to rigid conduct codes . . . .”235
Understanding the relevant conception of honor, then, is essential to understanding a
particular person, group or society.236
232 They will appeal to “national honor” or the “honorable” acts of keeping promises, re-
specting individual rights and safeguarding personal liberty. “A nation, the United States in
particular, also possessed honor and its actions needed to be shaped so as to protect and enhance
that honor. . . . It was, after all, for the United States that the founders pledged ‘our Lives,
our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.’” Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties:
Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 313, 325 (2001) (citing Anne-Marie [Slaughter]
Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J.
INT’L L. 461 (1989)).
233 See, e.g., CAROLINE COX, A PROPER SENSE OF HONOR: SERVICE AND SACRIFICE IN
GEORGE WASHINGTON’S ARMY 38 (2004) (describing honor as an inducement to serve the
cause of the American Revolution); Kamir, supra note 225, at 196–98 (describing the attri-
butes and implications of honor cultures generally).
234 Hunt, supra note 222, at 91; see also id. at 85–86 (explaining that every group has some
sort of honor system, even if not codified, nor well articulated, nor detailed).
235 Kamir, supra note 225, at 196. Along these lines, Professor Hunt daringly asserted that
honor “is not a social extravagance or personal indulgence, but rather can be accurately char-
acterized as a fundamental human need and therefore a basic human right.” Hunt, supra note
222, at 86.
236 Professor Bowman noted, for instance, that contemporary America’s view of radical
Muslim jihadists in terms of psychology, poverty, evil inclinations or post-colonialism,
renders incomplete any understanding until and unless we comprehend their culture’s honor
principles. BOWMAN, supra note 165, at 22, 296–303.
[I]f you look very closely into what the jihadists, or the various radical
groups who support them, have to say about what they do, you will
rarely see any reference to poverty. Even religion as such seems of less
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Not surprisingly, honor theorists accept the classically liberal concept of the
person237 as “having the ability and unremitting drive to reflect upon one’s own exis-
tence and place in the world.”238 Consistent with the liberal thesis of socialization,
within the relevant society, individuals of varying degrees of susceptibility encounter
one or more “honor cultures,” each hoping to indoctrinate those individuals into loyal
allegiance to the “honor group.”239 Significantly, the given honor culture desires devo-
tees loyal, not only to the honor group as a community, but more specifically, to the
discrete elucidation of its “honor code,” meaning the unique aggregation of selected
moral norms denoting that culture from all others240 by setting specific standards of
conduct.241 In other words, the honor culture seeks to instill in each adherent a “sense
of honor,” which unites the foregoing “two closely related elements: an understanding
of what constitutes honorable behavior, and an attachment to such behavior.”242 In this
way, “[h]onor cultures develop specific cultural norms” to the degree that “‘the entire
moral order is subsumed under the larger goal of honor.’”243
Logically, understanding honor and honor cultures requires appreciating the sys-
temic interplay244 of the culture with its constituents.245 Honor groups enforce the honor
culture’s honor code through a host of formal and informal rewards and punishments,
including: regarding the former, prestige, respect, acclaim, influence, power and
wealth; and for the latter, shame, shunning, derision, loss of influence, loss of power
interest to them than the idea of Arab or Islamic ‘honor’ and ‘manhood,’
with which honor is always intimately related.
Id. at 22.
237 See Crocker, supra note 97, at 269.
238 Williams, supra note 97, at 57 n.7 (citing ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS
200 (1984) (1975)); see also supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
239 The “honor group” is the amalgam of persons within an honor culture “who follow the
same code of honor and who recognize each other as doing so.” STEWART, supra note 223,
at 54.
240 See, e.g., KRAUSE, supra note 224, at 2; STEWART, supra note 223, at 24; Hunt, supra
note 222, at 84; Kamir, supra note 225, at 198 (noting that the particular honor code may be
broad and general while “demanding thorough mastery of the most nuanced specific norms
and expectations”) (footnote omitted).
241 KRAUSE, supra note 224, at 4, 28.
242 STEWART, supra note 223, at 47 (emphasis omitted).
243 Hunt, supra note 222, at 93 (quoting WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE MYSTERY OF COURAGE
179 (2000)).
244 A “system” that promotes interplay or interaction is always ongoing and active, never
static or inert. A system is a dynamic, continuous process of actions and reflection based on
inputs, reactions and feedback to assess the inputs and reactions which, in turn, inspire suc-
cessive sets of inputs, reactions and feedback. Under systems theory, unlike pure structural-
functional analysis, things and events, because they move in time, cannot be understood simply
by scrutinizing them at any given moment. See, e.g., FREDERICK L. BATES, SOCIOPOLITICAL
ECOLOGY: HUMAN SYSTEMS AND ECOLOGICAL FIELDS 80 (1997); Bayer, supra note 54, at
1063 (describing the systemic interplay between emotion and reason).
245 See Kamir, supra note 225, at 198.
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and ostracism.246 Honor, approval of the honor group and, often, admiration of ob-
servers outside the honor group frequently motivate each individual within the given
honor group.247
Moreover, because honor cultures exist to indoctrinate obedience through instill-
ing specific morality, the interesting study becomes not only of the members of that
culture, but how the culture itself affects, and is affected by, the greater society’s other
honor cultures.248
Now familiar with the mechanics of honor, we may proceed first to defining that
concept and then to exploring how honor influenced the Founders.
C. Honor: Morality’s Elegant Vessel
Like morality, a clear and universally accepted definition of honor eludes.249
Some view it as an amalgam of roughly related personal characteristics and social
interactions.250 To try and tame the definition, honor could be described, and usually
is understood, at least in part, as the quest for both self-respect251 and the respect of
246 See ; STEWART, supra note 223, at 54, 111; Hunt, supra note 222, at 88–89.
247 See, e.g., KRAUSE, supra note 224, at xi (“[H]onor rests on the sense of duty to oneself.”);
see also id. at 106 (noting public recognition as motivation to abide by an honor code). As
Frederick the Great caustically observed, “the one thing that can make men march into the
muzzles of the cannon which are trained at them is honor.” BOWMAN, supra note 165, at 37.
Indeed, “[a] man’s sense of honor was something that patriot and military leaders exploited to
enjoin all men to serve the cause of the American Revolution.” COX, supra note 233, at 38.
However, Professor David Hackett Fischer aptly cautioned that, along with honor, soldiers of
the Revolution were moved by a shared deep belief in general principles of liberty, fighting for
their property and their families and an abiding sense of moral rightness. DAVID HACKETT
FISCHER, WASHINGTON’S CROSSING 364, 368 (2004).
248 Indeed, most persons belong to various interrelated and disparate honor groups. Fre-
quently, the loyalties and demands of one honor group conflict with another, or conflict with
“absolute principles.” The individual may have to choose which code will predominate, at
least in a given situation. BOWMAN, supra note 165, at 4. As a consequence,
[t]he dictates of honor can so exhaust the social landscape that they have
the power to go beyond mere elements of a culture, and instead dominate
and constitute the essential building blocks of an entire culture. When
this happens, the analysis shifts from a consideration of the behavior of
individuals within a culture who seek simply honor, to what are generally
described as entirely ‘honor-based cultures.’
Hunt, supra note 222, at 93 (quoting WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE MYSTERY OF COURAGE 179
(2000)).
249 “It may seem even that the search for a theory of honor is misguided—that the word
covers a wide variety of concepts, none of which fit together in any clear way.” STEWART,
supra note 223, at 21.
250 See Kamir, supra note 225, at 200.
251 See, e.g., ADAIR, supra note 224, at 10; Kamir, supra note 225, at 197 (discussing
Julian Pitt-Rivers, Honor and Social Status, in HONOR AND SHAME: THE VALUES OF
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others.252 Acting dishonorably, then, amounts to failing both oneself and others.253
Certainly, honor provides an instrumental, utilitarian inducement to certain behavior,
which may spawn unselfish integrity or enhance already existing selflessness.254 But,
at its worst, persons and groups employ the trappings of honor cynically to inculcate
obedience and allegiance, mystifying the susceptible into submission based on honor’s
form, rather than honor’s meaning.255 Professor Wendel undoubtedly is correct that
in a rudimentary, unsophisticated sense, “there is nothing intrinsic in the concept of
honor that makes it likely that it will be connected with virtue or justice.”256
Utilitarian reality notwithstanding, honor can, and should be, appreciated as some-
thing more and better than either mere reputation or a device predominately intended
for the disdainful manipulation of other persons. Rather, “to pledge one’s sacred honor
is to affirm, in a most emphatic way, allegiance to one’s publicly proclaimed moral
principles.”257 Therefore, at its best, honor is deontological, the framework encompass-
ing moral commands (correctly discerned, one hopes) that must be obeyed whatever
the costs. Specifically, honor is the conceptual vessel emphasizing ethical principles
along with those personal characteristics a particular person or group considers of the
utmost consequence.258 Although some included values may be important but not
essential, the honor vessel invariably contains those values believed to be indispen-
sible to a life properly lived.
Because it comprises the morality that the respective person or group likely
deems worth dying for,259 honor is not simply a motivating contrivance. Rather,
MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY 21–22 (J. G. Peristiany ed., 1966)). See generally THE NOBLEST
MINDS (Peter McNamara ed., Rowman & Littlefield Pubs., Inc. 1999).
252 “At its simplest, honor is the good opinion of the people who matter to us, and who
matter because we regard them as a society of equals who have the power to judge our
behavior.” BOWMAN, supra note 165, at 4; see also, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 226, at 1071;
Hunt, supra note 222, at 84–85, 90 (noting, inter alia, that soldiers often fight “not for [some]
great cause, but for the sake of their reputations in the eyes of their comrades and families”);
Pangle, supra note 142, at 211.
253 See, e.g., KRAUSE, supra note 224, at 5; STEWART, supra note 223, at 54–55, 111.
254 See, e.g., KRAUSE, supra note 224, at 4; infra notes 289–92 and accompanying text.
255 For instance, the noted philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer believed that honor, “is nothing
but a crude instrument of social control . . . .” BOWMAN, supra note 165, at 88 (citing Arthur
Schopenhauer, The Wisdom of Life, in ESSAYS FROM THE PARERGA AND PARALIPOMENA 63
(T. Bailey Saunders trans., 1951)).
256 W. Bradley Wendel, Regulation of Lawyers Without the Code, The Rules, or The
Restatement: Or, What Do Honor and Shame Have to Do with Civil Discovery Practice?,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1567, 1585 (2003).
257 Joseph C. Cascarelli, Is Judicial Review Grounded In and Limited by Natural Law?,
30 CUMB. L. REV. 373, 404 n.107 (2000) (quoting PAUL EIDELBERG, ON THE SILENCE OF THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 22 (1976)).
258 See, e.g., KRAUSE, supra note 224, at 7; STEWART, supra note 223, at 50–51
(discussing Anne Trowbridge, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1992, at A18); Hunt,
supra note 222, at 93–97 (describing the honor culture of the antebellum South).
259 See Ronald R. Garet, “The Last Full Measure of Devotion:” Sacrifice and Textual
Authority, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 277, 297 (2006) (“We had always thought the principles of
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more intrinsically, and consistent with its deontological aspects, honor is an end in
itself.260 As one noted author expressed honor’s intrinsic anti-consequentialism, “[t]he
sense of honor is in certain respects categorical, rather than merely instrumental. There
are some things the honorable person simply will not do—or must do—as a matter of
principle, whatever the consequences may be.”261 Therefore, in harmony with the very
deontology it embraces, honor mandates the willingness to sacrifice both oneself and,
when necessary, others.
Professor Stewart recognized the sensible linking of honor and deontology by
explaining why honor is not simply integrity; that is, “[t]o thine own self be true,”
even when one abides by personal beliefs for seemingly unselfish reasons.262 To
use an obvious example, if honor is no more than integrity, a Nazi who fights for her
“Fatherland” would be honorable, as would a Nazi who genuinely supports Hitler. Both
instances evince honor as integrity. But, “the integrity position . . . has little social
significance. In substance, the integrity position reduces honor to a virtue, and there is
no obvious reason why one would wish to pick out this particular virtue from among
various others.”263 Absent deontology, each actor may form her own idiosyncratic rules
and is only to be judged according to her integrity; that is, the actor’s strict adherence
to her chosen rules.264 In that case, only the actor is able to judge the merits of her own
honor,265 which is a ridiculous way to govern a society.
D. The Declaration of Independence Embraces Deontological Morality as the
Essential Duty of Legitimate Government
The Declaration of Independence’s significance regarding history, theory of
government and political morality are so well known that citation seems almost
superfluous.266 For example, although perhaps not regarded as an epitome of either
equal freedom and equal justice worth dying for.”); Scot J. Zentner, Friends, Enemies and
the War in Iraq: A View from the Founding, 9 NEXUS 27, 35 (2004).
260 See KRAUSE, supra note 224, at 82; Pangle, supra note 142, at 210 (asking whether we
should conceive honor as “above all for itself, [ ] exhibiting and enacting the fulfillment, the
sublime beauty, of the souls of the men of honor, who as such stand out as the most important
part of the common good, as the truest or greatest goal of a well-ordered human society?”);
see also supra notes 139–54 and accompanying text (explaining that deontological precepts
must be obeyed for their own sake).
261 KRAUSE, supra note 224, at 29. “While one always has a certain interest in acting
honorably, insofar as doing so brings about the desirable ends of self-respect and public
recognition . . . . [h]onor is categorical in the sense that it imposes obligations that are not
subject to the contingencies of a utility calculus.” Id. at 82.
262 STEWART, supra note 223, at 51.
263 Id.
264 See id. (explaining integrity as personal honor).
265 Id. Hence the famous claim purportedly from Bismark, “I can do without anyone’s
respect—except my own.” Id. at 52 n.69.
266 See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE 189–208 (1997) (discussing the reinterpretation of the document during the
336 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:287
eloquence or profundity, Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed movingly and appropri-
ately the Declaration’s enormity:
Fellow Americans, we venerate more widely than any other
document, except only the Bible, the American Declaration of
Independence. That declaration was more than a call to national
action. It is a voice of conscience establishing clear, enduring
values applicable to the lives of all [persons.] It stands enshrined
today as a charter of human liberty and dignity.267
The foregoing describes the Declaration not only by the familiar term “liberty,” but
of equal importance and greater insight, as “a voice of conscience” that designed a
“charter of human liberty and dignity.” President Eisenhower thereby fittingly linked
the American Revolution with safeguarding innate human worth, a principle that, as
we will see, perseveres as the defining concept of this nation’s greatest legal paradigm,
due process of law.268
Moreover, Eisenhower’s rather spiritual perception, urging that the Declaration
“stands enshrined” in American hearts second only to the Bible, is perfectly fitting be-
cause the Founders understood that document’s indispensable principles to be enduring,
immutable and emanating from more than human making.269 Evoking a birthright de-
rived not from humankind but from eternity, and certainly among the most famous
enunciations of the inherent human condition, the Founders asserted as “self-evident
that all [persons] are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”270
early to mid-1800s from blueprint for legitimate revolution to a basic description of funda-
mental human rights). Therefore, Professor Larson rightly bemoaned the fact that, “[f]or most
legal academics, the Declaration is little more than a political puff piece, or a ‘propaganda
manifesto,’ as Richard Hofstadter described it.” Carlton F.W. Larson, The Declaration of
Independence: A 225th Anniversary Re-Interpretation, 76 WASH. L. REV. 701, 706 (2001)
(quoting RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS 269 (1968)). Still, as Professor
Maier sagely warned for all commentators who would exploit the text, “[T]he sacralization
of the Declaration of Independence after 1815 made it a powerful text to enlist on behalf of
any cause that might conceivably claim its authority.” MAIER, supra, at 197.
267 Dwight David Eisenhower, Report by the President to the American People on His
European Trip (Sept. 10, 1959), in WILLIAM J. FEDERER, TREASURY OF PRESIDENTIAL
QUOTATIONS 322 (2004) (emphasis added).
268 See infra Part IV.
269 “[T]he fundamental premise of the American Revolution [was] that there are, in fact,
things in the temporal or political realm worth dying for, that political life as such is not
altogether inferior to the spiritual life.” Zentner, supra note 259, at 35. In that regard, evoking
a nonsectarian spiritualism from the Declaration comports nicely with deontological morality’s
similar transcendence. See supra notes 139–48 and accompanying text.
270 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Regarding punctuation that
is unfamiliar to modern English, Carl Becker proposed that Thomas Jefferson’s use of
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In ringing, celebrated prose, the Founders identified the legitimate function of public
authority: “That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted . . . deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed.”271 Accordingly, the people enjoy an in-
herent prerogative to revolt for “whenever any Form of Government becomes destruc-
tive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute
new Government . . . .”272
All this the Founders summarized in the Declaration’s renowned introduction,
proclaiming that given “the Course of human events,”273 the colonies, as a matter of
abiding, eternal right, were free to “dissolve the political bands which have connected
them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal
station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them . . . .”274 In that
regard, the Founders legitimized the declaring of independence because England’s un-
remitting maltreatment of the colonies repudiated that empire’s claim to be a legiti-
mate sovereign.275
Although the initial goal of the Continental Congress might have been to expound
a formal argument for America’s legitimate revolution, the earlier quoted commentary
of President Eisenhower evinces a fitting larger meaning. The rights that the Founders
identified as emanating from “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” are so rudi-
mentary and essential that the moral authority, and thus the legitimacy, of any govern-
ment depends entirely on that government’s devotion to those indispensable but still,
nearly two-and-a-half centuries later, incompletely comprehended rights.276 As such,
capitalization and italicization in the Declaration was designed to emphasize words he con-
sidered to be the most important. See CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE:
A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS 220–21 (Vintage Books ed., 1958) (1922).
271 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
272 Id.; see, e.g., Epstein, supra note 219, at 79 (explaining that the Framers of the
Constitution as well as the Declaration’s drafters believed any government failing properly to
promote life, liberty and pursuit of happiness should be replaced).
273 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). Later in the text, the Founders
delineated the particular “Course of human events” as incessant, significant and destructive
abuses under the rule of Great Britain. Id. paras. 2–31.
274 Id. para. 1 (emphasis added). As the Founders correspondingly accented later therein,
when shackled by, “absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such
Government . . . .” Id. para. 2.
275 See, e.g., Phillip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1842–43
(2009).
276 The Founders’ strict standards for legitimacy sprang in part from their legendary mis-
trust of the very government they knew was necessary. See Paul A. Rahe, Fame, Founders,
and the Idea of Founding in the Eighteenth Century, in THE NOBLEST MINDS, supra note
251, at 25. Thomas Paine famously stated, “Society is produced by our wants, and government
by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the
latter negatively by restraining our vices. . . . Society in every state is a blessing, but government,
even in its best state, is but a necessary evil.” Id. at 29 (quoting THOMAS PAINE, Common
Sense, in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 69 (Moncure Daniel Conway, ed., AMS Press,
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the Founders necessarily relied on deontological principles greater than the exigency
of the American Revolution.277
One of the most expressive and stirring explanations of the Declaration’s deonto-
logical premises came, not surprisingly, from Abraham Lincoln, whose reverence for
that document is well established.278 During his celebrated August 21, 1858, debate with
Stephen Douglas in Ottawa, Illinois—referencing an 1854 speech he made in Peoria,
Illinois—Lincoln explained his opposition to repealing the Missouri Compromise,
which would allow slavery in Kansas and Nebraska.279 Therein, the future President
presented the necessary connection between transcendent morality, American society
and the Declaration: “This . . . covert real zeal for the spread of slavery, I cannot but
hate . . . . especially because it forces . . . an open war with the very fundamental prin-
ciples of civil liberty—criticizing the Declaration of Independence, and insisting that
there is no right principle of action but self-interest.”280
Lincoln’s splendid sentiments require little explication, particularly considering
the proof in Part I of this Article that deontology, not consequentialism, is correct. He
properly united the Declaration with both “the very fundamental principles of civil
liberty” and the fallacy of the utilitarian assertion “that there is no right principle of
action but self-interest.”281 In this way, Lincoln explained with apt fervor the duty—the
Inc. 1967) (1776)) (emphasis omitted). As we will soon see, although articulate and evocative,
Paine erroneously underestimated government as required only to restrain the wicked among
us. To the contrary, Kant proved that government is necessary for economic and other
community intercourse among moral persons. See infra Parts III.E–G.
277 Jefferson, for example, urged “that between society and society, or generation and
generation there is no municipal obligation, no umpire but the law of nature.” Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), supra note 56, at 631–36; see, e.g., John
D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty, and
the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y. 195, 321 (2009) (discussing Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), supra note 56). Declaration signer, jurist
and future Supreme Court Justice James Wilson similarly believed in the application of eternal
principles: “we may infer, that the law of nature, though immutable in its principles, will be pro-
gressive in its operations and effects.” Id. at 194 n.907 (quoting JAMES WILSON, Of the Law
of Nature, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note , at 525 (Kermit L. Hall &
Mark David Hall eds., 2007)).
Accordingly, scholarship confirms that the Founders’ phrase “the Laws of Nature and of
Nature’s God” refers to the Liberal concept of rights emanating from human beings’ natural
state. See, e.g., Newdow v. Rio Linda Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1030 & n.23 (9th Cir. 2010)
(stating that the Declaration embraces natural law theory); ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary Cnty.,
354 F.3d 438, 453 n.7 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted), aff’d, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
278 See MAIER, supra note 266, at 205–06.
279 Abraham Lincoln–Stephen Douglas Debates, First Joint Debate at Ottawa, Ill., Lincoln’s
Reply to Douglas (Aug. 21, 1858), available at http://lincoln.lib.niu.edu/file.php?file=Nh358s
.html [hereinafter Lincoln-Douglas Debates].
280 Id. (emphasis added). Quoted more fully in the Conclusion, Lincoln’s statement encap-
sulates the essence of this Article’s constitutional thesis.
281 See id.
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sacrifice—attendant to the eternal morality that underlies the Declaration, thereby
premising this nation. It is a duty that, as we will next learn, the Founders enunci-
ated through the pledge of American lives, property and sacred honor.
E. To Secure Government’s Intrinsic Duty to Protect Transcendent “Life, Liberty
and the Pursuit of Happiness,” the Declaration Pledges Every American’s
“Sacred Honor”
With so much at stake, it is hardly surprising that in concluding words as authori-
tative as any within that document, to achieve and to uphold virtuous independence
the Founders promised humankind’s most precious possessions as their collateral:
“for the support of this Declaration . . . we mutually pledge to each other our Lives,
our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.”282 While a narrower reading of the literal words
is possible, the better interpretation is that the Founders meant the Declaration’s con-
cluding line to apply generally, not simply to them. That is, the Declaration is more
than a mutual pledge exclusively among the members of the Continental Congress or
even among the “people of the individual states as separate political entities. . . .”283
Rather, “we mutually pledge” comprises “the American people acting as a whole.”284
Similarly, conservative social critic William Bennett rightly observed,
[F]ew Americans pay enough attention to the last line of the
Declaration of Independence. . . . These are not empty words; they
are as important as the opening paragraphs of the Declaration.
Rights are important. But just as we have a fair claim on our
rights, so America’s honor—our sacred honor—has a fair claim
on us.285
282 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
283 Larson, supra note 266, at 728–29.
284 Id.
285 BENNETT, supra note 155, at 25 (emphasis added); see also MAIER, supra note 266,
at 189–208. As historian Pauline Maier explained, even if not so intended by the Founders,
the Declaration has become a pivotal American exemplar of the innate rights of persons qua
persons. She quoted as emblematic the sentiments Peleg Sprague expressed in Hallowell, Maine
in 1826, the Declaration’s fiftieth anniversary. Sprague extolled that text as a, “Declaration, by
a whole people, of what before existed, and will always exist, the native equality of the human
race, as the true foundation of all political, of all human institutions.” Id. at 191 (emphasis
omitted). Such opinion, according to Professor Maier, “contributed to a modern reading of
the document that had begun to develop among Jeffersonian Republicans in the 1790s but be-
came increasingly common after the 1820s, and gradually eclipsed altogether the document’s
assertion of the right of revolution.” Id. But, of course, that “right of revolution” is predicated
on, as Sprague put it, “the native equality of the human race, as the true foundation of . . . all
human institutions,” particularly government. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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Thus, to thwart illicit government and consistent with the responsibility of timeless
morality, all are obliged, if circumstances require, to sacrifice—specifically, to secure
liberty with their lives, property and honor.
There is, however, a crucial contrast between “sacred Honor,” on the one hand,
and “Lives” and “Fortunes,” on the other. Regarding those three possessions of surely
inestimable worth, two are transitory—lives and fortunes—while only “sacred Honor,”
imbued with deontological morality, endures beyond time and space. Indeed, although
indisputably valued, the Founders did not express as sacrosanct life and property; but,
they designated honor to be “sacred.”286 That disjuncture leads to the interesting fact
that the preservation of liberty demands the populace’s willingness to sacrifice earthly
treasures—life and property—while the enduring treasure honor effectively safeguards
liberty only if it is not sacrificed. One must be, and remain honorable by being, devot-
ing to the honor culture of legitimate government through preserving those honor codes
that vouchsafe such government. Therefore, because honor is deontological, upholding
the moral requisites of “sacred Honor” may engender attendant sacrifices—pain, loss,
distress—that affect oneself, others or both.287 Thus, for the Founders, sacrifice is inte-
gral to the letter and spirit of the Declaration: sacrifice measured as the loss of property,
the loss of life and the price of honor.
It is no surprise, therefore, that modern analysts posit the pursuit of honor as a
prime, if not the prime, incentive for the founding of the United States—meaning the
Declaration, the Revolution and the Constitution considered together. Indeed, the con-
cept of honor has remained a dominant impetus throughout America’s history. “[H]onor
has been a guardian of American democracy from its inception . . . . Perhaps honor’s
most distinctive contribution has been to set in motion great acts of courage in defense
of liberty at defining moments in American history . . . .”288
Possibly more than any other historian, Professor Douglass Adair is credited with
recognizing the huge influence of honor and the pursuit thereof over the Founders.289
286 See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 222, at 90 (“In this construction, the Founders made it clear
that in an honor culture one’s honor was more important than either his life or his fortune.”).
287 See supra notes 257–62 and accompanying text.
288 KRAUSE, supra note 224, at 97; see also Burley, supra note 232, at 484–87 (discussing
the Founders’ views on honor and morality in government); Horwitz, supra note 226, at 1068
(arguing that the president’s oath of office set forth in the Constitution in effect requires the
office holder to pledge his personal honor to protect, as president, the nation’s honor).
289 ADAIR, supra note 224. Indeed, Adair’s argument “constituted a challenge to the reigning
interpretation of the founding period, which stressed the role of economic forces. The economic
interpretation of the founding is now widely regarded as inadequate.” Peter McNamara, Preface
to THE NOBLEST MINDS, supra note 251, at vii; see also, e.g., KRAUSE, supra note 224, at
101–03 (Adair tried to reconcile the conflicting theories of Charles Beard’s AN ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, (The Free Press 1986) (1913),
arguing that economic motivations explain the Revolution and responses to Beard that the
Founders were motivated by grand ideas, inspired visions and self-sacrifice).
I am particularly indebted to my colleague Professor David Tanenhaus for suggesting that
I research Professor Adair’s theories and responses thereto.
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Recognizing them as complex personalities, susceptible, as are we all, to various com-
plementary and conflicting inducements, Professor Adair explained that the Founders
embraced honor substantially, but hardly entirely, to pursue noble altruism.290 Rather,
the Founders candidly admitted their quite-human longing for fame, honor, glory291
and posterity’s favor which, along with patriotism, and a calling to serve the best
interests of their community, “urge[d] some of them to act with a nobleness and great-
ness that their earlier careers had hardly hinted at.”292 Impelled by their passion for
honor, the Founders matured to respect public service inherently, not solely for its
utilitarian recompense.293
Moreover, the Founders relied on honor to motivate honest, conscientious, able
individuals to accept not very lucrative public service.294 Despairing that disinterested
virtue and selflessness could not sufficiently motivate public service, John Adams re-
luctantly joined Hamilton’s, Morris’s and Madison’s opinion that “‘pride and vanity’
of America’s leading [citizens] could be deployed in defense of justice and good
government.”295 Specifically, constitutional checks and balances, designed to prevent
usurpation, despotism and the collapse of the nation into a loose confederation of
states, would succeed by attracting persons of “pride and vanity” who sought power,
prestige, and self-aggrandizement.296 Yet, by virtue of the offices and the public trust
290 ADAIR, supra note 224, at 8, 24–25.
291 See Rahe, supra note 276, at 5. The Founders frankly acknowledged that, in the words
of Gouverneur Morris, “the love of fame” is “the great spring to noble & illustrious actions.”
Id. In The Federalist, Hamilton notably observed that the quest for fame is “the ruling passion
of the noblest minds.” Id.
292 ADAIR, supra note 224, at 8. As Adair gracefully summarized regarding the drafting
of the Constitution,
[T]he greatest and the most effective leaders of 1787—no angels they,
but passionately selfish and self-interested men—were giants in part be-
cause the Revolution had led them to redefine their notions of interest
and had given them, through the concept of fame, a personal stake in
creating a national system dedicated to liberty, to justice, and to the
general welfare.
Id. at 24.
293 Id. 
294 For instance, “Washington saw clearly that honor alone could not be counted on to make
Americans serve the republic against their interests, but he saw equally clearly that without it
the cause was lost.” Lorraine Smith Pangle & Thomas L. Pangle, George Washington and
the Life of Honor, in THE NOBLEST MINDS, supra note 251, at 69.
295 Rahe, supra note 276, at 5–6.
296 Id. As Vice President, John Adams campaigned unsuccessfully,
to have grand titles conferred on the leading magistrates and legislators
of the new republic. . . . Even when that campaign failed and he found
himself dubbed ‘His Rotundity’ and treated with mockery in circles
which had once inspired affection, consideration, and respect, Adams
persisted in making the case for pomp and circumstance.
Id. at 6–7.
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they engender, selfish motives would be, if not replaced, at least calmed by honor.297
Thus, the Constitution and the Declaration were not ‘miracles,’ as sometimes claimed,
nor dei ex machinae, but the extraordinary creations of leaders spurred to greatness
largely by the yearning to be well and fondly remembered as the creators of a great
society. Perhaps paradoxically, the spur for fame helped them to cherish much more
fully the intrinsic rewards of public service in particular and of honor in general.298
F. The Declaration Did Not Conclude, but Rather Began the New Nation’s
Mission to Understand and to Attain “Sacred Honor”
As the Declaration’s plain text accents, honor, the morality honor denotes, and the
legitimacy of government predicated on honor, were deeply rooted in the hearts of
those who envisioned and created the United States.299 Indeed, as Professor Krause
stressed, “[t]he connection between honor and natural rights in the founding genera-
tion marks an important departure from traditional forms of honor. Democratic honor
frequently (although not always) is tied to universal principles of right rather than
to concrete codes of conduct applicable only to a particular group.”300
It is here that we move to a most important realization emanating from the
Declaration as an expression of the Founders’ shared concept of “sacred Honor,”
broadly defined. The Founders knew that their noble motives were entwined with their
“love of fame,” personal ambition and vanity.301 They also recognized that, due to their
frailty and imperfect wisdom, their political-moral philosophy was neither complete
nor correct in all regards.302 Consequently, as with understanding the Constitution, we
must take the Founders’ expression of “sacred Honor” not to be the last word, but in-
stead as part of ongoing deliberation of that subject. Like the Constitution,303 we may
297 As Madison explained, “[B]ecause this office holder and his colleagues represented ‘the
dignity of their country in the eyes of other nations,’ they would ‘be particularly sensible to
every prospect of public danger, or of a dishonorable stagnation in public affairs.’” Id. at 6
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 at 386 and NO. 58, at 395 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1961)).
298 See ADAIR, supra note 224, at 24. “In light of the role that the ‘laws of honor’ played in
the personal and political values of America’s Founding Fathers, it is no surprise that the . . .
Declaration of Independence closes with an exhortation to the signer’s sense of honor.” Hunt,
supra note 222, at 89 (quoting JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS
IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 170–71 (2001)).
299 See, e.g., KRAUSE, supra note 224, at 113–16; Hunt, supra note 222, at 83–84 (citing
KRAUSE, supra note 224, at 2–3).
300 KRAUSE, supra note 224, at 107 (emphasis added).
301 Rahe, supra note 276, at 5–6; see also ADAIR, supra note 224, at 8, 24–25.
302 See Sanford Levinson, Our Schizoid Approach to the U.S. Constitution: Competing
Narratives of Constitutional Dynamism and Stasis, 84 IND. L. J. 1337, 1355 (2009).
303 E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003); Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847–48 (1992); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941);
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442–43 (1934); Village of Euclid v.
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appreciate the Declaration not only in its own context, but as the wellspring of prin-
ciples, understood profoundly, yet only partially by the Founders. Indeed, they hoped
that subsequent generations would attain an ever-fuller understanding, even if eluci-
dation invalidated customs and beliefs that they either did not recognize as immoral or
so recognized but nonetheless, for political, pragmatic or other purportedly appropriate
reasons, refused to abandon.
Addressing the question “Whether one generation of men has the right to bind
another . . . [which is] among the fundamental principles of every government,”304
Thomas Jefferson, the Declaration’s primary author, cited the deontology of morality:
“[B]ut that between society and society, or generation and generation there is no munic-
ipal obligation, no umpire but the law of nature.”305 Similarly ,and of extraordinary
significance, James Madison unequivocally emphasized in The Federalist No. 14, “the
leaders of the revolution . . . pursued a new and . . . noble course. . . . They reared the
fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of the globe. They formed the
design of a great Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their successors to improve
and perpetuate.”306 The “Father of the Bill of Rights” supported his assertion with a
rhetorical question he had raised earlier in that essay:
Is it not the glory of the people of America, that whilst they have
paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other
nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity,
for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own
good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons
of their own experience?307
Reiterating that sentiment shortly before the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration,
Madison wrote to Jefferson, “And I indulge a confidence that sufficient evidence will
find its way to another generation, to ensure, after we are gone, whatever of justice may
be withheld whilst we are here.”308 Madison certainly implored that future Americans
find inspiration and guidance from, but not be shackled by, the words, acts, and beliefs
of the Founders.309
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). But see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 721 & n.17 (1997).
304 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), supra note 299, at
631–32.
305 Id. As one commentator concluded, Jefferson believed that “to lock in future generations
to the eighteenth-century mores and ethics would be absurd.” Bessler, supra note 277, at 321
(discussing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), supra note 56).
306 THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 88–89 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Wesleyan
Univ. Press 1961) (emphasis added).
307 Id. at 88.
308 Bessler, supra note 277, at 321, n.906 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Feb. 24, 1826)).
309 See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 302, at 1355. Professor Levinson argued that Madison’s
“eloquent” words reflect the “central question” confronting both the Founders and arguably
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James Wilson, another renowned signer, similarly linked the moral foundations
expressed in the Declaration to future, better comprehension beyond that of the
Founders themselves:
Morals are undoubtedly capable of being carried to a much higher
degree of excellence than the sciences, excellent as they are. Hence
we may infer, that the law of nature, though immutable in its
principles, will be progressive in its operations and effects. . . .
In every period of his existence, the law, which the divine wisdom
has approved for man, will not only be fitted, to the contemporary
degree, but will be calculated to produce, in future, a still higher
degree of perfection.310
The crucial tenet that the Founders themselves directed their successors to con-
tinue the quest for moral perfection has not been lost on subsequent American leaders.
Abraham Lincoln, for instance, rejected as unsound the argument that we can only
understand and advance the general principles of the Founders by accepting without
question their every precept, nuance and discrete belief.311 As noted scholars have
urged, Lincoln offered that the Founders were not actually ready to accord the universal
principle of equality they venerated in the document.312 Therefore, “[t]he Declaration
was intrinsically reformist insofar as it would push the nation forward and upward by
promising universal liberty and equality for all, thereby inviting the reforms required
to fulfill its promise.”313
Not a decade ago, discussing the Constitution’s Due Process Clauses, the Supreme
Court expressed the principle in persuasive words fully applicable to the authors of
the Declaration:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the com-
ponents of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have
been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight.
successive generations of Americans, “Are we capable of exercising our own reflection and to
make our own well-reasoned choices about how we wish to govern ourselves, or are we, on
the contrary, trapped within a static constitutional structure . . . ?” Id.
310 Bessler, supra note 277, at 321, n.907 (quoting WILSON, supra note 277, at 525).
311 MAIER, supra note 266, at 205–06.
312 KRAUSE, supra note 224, at 138.
313 Id. at 138–39 (citing HARRY V. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED 315–21
(Doubleday, 1959)); see also, e.g., MAIER, supra note 266, at 205–06. Lincoln “saw the
Declaration of Independence’s statements on equality and rights as setting a standard for the
future, one that demanded the gradual extinction of conflicting practices [particularly slavery]
as that became possible . . . .” Id. at 205.
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They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later genera-
tions can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact
serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in
every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for
greater freedom.314
Conservative analyst William Bennett expressed concisely and unromantically why
the creators of the Revolution cannot have the last word: “The Founders certainly were
no angels—often they did not live by their own advice.”315
Accordingly, in faith with the Declaration, we must understand even better than
did the Founders the contours of transcendent morality—“the Laws of Nature and
of Nature’s God,” if you will—that keeps legitimate government in check. Surely,
as would any good parents, the Founders expected from us sufficient fortitude—
“sacred Honor”—to discover the depths of morality they did not know, to vouchsafe
through government the moral duties they could not or would not endure and to accept
the sacrifices our greater appreciation of morality requires.
While it is doubtful that the Founders would have agreed that the “Constitution
is a suicide pact,”316 their basic expression of “unalienable Rights” incited and con-
tinues to elucidate our increasing understanding of honor’s bequest, particularly due
process of law.317 Consistent with our duty to learn more about the profundity and
meaning of their principles than did the Founders themselves, we turn to arguably the
greatest expression of morality’s value monism, Kantian honor.
314 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003); see also United States v. Comstock,
130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010) (“The Federal Government undertakes activities today that
would have been unimaginable to the Framers . . . . Yet the powers conferred upon the
Federal Government by the Constitution were phrased in language broad enough to allow for
the expansion of the Federal Government’s role.”) (quoting New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 157 (1992)); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 847–49 (1992) (holding that the meaning of “liberty” is not limited to perceptions of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment nor to the enumeration of specific protections under
the Bill of Rights); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 226 (1986); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941) (“[I]n setting up an enduring framework of gov-
ernment [the Framers] undertook to carry out for the indefinite future and in all the vicis-
situdes of the changing affairs of men, those fundamental purposes which the instrument
itself discloses.”).
Speaking for the Court, seventy years before Lawrence, Chief Justice Hughes expressed
the concept as virtually self-evident: “It is no answer . . . to insist that what the provision of the
Constitution meant to the vision of [the Framers’] day it must mean to the vision of our time . . .
that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-day . . . carries its own
refutation.” Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442–43 (1934).
315 BENNETT, supra note 155, at 18.
316 See, e.g., infra notes 488–90 and accompanying text.
317 See infra notes 539–59 and accompanying text.
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III. THE KANTIAN OVERVIEW
I turn to the profound ideas inspired by the writings of Immanuel Kant to elucidate
the value monism evoked by the Founders. I agree with the many theorists arguing
that Kant’s moral philosophy best captures the spirit, if not the letter, of pledging one’s
honor to fulfill the fundamental task of good government: securing “Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness.”
Few philosophers have provoked the imagination and engendered the respect
of modern legal theorists as has Immanuel Kant. Perhaps more than any other post-
Hellenistic thinker before him, Kant provided a workable articulation of the abstract
moral base below which human behavior and the laws regulating human behavior can-
not go.318 In particular, Kant’s ideas premise much contemporary deontology, espe-
cially for theorists who espouse the inevitable intersection of law and morality319 to
defend the robust assertion of justice as “fairness.”320 Accordingly, my argument is
that Kantian Ethics—also appropriately known as Kantian Honor—best expresses
the flowering of the moral precepts that the Founders vouchsafed in the Declaration
with America’s “sacred Honor.”321 Because “sacred Honor” is elaborated, explicated
and enforced via the Constitution’s Due Process Clauses,322 due process should be
understood as the American idiom of Kantian Honor.
Any writer must approach Kantian analysis with great caution and modesty. Com-
mentators often disagree about particular meanings of Kantian theory or whether he had
a fully coherent theory at all.323 Of course, such debates do not limit commentators’
prerogative to find inspiration from ambiguous or incomplete philosophies. Conse-
quently, even if one can “make[ ] no claim to have arrived at the understanding that
Kant intended . . . . [a justifiable] goal is to construct a useful understanding of Kant’s
formula . . . rather than one that would have met with Kant’s approval.”324 Nonetheless,
there appears to be sufficient agreement that Kant’s philosophy, especially his moral
318 See Carlson, supra note 48, at 33 (“Kant’s project was to render morality undogmatic—
to ground it in the fact of reason.”).
319 If Kant is right, “the condition for the existence of a legal system is morality as such.”
Id. at 23. Thus, Positivism is wrong to conclude that there is no inevitable connection between
law and morals. Id.
320 See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 34, at 106 (to speak of “rights” requires a context of
“justice or fairness,” which, in turn, “can be operative only in a context of institutionalized
procedures guaranteeing due process . . .”) (citing Immanuel Kant, Concerning the Common
Saying: This May Be True in Theory but does not Apply in Practice, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
KANT 289 (Carl J. Friedrich trans., 1949) (1793)); see also John Rawls, Justice as Fairness,
67 PHIL. REV. 164 (1958).
321 See infra notes 363–65 and accompanying text.
322 See infra Part IV.F.
323 E.g., WOOD, supra note 24, at 206.
324 Wright, supra note 36, at 274.
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theory, provides a dependable grounding to assess individual and societal behavior
in general and legal principles in particular. Intellectuals, such as the properly cele-
brated John Rawls, have restored Kant’s proper place at the heart of the debate on both
theoretical and functional morality, especially the morals of law.325
A final preliminary matter merits brief mention: the emphatic distinction between
“Kantian ethics” and “Kant’s ethics,” with most commentators accepting the former
and rebuking the latter—in a manner similar to embracing the paradigms of the
Founders but not necessarily their actual applications of their own moral theory.326
Kant’s ethics are his specific moral applications and discrete moral conclusions.327
“Kantian ethics, on the other hand, is an ethical theory formulated in the basic spirit
of Kant . . . .”328 A proponent of Kantian ethics enthusiastically adapts Kant’s broad
principles to form what she believes is either a more accurate, pertinent meta-theory
or a better application of such to precise circumstances. By contrast, most modern
critics find Kant’s ethics steeped in untoward prejudices and senseless fanaticism.329
325 See WOOD, supra note 24, at x. Until the mid-twentieth century, the idea that ethics could
be subject to rational discourse was in some disrepute, with critics arguing morality was, at best,
a set of abstract principles not readily applicable to discrete social and personal dilemmas. Many
of those who still pursued a reasoned analysis of morality “took it for granted that utilitarian-
ism was the only possible basis for rational discussion . . . .” Id. This changed with Rawls and
his commentators, who “showed not only that ethical theory could be treated with analytical
sophistication and applied to issues of vital social concern, but also that Kantian ideas were
indispensable to doing this in the right way.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Powers, supra
note 33, at 1575–88 (discussing Rawls’s adaptation of Kantian morality).
326 See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 24, at xii.
327 Id. at 1.
328 Id.
329 Some scholars maintain that modern “fashionable assumptions” misconceive much of
Kant’s ethics. See, e.g., id. at 2. Still, the prevailing sentiment castigates Kant for believing, to
cite three examples, (1) that one must keep a trivial promise, such as guaranteeing to be some-
where by noon, even when breaking that promise might save a life, (2) that one may never take
an innocent life regardless of the consequences, and (3) that lying is immoral under any circum-
stance even if speaking truthfully reveals to a potential murderer the location of her intended
victim. See, e.g., Kuklin, supra note 34, at 499–500; Waldron, supra note 15, at 1536. Of course,
one could imagine and defend a moral system that absolutely forbade breaking promises, telling
lies and killing the innocent. Conceivably, if everyone actually abided by such principles the
world would be better, even happier, as war would be unpalatable, homicide would be unknown,
and honesty in interpersonal relations would prevail over rationalizations, obsequiousness
and duplicity.
Regarding prejudice, Kant considered non-Caucasians intellectually limited, which he attrib-
uted in large measure to those races having developed in unsuitable climates and environments.
In later writings, Kant appeared to have modified, but not fully repudiated, his racial theories
which may have had a substantial influence on racist models of the 18th and 19th Centuries.
See WOOD, supra note 24, at 8, 10–11. Similarly, Kant thought women inferior to men both
intellectually and physically. Id. at 7.
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In these regards, much of the philosophical world scorns, “the stiff, inhuman, moralistic
Prussian ogre everyone knows by the name Immanuel Kant.”330
Yet, Kant espoused profound respect for the individual, particularly that each of us
may be self-motivating, self-reflecting, cognizant of moral duties and willing to accept
responsibility for our actions.331 Correspondingly, Kant’s argument that morality is
more precious than life332 evinces an abiding faith in the nobility of humankind that
many arguably non-bigoted consequentialists lack.
A. Kant’s Dignity Principle
The Kantian philosophy of moral honor might be encapsulated within the propo-
sition that “[b]ecause the worth of every human being is absolute, the worth of all per-
sons is fundamentally equal.”333 This parity of worth stems from the unique rational
capacity inherent in each human being. Accepting the liberal premise that persons are
educable in reason, Kant argued that the compelling attribute of humankind is the
“rational capacities [of individuals], including their ability to make rational choices re-
garding what is deeply valuable or worthy.”334 Rational capacity is special because it
allows persons to be more than the effects of their environments. Rather, consistent with
our general perception of deontology, persons may rationally discern deontological
330 WOOD, supra note 24, at xii.
331 Id. at 3. Indeed, Kant argued that respecting others may require not simply refraining
from acting immorally, but also taking affirmative steps to render assistance. See HILL, supra
note 61, at 202; Wright, supra note 36, at 277. Going further, Professor Wood explained that
according to Kantian philosophy, we all have a duty of “sympathetic participation,” that is to
develop an understanding and appreciation of that which may foster the happiness of others.
WOOD, supra note 24, at 176–77. Thus, contrary to some cursory critiques, Kantian ethics
requires persons to be compassionate and humane. See, e.g., id. at 171.
332 See infra notes 351–57 and accompanying text.
333 WOOD, supra note 24, at 3.
334 Wright, supra note 36, at 274. Similarly, Professor Wood explained,
Kant’s theory of the will takes us to be agents who are self-directing in
the sense that we have the capacity to step back from our natural desires,
reflect on them, consider whether and how we should satisfy them, and
to be moved by them only on the basis of such reflections.
WOOD, supra note 24, at 67. If so moved, we select means to attain our chosen goals.
The origins of Kant’s philosophy stretch back over two millennia, particularly to Cicero
who argued that:
[T]he ability to reason turned man into an autonomous being, able to
choose his fate and act upon that choice. This conception of dignity, as
being based in man’s ability to reason, has been described as “the central
claim of modernity—man’s autonomy, his capacity to be lord of his fate
and the shaper of his future.”
John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 655,
677 (2008) (quoting Yehoshua Arieli, On the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the
Emergence of the Doctrine of the Dignity of Man and His Rights, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN
DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 1, 12 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002)).
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morality, or at least make serious, arguably useful attempts to do so.335 To that effect,
Kant proposed the idea of “practical freedom,”
namely, a capacity to follow determinate laws given by the faculty
of reason . . . the capacity to recognize rational nature as an end
335 See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text. This Article has already addressed under
deontology, and need not repeat, the well-known objections that persons are capable neither
of making rational decisions nor of understanding a priori principles. See supra notes 97–117
and accompanying text.
Given its crucial importance, a very brief explication of Kant’s “idea of reason” is apt. Kant
“formulated reason as the ability of humans to appreciate the implications or ‘universality’
of their actions.” Castiglione, supra note 334, at 678 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., HILL,
supra note 61, at 40–41, 207–08 (noting that humans’ rationality enables them to plan for and
consider future consequences); Tesón, supra note 53, at 75–76 (asserting that Kant believed
republics’ constitutions should apply cosmopolitan moral theory). Reason enables univer-
sality by “order[ing] concepts so as to give them the greatest possible unity combined with
the widest possible application.” Weinrib, supra note 83, at 479 (citing KANT, supra note 83,
at *A644/B672). Thus, reason performs the “systematizing function” by which persons both
understand discrete concepts and form ever larger amalgams of ideas, culminating in an
“articulated unity . . . upon which all the conceptual lines converge,” which certainly accords
with our earlier discussion of value monism in morality. Id. at 480.
Within the realm of reason, Kant emphasized “practical reason,” which is “[a] will which
can be determined independently of sensuous impulses [passion and emotion], and therefore
through motives which are represented only by reason . . . .” Id. at 481 (citing KANT, supra note
83, at *A800/B828–A802/B830). The facility for practical reason is essential because people
must think as deontologists, not as consequentialists, so that they may embrace standards appli-
cable to all and not simply to the self to promote the self’s own well being. See id. at 483.
The capacity for practical reason allows for “practical judgment,” meaning “the capacity
to descend correctly from a universal principle to particular instances that conform to it.” WOOD,
supra note 24, at 152; see also, e.g., Wright, supra note 36, at 278 (discussing KANT, supra
note 93, at 156). Through “practical judgment” individuals can both derive lower level moral
precepts from morality’s value monism—the dignity principle—and discern how to apply such
precepts to discrete scenarios. Such is not, however, merely
a rigorous deductive procedure. Instead, we should think of the
[process] . . . more as interpretive or hermeneutical in character. Rules
or duties [and proper applications] result when the basic value and
fundamental principle are interpreted in light of a set of general em-
pirical facts about the human condition and human nature, perhaps also
as modified by cultural or historical conditions.
WOOD, supra note 24, at 60; see also, e.g., Carlson, supra note 48, at 37–38. Thus, judgment
may be learned but cannot be appreciated merely by understanding rules uninformed by ex-
perience. WOOD, supra note 24, at 64. That would be like trying to understand chess simply
by reading a rule book without ever playing the game. This is consistent with the previously
explained beneficial effects of experience on generating and informing deontological inquiry.
See supra Part I.D.
Practical judgment can, but certainly does not inevitably, render wisdom “a comprehensive
knowledge of which ends to pursue, how to combine them, and how to pursue them under con-
tingent conditions.” WOOD, supra note 24, at 153; Carlson, supra note 48, at 37–38 (stating
that practical reason cannot impart whether freedom or nature generate human action).
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in itself as a reason for acting in certain ways, and to act in those
ways on the basis of that reason . . . the capacity to act for reasons,
rather than only on the basis of feelings, impulses, or desires that
might occur independently of reasons.336
The extraordinary potential human competence inherent in practical freedom—
the aptitude to discern meaningfully, if not perfectly, a priori rules and to understand
that the moral duty of obedience stems from those rules’ a priori nature—comprises
nothing less than “the fundamental condition of being a person—in the sense of a
being that can be held morally and legally responsible for its actions . . . .”337
Persons’ capacity for rational thought—allowing intentionally moral behavior—in
turn, accords every person an intrinsic or native dignity that every other person must
respect.338 Indeed, and of supreme consequence, these unique and sublime attributes
oblige that “to the extent that they are capable of free and autonomous thinking and of
genuine moral deliberation, people possess dignity, or worth, as ends in themselves.”339
Certainly, Kant did not assert that the capacity to reason assures the correct “solution
to every controversy.”340 Many scholars purport an inevitable indeterminacy of concepts
that precludes complete certainty;341 although as argued in the deontology portion of
this Article, indeterminacy must derive from humankind’s present inability to reason
flawlessly and not from the concepts themselves. Were we capable of perfect under-
standing arising from perfect reasoning capacity, we would discover perfect resolutions
to moral dilemmas. Nonetheless, the potential to contemplate by escaping environ-
mental influences in the conscientious quest for truth allows persons not only to expect,
but to demand that their dignity be respected.342
As important as the right to demand dignity is the concomitant duty to respect dig-
nity. Because all persons are “ends in themselves,” each person enjoys the primary right
that his or her dignity be respected by all others as he or she must respect the dignity of
336 WOOD, supra note 24, at 127.
337 Id. at 129.
338 See id. at 94.
339 Wright, supra note 36, at 275 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). “Kantian ethics
rests on a single fundamental value—the dignity or absolute worth of rational nature, as giving
moral laws and as setting rational ends.” WOOD, supra note 24, at 94.
340 Weinrib, supra note 83, at 506. “[T]he inability of the concept of right to predetermine
hard cases is merely the unavoidable concomitant of . . . being an idea of reason.” Id. at 507.
341 A concept is a universal, that is, something general that applies to the
many particular instances falling under it. One invokes a concept not to
produce a full enumeration of its instances but to clarify them by reference
to the common category to which they belong. Particulars . . . always con-
tain something contingent with respect to their universal. Because of this
contingency, they cannot be derived from any definition of the concept.
Id. at 505–06.
342 Wright, supra note 36, at 274–75.
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all others.343 Accordingly, innate dignity allows individuals to demand moral treatment
from others while simultaneously requiring those individuals to treat others morally.344
This is the core of Kantian moral honor—and, in legal realms, of Kantian justice—for
to act in ways that offend this right is to be immoral,345 and thus dishonorable.
Because the capacity for rational thought is presumed among all persons, the dig-
nity owed to each person is not a function of whether she has actually acted in a dig-
nified manner—rationally, humanely and morally.346 That someone acts immorally
does not free others from their moral duties, even if they are victimized by those im-
moral acts. The core of Kantian honor, then, is an individual’s, a group’s or a society’s
faithful respect for the dignity of all other persons, groups and societies.347 Accordingly,
as we discovered within deontology, the immoral conduct of others cannot justify re-
sponding in kind; we may not use immorality to fight immorality.348 Nor is destroying
dignity justified on the utilitarian theory that doing so preserves more dignity than was
destroyed.349 One human being is never inherently more valuable than another human
being; therefore, and most profoundly, human beings are not fungible.350
B. Each Person’s Innate Dignity Is More Precious than Life
Given its singular importance, Kant posited logically but notoriously that the
value of humankind’s innate dignity is priceless, indeed greater than life itself be-
cause “[t]he value of the end . . . must have existed already prior to [one’s] rational
choice.”351 That is, both the moral law and individuals’ abilities to rationally discern
morality exist before one actually makes any moral choices, which underscores
343 WOOD, supra note 24, at 215 (quoting Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, in
CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE WRITINGS OF IMMANUEL KANT 6:237 (1992)).
344 See id.
345 See id.
346 See, e.g., MULHOLLAND, supra note 55, at 94, 314; Wright, supra note 36, at 275.
347 See supra notes 339–43 and accompanying text (explaining that moral duties inure to
and are born by human associations as well as individual persons). Accordingly, dignity is not
a comparable entity. That Jones’s behavior respects the dignity of fellow individuals while
Smith’s conduct does not, neither lessens Smith’s innate dignity nor enhances Jones’s, although
we may pronounce Jones more praiseworthy than Smith (and Smith may warrant societal chas-
tisement including, if her disregard of others’ dignity constitutes a crime, criminal penalties).
348 See supra notes 149–53 and accompanying text.
349 See, e.g., Tom Stacy, Acts, Omissions, and the Necessity of Killing Innocents, 29 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 481, 501–12 (2002); see also WOOD, supra note 24, at 331 n.1.
350 “The assignment of dignity to each rational agent [even those who choose not to act
rationally], then, functions not to introduce a new kind of value calculation, but rather to
block our tendency to treat rational agents as interchangeable commodities.” HILL, supra
note 61, at 205; see also, e.g., KORSGAARD, supra note 68, at 309–10 n.46; Wright, supra
note 36, at 275–76 (asserting that dignity in all persons is equal and incomparable).
351 WOOD, supra note 24, at 92.
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why, as noted, rational “capacity . . . is not represented merely as the object of a con-
tingent inclination . . . . It must be esteemed as unconditionally good, as an end in
itself.”352 Because morality and dignity are interrelated ends in and of themselves,
human beings—the repositories of morality and dignity—likewise must be regarded
and treated as ends in themselves.353
“The duty to respect others is grounded in the value of their humanity, not in their
achievements or their moral conduct . . . . To preserve human life per se is not among
the principles.”354 It could not be otherwise because the compulsory duty to regard
each person’s innate dignity as more important than the preservation of anything else,
even life and security, is deontological. Logically then, Kant avowed that the essence
of immorality, thus the essence of evil, is to offend dignity. As we know, deontological
morality, which precedes any actual moral decision, prohibits us from doing evil re-
gardless of outcome.355 If it is evil to defy other persons’ dignity, we must suffer the
consequences of refraining from our evil preferences no matter how terrible those con-
sequences may be.356 The dignity principle, then, is Kantian ethics’ value monism,
that is, morality’s elementary requirement—its foundational command,357 a central
corollary to “Let justice be done even if the world should perish.”358
We now may also appreciate that Kant’s philosophy valuing the innate potential
for nobility above human life is not premised on an unthinkingly literal, fetishistic ardor
for human beings’ rational abilities. Rather, Kant argued that only the value monism of
respecting each person’s rational capacity enables us to discern the fabric of ethics that
clothes us against the allure of doing evil that is endemic to social order itself.359 Kant’s
theories are informed by Rousseau’s lament “of the way our natural desires have been
influenced by the loss of innocence—the restless competitiveness—characteristic of
human beings in the social condition . . . .”360 Kant believed that the “only resource in
combating the radical evil of our social condition is the faculty of reason . . . .”361
Accordingly, as we will soon confirm but may intuit now, Kant’s “dignity
principle” forms the core of his theory of legal justice pursuant to which, consistent
352 Id. at 91 (emphasis added); see also HILL, supra note 61, at 202 (arguing that the rational
capacity of even those who act unethically is an end of itself). Such, of course, is consistent
with the earlier-explained obligation that obeying deontological morality is an end in itself.
353 See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
354 HILL, supra note 61, at 204.
355 See supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text.
356 See supra notes 135–43 and accompanying text.
357 This is Kant’s “radical,” “defiant and paradoxical[ ]” egalitarianism, the “most funda-
mental idea in Kantian ethics.” WOOD, supra note 24, at 94.
358 KANT, supra note 15, at 102 n.16.
359 See WOOD, supra note 24, at 178–80.
360 Id. at 4.
361 Id. at 5. Professor Wood explicated that even when moral commands are relatively clear,
their “flagrant violation is extremely common, even built systematically into the basic familial,
economic, criminal justice, military, political and other institutions of many societies.” Id. at 57.
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with morality’s and dignity’s worth above even life, Kant urged “‘if justice goes, there
is no longer any value in men’s living on the earth[.]’”362
In light of the foregoing, Professor Pangle appropriately offered that the dignity
principle—the bedrock of Kantian justice—is best understood as a form of honor.363
Pangle’s logic certainly supports this Article’s attempt to link to the Founders’ quest
for a better conception of “sacred Honor” to Kant. In response to Locke’s arguments
that persons should pursue utilitarian happiness with security and property interests
as paramount goals, Kant proposed “a new and nobler account of liberalism and the
liberal meaning of honor.”364 The dignity principle requires us to “discover in our-
selves a higher call—the reverence for a life of principle . . . a life lived according to
a moral code or law, for its own sake, as the supreme end in itself to which all other
ends or interests must be subordinated and if necessary sacrificed.”365 Such is honor—
the principled life.366
C. Kant’s Categorical Imperative—Formulation One, Universal Maxims
As explained above, Kant embraced liberalism’s conception of actors in society:
people and groups act purposefully to maximize their individual happiness. To attain
their personal goals, individuals must interact in a social milieu, unavoidably contact-
ing, involving and affecting others often against their inclinations or preferences.367 The
fundamental question of individual personhood vis-à-vis social interaction is: How are
actors to know whether their choice of goals and the means to attain their goals comport
with the innate dignity of those who, wittingly or unwittingly, are thereby affected? Put
a bit differently, how do actors know that they are abiding by the dignity principle?
For Kant, the expedient to abide by the dignity principle is the hugely important
Categorical Imperative (CI),368 Kant’s “supreme principle of morality”369 deduced
from “pure practical reason”370 and expressed as “a universal law that all rational
362 Waldron, supra note 15, at 1540 (quoting KANT, supra note 15, at 141). Professor
Sunstein likewise observed in the American context, Kantian adjudication means “even if the
heavens will fall, the Constitution must be interpreted properly.” Sunstein, supra note 122,
at 164.
363 Pangle, supra note 142, at 212–15.
364 Id. at 213.
365 Id. at 214.
366 Id. at 215.
367 See Wright, supra note 36, at 277.
368 “[T]he importance of Kant’s ‘formula of ends’ in modern moral philosophy is impossible
to deny.” Id. at 271 (citing, inter alia, David Morris Phillips, The Commercial Culpability
Scale, 92 YALE L.J. 228, 254 n.110 (1982) (describing the Categorical Imperative as “the
fundamental principle of common morality”)).
369 Tesón, supra note 53, at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also WOOD, supra
note 24, at 68 (“The supreme principle of morality admits of no conditions or exceptions, of
course, because there is nothing higher by reference to which conditions or exceptions could
be justified.”).
370 Tesón, supra note 53, at 63 n.49.
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beings can make and act upon for themselves as free, self-determining agents whose
actions are morally good.”371 Kant’s CI is his understanding of honor, meaning how
people should live in a world of others.372
Kant formulated three related variants of the CI, the first of which expresses: “Act
only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become
a universal law.”373 Put perhaps too easily, formulation one appears to be Kant’s re-
statement of the Golden Rule, do unto others as you would have them do unto you.374
“[T]he test is whether you could will it to be permissible (under the moral law) for
everyone to act on the maxim.”375 Thus, one ought not do X unless one believes that
all other persons under like circumstances may morally do X.376
Professor Weinrib offered that the first formulation explains how one may act
freely and purposefully but without illicit reliance on consequentialist justifications.377
If the moral sufficiency of behavior cannot be gleaned by inclinations—that which
will maximize happiness or minimize unhappiness—then one must act on principles
“valid for all purposive beings whatever their particular inclinations. Such a principle
would determine choice by virtue of the ability to universalize and not by virtue of the
particular content of choice.”378
D. Kant’s Categorical Imperative—Formulation Two, Treating Persons as Ends
in Themselves
Although essential, formulation one is insufficient to fulfill the dignity principle.
That persons might, in perfect conscience, will some behavior as a “universal maxim,”
and be prepared not only to apply that maxim to others but also to themselves does not
necessarily prevent individuals from mistaking their personal preferences for moral
principles. Formulation one certainly constrains hypocrites who would allow them-
selves benefits or advantages they would deny others who are similarly situated. But
371 Id. at 63 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
98–103 (Harper Torchbooks ed., H.J. Paton trans. 1964)).
372 “Honor [is] the principled life guided by the categorical imperative . . . .” Pangle, supra
note 142, at 215.
373 Tesón, supra note 53, at 63 (quoting KANT, supra note 371, at 88).
374 Kuklin, supra note 34, at 498.
375 WOOD, supra note 24, at 70.
376 For example, Jones might punch Smith in the mouth because Smith made insulting, in-
appropriate and untrue remarks about Jones’s spouse. Faithful fulfillment of CI Formulation
One requires Jones’s justification to be more than hitting Smith made Jones happy, a purely
consequentialist, and thus inadequate moral justification. Instead, Jones must explain why under
like circumstances, any offended spouse justifiably may punch the offender (therefore, Jones
must acknowledge that Smith could hit Jones if Jones insulted Smith’s spouse).
377 Weinrib, supra note 83, at 482–84.
378 Id. at 483 (emphasis added). This is the “positive aspect of freedom,” or what could be
called the “practical idea of reason,” that is, free choice guided by practical reason. Id. at 484
(citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 213, 226 (J. Ladd trans.,
1965)); see also supra note 335 (defining “practical reason”).
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in genuine sincerity, under formulation one, some might be willing both to espouse
and to abide by a certain universal principle, such as violent retaliation for perceived
insults, which, in fact, immorally intrudes upon the dignity of other persons.
The first formulation lacks a common neutral basis to judge whether the proposed
universal maxim is moral. To resolve that problem, Kant gave us perhaps his most
celebrated precept, the CI’s second formulation, which states, “Act in such a way that
you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other,
never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”379
Commentators agree that, pursuant to Kant’s somewhat esoteric expression, actors
meet their moral obligation under the dignity principle by obeying universal maxims
that, as we now know dignity requires, treat persons as “ends in themselves.”380 As his
formulation makes clear, Kant certainly did not assert that one may not use others as
means to achieve one’s chosen goals. Such a proposition would be patently ridiculous
because attaining virtually all aspirations from babyhood to our dying breath typically
requires the assistance of others.381 Rather, Kant’s second Formulation sensibly ad-
monishes that one cannot treat others solely or merely as means. Instead, one must use
other persons in ways that respect their individual dignity—their rational capacities,382
indeed, in ways that treat those whom one uses with honor.383
Therefore, “[a]ccording to Kant, you treat someone as a mere means whenever you
treat him in a way to which he could not possibly [rationally] consent.”384 To avoid
such immoral conduct, actors must always remember that persons are not inanimate
objects, meaning things that may be used purely at the whim of and for the benefit
of the user. Because things have neither consciousness nor soul, no one need obtain
their leave or worry that they might rationally complain about their misuse or abuse.
“Things are instrumental and have only extrinsic value. Human beings, on the other
hand, have intrinsic value.”385 As Professor Kutz compellingly invoked, “[Using] a
379 Tesón, supra note 53, at 64 (quoting KANT, supra note 371, at 96).
380 Id. at 64.
381 Kant has no general objection to using people, or to using them as a
means. Life could hardly be possible otherwise. The Kant scholar H. J.
Paton points out that “[e]very time we post a letter, we use post-office
officials as a means, but we do not use them simply as a means.”
Wright, supra note 36, at 277 (quoting H. J. PATON, THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: A STUDY
IN KANT’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY 165 (4th ed. 1963)).
382 “[I]t is possible to treat persons as ends in themselves and also as means, as long as you
respect their rights and dignity.” WOOD, supra note 24, at 87; see also Wright, supra note
36, at 277.
383 As earlier noted, but worth quoting again, “Honor [is] the principled life guided by the
categorical imperative . . . .” Pangle, supra note 142, at 215.
384 KORSGAARD, supra note 68, at 295 (citations omitted). As Professor Hill similarly
expressed, “the test of whether we are treating someone as an end in himself is whether that per-
son does, or can, ‘share the end’ of our action.” HILL, supra note 61, at 73 (footnote omitted).
385 Tesón, supra note 53, at 64.
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person [solely] [for another’s gain] does not sufficiently respect and take account of
the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.”386
Logically, violations of the CI do not require the complete objectification of a
human being at all times, in all situations. Rather, and much more likely, a violation
of the CI, particularly the Second Formulation, arises by objectifying a person in a
particular setting, under specific circumstances, in a singular manner.387
Granted, one might complain that the premises for the CI are problematic because
Kant never fully proves that “rational beings are ends in themselves but only [explains]
that in setting ends according to reason, we must presuppose that they are.”388 To the
contrary, Kant presented a remarkably elegant, indeed beautiful, depiction of human-
ness through which to attain a workable deontology for the everyday world. To coerce,
deceive, intimidate, confound, abuse or otherwise objectify a person seems the very
definition of degrading that which is the most noble: a being capable of understanding
morality and of acting morally through critical self-reflection. To so treat a rational being
must be immoral per se. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that analysts understand the
CI, particularly its second formulation, as the cornerstone, in Kant’s chosen term the
“groundwork,” that “is unconditionally binding on all human beings, whatever their cir-
cumstances and regardless of what (contingent) ends must be sacrificed to satisfy it.”389
We now can understand why, contrary to some commentary,390 but fully consistent
with deontological theory,391 Kantian ethics can explain regimes of self-defense and
386 Kutz, supra note 139, at 256 (quoting ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE & UTOPIA
33 (1977)) (alterations in original).
387 For example, anticipating our later discussion a criminal trial absolutely devoid of due
process offends the Second Formulation because the defendant is denied any meaningful
opportunity to affect the process by which the Government seeks to take her life, liberty or
property; thereby, the defendant is dehumanized into an object subject to the remorseless whim
of the State. See infra notes 457–61 and accompanying text. Less quantitatively wrongful, but
no less qualitatively immoral and dishonorable, is one non-harmless due process violation
in an otherwise scrupulously constitutionally fair trial. A single depravation, such as not
according the accused minimally competent legal counsel, treats the accused solely as an object
by impeding her ability to participate in the criminal trial that might lead to her conviction and
punishment. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417–18 (2004) (discussing the right to
counsel as “fundamental and essential to fair trials”).
388 WOOD, supra note 24, at 93.
389 HILL, supra note 61, at 201; see also WOOD, supra note 24, at 163 (explaining that
Kant’s rejection of “conflict of duties” means that one duty may not “come into conflict with
another as to ‘cancel’ it . . . .”).
390 See, e.g., George C. Christie, The Defense of Necessity Considered From the Legal and
Moral Points of View, 48 DUKE L.J. 975, 1042 (1999) (noting that intentional killing of an
innocent person to save a larger number of other people violates “Kant’s injunction that one
must treat people as ends in themselves and never as means”); Cass Sunstein, The Case of
the Speluncean Explorers: A Fiftieth Anniversary Symposium, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1883,
1888 (1999) (positing that Kantians could condemn defendants who took the life of a non-
consenting wholly innocent person to save their own lives). Both articles are discussed in
Stacy, supra note 349, at 482 n.4.
391 See supra notes 135–41 and accompanying text.
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sacrificing the innocent in the defense of others.392 For instance, if a parent of three
children could save one from drowning or save two, but not all three, “[s]urely she is
justified in saving the two, but it is hard to conceive that she would accept that the ratio-
nale was that two are worth twice as much as one.”393 Rather, given the inevitability of
three deaths absent intervention but the impossibility of saving three lives even with
intervention, Kantian dignity theory can justify saving as many lives as possible.394
The moral principle, of course, is not based on a consequentialist maxim, but rather
that the number of lives at stake may be “pertinent information” for the implementation
of the general moral-legal standard in a discrete situation.395 Two theories support that
conclusion. First, because surely it is moral to rescue rational beings, then, one could
will as a moral maxim saving as many equally priceless lives as possible in a given
crisis. Alternatively, if saving either one child or two children are equally moral out-
comes, then the parent has two moral options but is only physically able to exercise
one. At that point, the parent’s decision is no longer deontological but consequentialist
because, as we learned, within the realm of moral choices, individuals may choose the
options that maximize their respective pursuits of happiness. Therefore, the parent may
choose to save two children rather than one.396
As the drowning children example shows, arguing that “numbers count” does not
per se transform a precept from deontological to consequentialist because “[i]t matters
how, for what reasons, and under what constraints a theory allows the numbers to
count.”397 When every available moral solution to a particular problem engenders loss
of innocent lives, opting for the moral resolution that sacrifices the least number com-
ports with respecting the dignity of others.398
392 See, e.g., Stacy, supra note 349 (advancing a new Kantian justification for necessity
killing, which does not depend on actual or hypothesized consent).
393 HILL, supra note 61, at 206.
394 Id. at 215.
395 Id. As Professor Stacy aptly concluded, “The overriding value Kantian moral philosophy
places on the rational autonomy of individuals does not support indifference to how many
individuals survive. That would not be in harmony with the value of the individual human
beings whose personhood rational autonomy defines.” Stacy, supra note 349, at 508.
396 The foregoing posits the possibility that the parent morally might choose to save one
rather than two children. Of course, the reasons why a parent might so choose could invali-
date the decision. For instance, choosing to save the handsomest or nicest child arguably would
offend the dignity of the two other children unless one could will a universal maxim that
attractiveness or pleasantness dominates other characteristics (a doubtful proposition indeed).
Accordingly, there may in fact be no qualities or characteristics that morally could justify
saving one rather than two children.
397 HILL, supra note 61, at 215 n.12.
398 Stacy, supra note 349, at 510–11; see also, e.g., WOOD, supra note 24, at 331 n.1.
Similar arguments explain a Kantian justification for self-defense. See , e.g., MURPHY, supra
note 34, at 108–09 (explaining that wrong acts under extreme circumstances can be excus-
able moral wrongs); RODIN, supra note 59 (arguing that nations are constrained by Kantian
morality, which includes the right of national self-defense).
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E. Kant’s Categorical Imperative—Formulation Three, The Categorical
Imperative and the State
Experience, if not logic, tells us that violations of the CI’s Second Formulation
commonly involve coercive force and deception because under the former, “I have
no chance to consent” and under the latter, “I don’t know what I am consenting to.”399
Immediately, one might respond: although we know that groups and governments must
obey moral duties,400 is it not the very definition of society via its governmental offices
to coerce certain behaviors and forbid other behaviors, all under penalty of law regard-
less of the willingness of those who do not wish to be so controlled? If coercion is sus-
pect under the CI’s second formulation, we must understand how and why governments
may operate without violating the dignity of those who would not comply voluntarily.
Aware of this issue, Kant argued that although the moral duties required of human
beings inure to the social structures they create, especially government, properly de-
signed governmental compulsion is not only apt, but essential.401 His resolution is
typically liberal and compellingly consistent with the legal-governmental framework
created by the Founders. First, we must recall a key concept quoted just a few para-
graphs above: “According to Kant, you treat someone as a mere means whenever you
treat him in a way to which he could not possibly consent.”402 Similarly, Professor
Hill explained that Kant certainly does not mean that per se one cannot do to another
The situation that troubles many commentators is that deontology, including Kantian
ethics, will not per se allow saving two or more imperiled innocents by sacrificing one innocent
who is not in danger. The classic example is grabbing bystander Smith and throwing her into
the line of fire when Jones is trying to shoot two or more blameless persons. The immorality
is that Smith is used purely as a means and not as an end in herself because we do not have
Smith’s knowing consent to be sacrificed so that others may survive. As my earlier discussion
of deontology explained, Smith has no duty to let herself be sacrificed without her voluntary
permission. Otherwise, whenever it could be done, society would be obliged to exterminate some
to save a greater number of others, a morally untenable practice unless those exterminated
freely agree to that fate. For instance, any society that per se condones taking some innocent
lives to save a greater number of innocent lives would be duty-bound to randomly snatch healthy
individuals, euthanize them, and harvest their various body parts so that numerous terminally ill
others may live. See supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text. While it is undeniably uncom-
fortable and sometimes seemingly contrary to “common sense,” Kantian ethics rightly refutes
the claim that sacrificing some innocent persons to save other innocent persons is moral per se.
399 KORSGAARD, supra note 68, at 295.
400 See infra text accompanying notes 411–23.
401 See, e.g., HILL, supra note 61, at 208–09 (noting that there are moral and prudential
reasons to form and support civil authorities with coercive powers); MULHOLLAND, supra note
55, at 291 (explaining that for Kant submission to civil authority is not “wrongful imposition”
on freedom); Tesón, supra note 53, at 64–66 (arguing that mechanics for guaranteeing civil and
political rights implement respect for autonomy and dignity of persons and form the basis of
a republican constitution).
402 KORSGAARD, supra note 68, at 295 (emphasis added).
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something that other would not want.403 Rather, “insofar as [others] are used as means,
they must be able to adopt the agent’s end, under some appropriate description, without
irrational conflict of will.”404
Therefore, even if personal preferences and inclinations impel otherwise, a person
must be guided instead by her unbiased rationality. If her rational capacity understands
that a particular action or standard rightfully may be willed as a universal maxim and
does not objectify persons, but instead treats persons as ends in themselves, then she
must accept the action or standard as moral no matter how much she might like it to
be otherwise. Such moral behavior, then, may become a rational imposition; that is,
imposed against all unwilling others. So long as the actor’s challenged behavior or stan-
dard does not offend dignity, unwilling others must accept the impositions imposed
by that moral, albeit disliked, conduct, even if they have been used for the advantage
of the actor.405
To understand how the two formulations must operate, Kant proposed his third
formulation of the CI: “Not to choose otherwise than so that the maxims of one’s
choice are at the same time comprehended with it in the same volition as universal
law.”406 The third formulation unites the first two formulations to buttress how a law
or maxim can be “valid universally for all rational beings . . . with the conception of
every rational nature as having absolute worth as an end in itself . . . , to get the idea of
the will of every rational being as the source of a universally valid legislation . . . .” 407
Kant sought to explain by this third formulation how any given person might consider
herself subject to universal laws and simultaneously to have willed those laws, meaning
“every rational will, equally our own and that of other rational beings, . . . in obeying
the objectively valid moral law, [may] regard[ ] itself as at the same time giving that
law.”408 Formulation three assures that any maxim that might fulfill the first two
formulations belongs in a “system of moral laws.”409
403 HILL, supra note 61, at 45.
404 Id.
405 The hundreds of impositions, minor and occasionally major, with which we deal daily
illustrate Kant’s theory. Obeying traffic signals when we are in a hurry, keeping our voices
politely low in restaurants and being silent in theaters even if we wish to make witty comments
about the show evince lesser, but understandable, examples of respecting the dignity of those
around us, including strangers, for the sake of universal maxims of decent social behavior.
We forego behavior that we would prefer because we recognize how such behavior would
be inappropriately intrusive into the lives and comfort of others who would wrongfully be
obstructed from pursuing lawful, moral projects.
406 WOOD, supra note 24, at 66–67 (quoting Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals, in CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE WRITINGS OF IMMANUEL KANT 4:400
(1992)). Alternatively, the third formulation holds that one must accept “the idea of the will
of every rational being as a will giving universal law.” Id. at 66 (quoting Kant, supra note
406, at 4:431).
407 Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
408 Id. at 76 (citing Kant, supra note 406, at 4:434–35).
409 Id. at 77. Professor Wood attempted an easily accessible explanation of formulation three,
“to think of ourselves as members of an ideal community of rational beings, in which each of
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This leads to the next logical, indeed obvious stage: how to protect the pursuit of
happiness; that is, freedom to seek one’s chosen goals. In Kant’s words the essence of
freedom is when:
No one can compel me (in accordance with his belief about the
welfare of others) to be happy after his fashion; instead, every
person may seek happiness in the way that seems best to him, if
only he does not violate the freedom of others to strive toward such
similar ends as are compatible with everyone’s freedom under a
possible universal law . . . .410
To reconcile the impositions that various persons’ morally legitimate projects might
impose against unwilling others—that is, to establish a process by which all persons
can peacefully pursue happiness by using others as means consistent with the dignity
principle—people must form societies that include government, the entity authorized
to make and enforce law by coercive means.411 For Kant, society cohered through gov-
ernmental authority is more than a convenience.412 In fact, people do not form societies
out of mutual consent—Kant was not a consent theorist.413 Rather, Kant was a natural
rights theorist who believed the “natural will” compels forming and perpetuating
society as the basis to discern whether proposed standards may be willed as universal
us should strive to obey the moral principles by which we would choose that members of the
community should ideally govern their conduct.” Id. at 78. Similarly, effectuating the Third
Formulation is part of the famous project of John Rawls’s “original position” by which he
posited disembodied spirits planning a new social order, but unaware of what their respective
statuses will be once they inhabit the society they created. Rawls argued that through a bar-
gaining process based on reason, the spirits would agree to maximize the opportunities of all
and, correspondingly, minimize restrictions on legitimate pursuits of happiness due to irrelevant
prejudices. The spirits would devise a system steeped in fundamental rights and certain shared
economic opportunities. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10–11 (1999); accord, e.g.,
HILL, supra note 61, at 208 n.7 (discussing Rawls).
410 Tesón, supra note 53, at 62 (quoting Immanuel Kant, On the Proverb: That May be
True in Theory, But Is of No Practical Use, in PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS 72
(Ted Humphrey trans., 1983)) [hereinafter Kant, On the Proverb].
411 In fact, Kant’s entire project in his The Metaphysical Elements of Justice is explaining
“the nature and justice of coercion.” MURPHY, supra note 34, at 91. Freedom is an inherent
“good,” which needs no justifying while coercion is inherently opposed to freedom and,
therefore, warrants justification. Accordingly, “coercion is justified only in so far as it is used
to prevent invasions against freedom. . . . So Kant has to establish the paradoxical claim that
some forms of coercion (as opposed to violence) are morally permissible because, contrary
to appearance, they really expand rational freedom.” Id. at 92. This is, according to Kant, the
“best justification for civil government.” Id. at 104.
412 See supra notes 372–73 and accompanying text.
413 MULHOLLAND, supra note 55, at 278–81 (discussing specifically Kant’s view of
property); see also id. at 289–90 (discussing why Kant was not a “social contractualist”).
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maxims.414 A coercive government arises “not to maximize welfare or to give the
morally vicious their just deserts but rather to create the conditions in which each has,
so far as possible, a fair chance to live out a life as a rational autonomous agent.”415
Kant’s pivotal enrichment of the prevailing metaphor is that the “social contract”
does not symbolize a discretionary arrangement of expediency, but rather a moral
requisite without which the dignity principle cannot be achieved. Suggesting the title
“kingdom of ends,”416 Kant asserted that governmental society is indispensible because,
when properly formed and operated, it assures maximum protection and enjoyment
of the dignity principle, while absent a legitimate state there is no formal and proper
enforcement of the CI.417
Kant’s overarching emphasis on the pursuit of moral decency accords the social
contract nobility and virtue exceeding Lockean concepts of pure security and the
protection of possessions (although those latter considerations surely are relevant to
liberty). Kant accepted that persons must leave the state of nature where generally be-
havior is unconstrained418 to form societies “that assign to each rights and respon-
sibilities . . . [thereby] secur[ing] to each person a reasonable opportunity for life and
414 True, Kant described the transfer from the state of nature as “an original contract, in
which people give up their inborn external freedom in order immediately to receive it back
secure and undiminished as members of a lawful commonwealth.” Weinrib, supra note 83, at
478–79 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 315–16 (J. Ladd
trans., 1965)). This contract arises because in a world of limited resources, all “persons are in
practical relation to one another,” a condition Kant believed is “constituted by nature itself.”
MULHOLLAND, supra note 55, at 280 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, “consent
is irrelevant to the justification of political obligation and the conditions for the acquisition
of rights.” Id. For example, while the particular details may vary from society to society, all
persons must will rational restrictions on the use of land, including their own realty, if they are
peaceably and effectively to use land at all. Such restrictions via titles and other guarantees are
part of the function of states. Id. at 280–81. Accordingly, rather than an actual or figurative
arm’s length agreement, “the original contract ‘is in fact merely an idea of reason . . . .’”
Weinrib, supra note 83, at 479 (quoting Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying: “This May
Be True in Theory, but it Does not Apply in Practice,” in KANT’S POLITICAL WRITINGS 79
(H. Reiss ed. 1979)).
415 HILL, supra note 61, at 209.
416 Id. at 58; see also WOOD, supra note 24, at 78 (using the title “realm of ends”).
417 “[T]he idea of a state” is “derived” from “the universal principle of right.” WOOD, supra
note 24, at 215; see also, e.g., MULHOLLAND, supra note 55, at 285; Waldron, supra note 15,
at 1546.
418 In the state of nature, where there is no controlling, official governmental authority, per-
sons may pursue their happiness by any means. “[I]ndividuals fight in the state of nature, and
the consequent war of all against all can only cease when people submit to a unitary sovereign.”
Waldron, supra note 15, at 1545 (discussing THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 86–90, 117–21
(Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651)); see also Hamburger, supra note
275, at 1835–36 (noting that individuals in the state of nature had to form civil governments
to preserve the liberty enjoyed under natural law).
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liberty as a rational autonomous agent.”419 Indeed, “in the absence of legal authority, . . .
individuals will disagree about right and justice . . . [which likely] will lead to violent
conflict. The task of the [legitimate government] is to put an end to this conflict by re-
placing individual judgments with the authoritative determinations of positive law.”420
It is through the rational edicts of the officers of the state that individuals know the
reciprocal laws that bind and manage interpersonal relations.421
The state, then, is essential to legitimize rights and accord duties derived from
moral laws gleaned through the freedom innate in human beings.422 The state is the
requisite key to implement the moral law—the moral imperative.423 Accordingly, a
state “has moral standing qua the creature of a social contract.”424 It is not a “commu-
nity . . . hold[ing] a preeminent position at the expense of the individual.”425 Rather, the
“fundamental unit” and “fundamental end” of society under government both domestic
and international is the “individual human being.”426 That is why Kant believed that re-
maining in the state of nature under any conditions is wrongful as, by definition, there
is no external, coercive state to assure protection of “rightful freedom”—even if people
happen voluntarily to employ their “lawless freedom” to “limit their actions to what is
right.”427 After all, the very concept of the state of nature encourages, if not outright
allows, each person to exercise her predilections without concern about other persons.428
419 HILL, supra note 61, at 208.
420 Waldron, supra note 15, at 1545; see also MURPHY, supra note 34, at 104. True, the
obligations of the dignity principle precede the formation of governments, thus, absent gov-
ernment, persons are morally obliged not to act in ways that offend the innate humanity of
others. In fact, unlike Hobbes and in agreement with Locke, Kant did not envision the state
of nature as per se uncivilized. “But though it may be sociable, the state of nature . . . is a
situation in which people have a ‘tendency to attack one another’ and to do so in the name
of justice.” Waldron, supra note 15, at 1546 (quoting KANT, supra note 15, at 123–24); see
also MULHOLLAND, supra note 55, at 285.
421 MURPHY, supra note 34, at 104; see also, e.g., MULHOLLAND, supra note 55, at
304–05. Therefore, accusations made in texts, such as in MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 172–73 (1982), that Kant rejects socialization as essential to the
self are arguably misplaced. Indeed, Kant accepted that it is predominately through social
contexts that a person chooses among competing preferences, predilections and desires—the
pursuit of happiness—which, of course, must conform to the dignity principle. See, e.g.,
Weinrib, supra note 83, at 503. Certainly, society, the state and the government are not merely
instrumental, but essential instruments for both personal fulfillment through the pursuit of
happiness and obedience of the dignity principle.
422 MULHOLLAND, supra note 55, at 304–05.
423 See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 24, at 213–15 (discussing KANT, supra note 406, at
6:313–14).
424 Tesón, supra note 53, at 71.
425 Id.
426 Id.
427 WOOD, supra note 24, at 215.
428 Waldron, supra note 15, at 1546–47 (discussing KANT, supra note 15, at 123–24).
Apparently, Kant did not accept Rousseau’s view of “the nobility of natural man.” Id. at 1547.
“Even if men are angels, they are opinionated angels, and they hold (or there is a strong
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In this way, Kant challenged Lockean utilitarian social contract theory by em-
phasizing a higher calling—a “reverence for a life of principle” that alone validates
and legitimizes society and the government that enforces society’s edicts.429 Thus,
forming a governmental social order is “obligatory” because the dignity principle
is obligatory.430
Of course, the core concept of the state and the government that governs the
state is the authority to employ coercion.431 That is, individuals relinquish their com-
plete freedom of action in the state of nature in exchange for the security of a formal
state that alone is empowered both to establish legal laws and to enforce those laws
through coercive means—even violence—if necessary.432 The security engendered is
the opportunity to pursue one’s happiness within the confines of the CI while employ-
ing the offices of the state to constrain others who would limit one’s legitimate pursuit
of happiness by violating the CI.433 Thus, to express the obvious, coercion is required
so that recalcitrant persons will obey rational laws.434
Consistent with the foregoing, Kant identified juridical duties, also called “duties
of right,” that may be enforced by the legitimate coercion of the State against those
who will not obey by self-constraint.435 Ethical duties, by contrast, “are to be fulfilled
through inner rational constraint.”436 Ethical duties or “duties of virtue” encourage us
to maximize “our own perfection and the happiness of others”; but, doing so is not
compulsory under Kantian theory.437
probability that they hold) conflicting views about justice for which they are prepared to
fight.” Id. Indeed, Kant’s prototypically liberal presumption is that, given their druthers, each
individual wants to act selfishly and immorally but rationally understands the value of mutual
cooperation, under the guise of a State, with obeying rational law as the cost of individual and
common security. Thomas C. Grey, Serpents and Doves: A Note on Kantian Legal Theory,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 585 (1987) (discussing Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in KANT:
ON HISTORY 366 (L. Beck ed. 1975)).
429 Pangle, supra note 142, at 214.
430 MURPHY, supra note 34, at 104; accord Waldron, supra note 15, at 1535 (quoting KANT,
supra note 15, at 124).
431 WOOD, supra note 24, at 215. “[T]he ideal combination of rights is the one that yields
the maximum possible individual autonomy under the coercion presupposed by the social
contract.” Tesón, supra note 53, at 66.
432 E.g., MULHOLLAND, supra note 55, at 281–82; WOOD, supra note 24, at 215 (discussing
the importance of coercive power).
433 E.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
509, 516 (1987) (discussing reasons for contracting away a degree of liberty).
434 See, e.g., HILL, supra note 61, at 209 (“The coercive power of the state must provide
incentives so that even without conscience everyone will have clear and sufficient reason not
to violate the liberty of others . . . .”); Mulholland, supra note 55, at 287
435 MARCIA W. BARON, KANTIAN ETHICS ALMOST WITHOUT APOLOGY 31–32 (1995).
436 WOOD, supra note 24, at 220; see also BARON, supra note 435, at 31–32; WOOD, supra
note 24, at 161–62.
437 WOOD, supra note 24, at 166–67; see also KORSGAARD, supra note 68, at 20 (contrasting
duties of virtue and duties of justice).
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In light of these definitions, obeying the law, such as refraining from commit-
ting murder, is a juridical duty, the violation of which may be punishable by lawful
authority. Ethical duties, however, arguably concern what the Founders regarded as
the “pursuit of Happiness,” that is, all projects within the expansive boundaries of
moral behavior.438 Certainly, we may pursue happiness by leading selfless lives, giving
all our spare time and resources to charities and similarly worthy pursuits. But, there is
no broad moral duty to be selfless because preserving each person’s innate dignity does
not require a universal maxim that members of society must suffer excessive depri-
vations for the sake of other members.439 Accordingly, we may live selfish lives, acquir-
ing for ourselves as much as we can with no thought of sharing so long as doing so is
not immoral; that is, the pursuit of happiness as selfishness must not denigrate anyone’s
innate dignity.440
438 This explains Kant’s “universal principle of justice” elucidating the pursuit of happiness
which “allow[s] individuals [sic] freedom to form and pursue their own life plans subject only
to the constraint that others be allowed a similar freedom.” HILL, supra note 61, at 54; see
also, e.g., Grey, supra note 428, at 582 (noting that the state of external freedom is based on
Kant’s universal principle of justice); Pangle, supra note 142, at 213–15, 219 n.10 (explaining
that according to Kant the pursuit of happiness is an “inescapable substantive end” that is the
“expression of honor and principle”).
439 Doubtless, along with refraining from intruding illegitimately into the dignity of others,
one might recognize universal maxims imposing positive duties—mandatory affirmative
obligations—incumbent upon society’s membership to help those in need. “If, as seems
obvious, too much inequality between people . . . is incompatible with their pursuit of com-
mon ends, then Kantian ethics implies that limiting human inequality should always take pri-
ority over maximizing human welfare.” WOOD, supra note 24, at 79; see also Wright, supra
note 36, at 277 (discussing affirmative duties). In such cases, the citizenry in some fashion must
dedicate resources to fulfill those affirmative duties. For instance, as a matter of fundamental
decency, not discretionary largesse, the Constitution’s Sixth Amendment requires American
society to provide competent attorneys to criminal defendants who cannot afford legal repre-
sentation. See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417–18 (2004); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 343–45 (1963). Necessarily, supplying lawyers costs tax dollars, which taxpayers must pay
regardless whether they would otherwise voluntarily allocate a portion of the public coffers to
criminal defense counsel for the indigent.
440 See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 24, at 167. That is why, for example, Kantian ethics permits
Jones to use clever but honest advertising and creative marketing to drive her competitor
Smith out of business but does not allow Jones to succeed by vandalizing Smith’s store.
Of course, legitimate government may regulate to promote policies consistent with, but
exceeding the minima necessitated by, the dignity principle. For example, assuming arguendo
that under the dignity principle society has an affirmative duty to provide minimum nutrition,
clothing and shelter for the needy, legitimate law may surpass that minimum amount so long
as the excess does not unreasonably intrude into the liberty of others.
Although at least one commentator laments that the following is weak, MURPHY, supra
note 34, at 112 n.16, Kant provides a plausible explanation for why law that exceeds the
arguable minimum social moral obligation may be legitimate even if those opposed are com-
pelled to support such policies with taxes or other personal resources. Kant argued that while
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In sum, comparable with the Founders’ precepts in the Declaration, government
is legitimate if it “maintain[s] a system of peace wherein each citizen will enjoy the
most extensive liberty compatible with like liberty for others. This is the only reason
why rational autonomous persons would contract to give up liberty; and only in terms
of this end is state coercion justified.”441
F. How Government Is Constrained Lest Coercive Authority Be Used Illicitly
Along with other theorists, including the Founders, Kantian philosophies under-
stand a correlated core principle: government will almost certainly fail its moral duties
absent constraints limiting how government itself employs its singular, breathtaking
authority to coercively enforce the laws it creates. Therefore, Kant embraced the fruits
of the Framers, describing “[a] republican state as one defined by a constitution based
upon three principles: freedom, due process, and equality.”442
In particular, Kant believed that, to be a legitimate source of rights, policies and
correlative obligations, civil society must be governed by impartial persons with
“supreme title” to give, apply and execute “laws determining rights.”443 Because, to pro-
mote the CI, law must be the product of detached rationality, each legislator must view
herself and all members of her “kingdom” as “ends in themselves.”444 This requires,
inter alia, that “the legislators regard the rationality of each member as unconditionally
and incomparably worth preserving, developing, and honoring.”445
Second, to maximize the probability that government will be legitimate and remain
so, Kant embraced separation of powers—legislative bodies to make law, a judiciary
or similar system to resolve public and private disputes, an executive to enforce law
and such other mechanisms as are appropriate to establish and to enforce the rational
individuals form societies to morally pursue their private goals, the state may assume an
“external aspect,” whereby law “becomes the general or universal will.” Weinrib, supra note
83, at 490. Therefore, the state may subvert individual preferences in favor of a general will if
doing so is consistent with the dignity principle. Id. In other words, to pursue their respective
goals, persons rationally accept a realm of competitive politics wherein individuals and groups
attempt to influence government to adopt policies that other individuals and groups may oppose.
The winners in each discrete instance impose their will on the losers, the unwilling others.
The imposition placed on such unwilling others to obey laws with which they do not agree
is moral so long as governmental process is legitimate. If such is not what the governed want
and expect, they may either reform the structure of government or move to someplace where
government exists only to realize the CI’s minima.
441 Murphy, supra note 433, at 516; see also HILL, supra note 61, at 209 (noting that the
aim of a coercive legal system is to allow individuals to “live out a life as rational autonomous
agents”).
442 Tesón, supra note 53, at 62; see also Kant, On the Proverb, supra note 410, at 71–84.
443 MULHOLLAND, supra note 55, at 286.
444 HILL, supra note 61, at 61.
445 Id. (emphasis added).
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rule of law.446 Such dispersed authority helps ensure that the government will not col-
lapse into either despotism or anarchy.447 In this regard, which has become accepted
elementary American constitutional law,448 Kant warned that repression can arise not
only from dictatorial leaders, but also from the “tyranny of the majority,” meaning “a
system of pure democracy . . . unconstrained by rights.”449 Such may occur because
“the [tyrannical] majority legislates for everyone, while regarding itself as not subject
to any higher universal laws and while it, itself, does not constitute everyone.”450
Accordingly, as a third principle of tremendous significance, Kant recognized that
government must be restrained by relatively explicit overarching injunctions predicated,
of course, on the dignity principle:
If in our everyday behavior we should never consider fellow
human beings merely as means, it follows a fortiori that the con-
stitution of the state, an artificial creation to serve human needs,
must embody and incorporate a formula of respect for persons—a
bill of human rights. . . . [Such] mechanisms for guaranteeing tra-
ditional civil and political rights, which act as barriers against the
abuse of state power, form the basis of a republican constitution
because such mechanisms implement the respect for autonomy
and dignity of persons.451
Thus, completely consistent with both America’s founding and American con-
stitutional theory, Kant appreciated that government is indispensable to protect each
person’s right to liberty—to pursue happiness in moral ways—but also, government
must be controlled lest, as any powerful entity is apt to do, it abuses its authority in
violation of the very principles it was created to safeguard.452
446 See, e.g., MULHOLLAND, supra note 55, at 283–85; WOOD, supra note 24, at 213
(discussing separation of powers).
447 As Madison earlier had famously stated, “The accumulation of all powers legislative,
executive and judiciary in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny.” THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 293 (James Madison) (Gary Wills ed., 1982).
448 The Supreme Court “consistently has given voice to, and has reaffirmed, the central
judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of
governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.”
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989); accord Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 536 (2004); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996).
449 Tesón, supra note 53, at 62 (citing Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical
Sketch , in PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS 114 (Ted Humphrey trans., 1983)); see also
Kant, On the Proverb, supra note 410, at 71–84.
450 MULHOLLAND, supra note 55, at 325.
451 Tesón, supra note 53, at 64 (citing, inter alia, Kant, supra note 407, at 72) (second
emphasis added).
452 On this point, many commentators misinterpret Kant’s theory, arguing that he opposed
all revolutions against established government. Granted, Kant averred that aside from enacting
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In this regard, as previously accented, arguably Kant’s most significant contribution
is linking liberal political theory not to utilitarian principles of property, contract, and
mutual security, but to the incontrovertible moral duties emanating from the dignity
principle, incumbent on all persons, mandatory regardless of the consequences and
achieved, if at all, through society, the state and government.453 Consistent with his
deontology, Kant identified justice as the principle indispensible to government’s obli-
gation under the CI. He invoked the proposition in terms that we now understand are
not hyperbolic, but morally correct: “if justice goes, there is no longer any value in
men’s living on the earth.”454
The core of Kantian justice is due process of law455 which is unsurprising because
Legality that offers only prudential reasons for compliance with
law—follow the law or the state will impose unpleasant conse-
quences upon you— . . . [defies] Enlightenment notions of auton-
omy and respect. In fact, a state that secures compliance with
law purely through threats of sanction—indeed, a state that roots
its existence through the power to enforce law—is by definition
illegitimate.456
The archetypal example, of course, is criminal law and procedure.457 Due to her in-
nate rational capacity, the criminal can, and should, accept the principles of reasonable
reforms, the proper means to oppose unjust laws are almost always protest and passive
resistance. Accordingly, he disagreed with Locke that revolution is justified in a merely
imperfect state. MULHOLLAND, supra note 55, at 337–46; see also Waldron, supra note 15,
at 1545 (“The moral requirement of obedience to actually existing law, Kant concluded, is
‘absolute.’”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, On the Common Saying: “This
May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice,” reprinted in KANT: POLITICAL
WRITINGS 81 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991)).
Nonetheless, a plausible Kantian analysis asserts that any government acting as an irre-
deemable “despot” may be deposed by revolution, should lesser measures fail. Some right to
revolution as a last resort makes seamless Kantian sense as there is no reason to exist under
a formal system that is ceaselessly worse than the state of nature from which the government
should afford liberation. MULHOLLAND, supra note 55, at 342; see also Tesón, supra note
53, at 68 (discussing Kant’s theory of a right to revolution). Such, of course, is precisely the
theory of “sacred Honor” the Founders expressed in their Declaration of Independence. See
supra Part II.
453 E.g., Pangle, supra note 142, at 213–18 (discussing moral duties).
454 Waldron, supra note 15, at 1540 (quoting KANT, supra note 15, at 141).
455 See MURPHY, supra note 34, at 106.
456 Williams, supra note 97, at 86 (citing ROBERT PAUL WOLFE, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM
3–19 (Harper & Row 1970)).
457 “[T]he greatest expression of the Enlightenment ideal within the Kantian tradition is
the criminal trial. It is where the ideal is most fully vitalized and where it is most forcefully
put to the test.” Id. at 83.
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criminal justice, even if the criminal indulges her preference not to obey criminal law.458
Although the criminal would have preferred to succeed in her crime, her innate ratio-
nality informs her that what society imposed against her could be willed as universal
rules for peaceful civil dealings and relations within a social order, so long as such due
process never failed to treat her as an end in herself.459 Due process succeeds by ensur-
ing that the suspect or defendant meaningfully may participate in the process that seeks
to penalize her, thereby treating her as a subject, not an object—as an end in herself,
and not merely a means to foster some public or private interest.460 Therefore, a criminal
cannot properly object to the search of her home pursuant to a properly issued warrant,
to her arrest based on probable cause, or to a trial, conviction, and sentence all consis-
tent with due process, including affording her the genuine, adequate opportunity to
contest the legality of the governmental actions taken against her.461
As Professor Williams persuasively explicated,
The real power of [due process] is not, as is often assumed, that
[one] is entitled to . . . due process . . . because we ought to be risk
averse in our diagnosis of who are [criminals] . . . . No, the real
power lies in the fact that criminal adjudication . . . is the only
way to legitimize the exercise of state power against a [criminal
defendant]. The function of the criminal trial, on this account, is to
vindicate what the Enlightenment demands of the state: a justifi-
cation for its own existence.462
458 See, e.g., HILL, supra note 61, at 45, 73 (discussing criminals’ rational acceptance of
punishment).
459 See, e.g., id. at 180–84 (discussing punishment for criminal acts); MURPHY, supra note
34, at 108.
460 HILL, supra note 61, at 210 (describing criminals’ opportunity to participate in pro-
ceedings); MURPHY, supra note 34, at 106 (discussing injustice of humans being treated as
means to an end); accord Tesón, supra note 53, at 67 (explaining that the laws of any state
must conform to the CI). Indeed, while certainly distressing but perfectly correct, a convicted yet
innocent person can harbor no moral objections so long as the investigation, arrest, trial and
sentencing comport with true due process. As perfection is not possible in human endeavors,
we can hope for no better treatment than the best humanly possible. Accordingly, the courts
have adopted an accurate, if curt, shorthand, “[A person] is entitled to a fair trial but not a
perfect one.” Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953); see also McDonough Power
Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984); Owens v. United States., 483 F.3d 48,
54 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1353 (11th Cir. 2005).
461 As the Supreme Court prudently underscored, “[t]he fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
552 (1965)); see also City of L.A. v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 717 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting
Eldridge); Tate v. District of Columbia, 627 F.3d 904, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 2886 (2011).
462 Williams, supra note 97, at 88–89 (emphasis added).
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G. Why Law and Morals Functionally Are Inseparable
Pursuant to the foregoing Kantian exposition, law is paramount in Kantian soci-
ety as the device through which the State exercises its rightful coercion and by which
government’s coercive power rightfully is limited, all for the sake of the Categorical
Imperative.463 Accordingly, in a most fundamental sense, Kant teaches us that while
law may be identifiable in positive terms—recognizable via processes of enactment
and enforcement that we understand apply only to law464—positivism mistakenly
asserts that process is enough for law to be law.465 “In Kant’s view, all moral laws,
even all legitimate laws of the State, must be conceived as (or as falling under) natural
laws. In fact, Kant contended that merely statutory or positive legislation does not,
properly speaking, give ‘laws’ at all, but only ‘commands.’”466 Rather, “the condition
for the existence of a legal system is morality as such.”467 While Kant did not aver a
corresponding legal duty for every ethical duty, “law sets . . . the minimal . . . moral
conditions for the interaction of purposive beings.”468 As such, there must be some
unity—some value monism—to law. Like morality, concepts of law “cannot be under-
stood in isolation from one another,” although they can be described discretely.469 The
unity for law,470 as accented above, is the dignity principle, particularly as advanced
463 See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 34, at 94 (explaining that for Kant, law serves as basis
for interfering with freedom of those who would use their freedom to oppress others); Pangle,
supra note 142, at 213–18 (discussing moral duties and noting that honor in itself is goalless
unless it receives as content promotion of peace under rule of law). Notably, “Kant almost
never gives us the content of this law—only its form.” That form, of course, is the CI. Carlson,
supra note 48, at 39 (citation omitted).
464 For a general explanation of positivism, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
185–212 (2d ed. 1994) (conceptualizing the relationship between law and morals and explain-
ing natural law and legal positivism).
465 The separation of law and morals is the pivotal idea of positivism; that is, there is no
inevitable connection between law and morals. “Morality, for [positivists such as H.L.A.] Hart,
is content. Law is form. The form of the law is sufficiently flexible to encompass any content,
moral or not.” Carlson, supra note 48, at 29 (citation omitted).
466 WOOD, supra note 24, at 108–09 (quoting Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, in
CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE WRITINGS OF IMMANUEL KANT 27:273 (1992)).
467 Carlson, supra note 48, at 23. “Both law and ethics are for Kant branches of moral
philosophy . . . . They differ in the incentive that each holds out: in law the actor responds to
the prospect of external coercion, whereas in ethics the idea of duty itself motivates the action.”
Weinrib, supra note 83, at 501; see also Grey, supra note 428, at 581. Professor Grey offered an
alternative understanding: “Kant treats Law not as part of morality but rather as a precondition
for its realization.” Grey, supra note 428, at 586. Yet, under this idea, as well, the function of
law must be the vindication of the dignity principle if law is to be legitimate.
468 Weinrib, supra note 83, at 503.
469 Id. at 480 n.26 (discussing contract legal concepts such as acceptance and consideration).
470 “[E]very aspect of law must bear the traces of [some focusing] idea and . . . these traces
are decisive for the systemic connections within law. . . . The idea of reason runs through the
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by due process. As we will next see, deontological dignity is precisely the grounding
of due process under American constitutional law and, thus, pursuant to our “sacred
Honor,” should be subject to Kantian honor’s admonition that faithful fulfillment of
due process—of justice—is more important than life itself.
IV. DUE PROCESS—AMERICA’S HIGHEST DUTY—AMERICA’S VALUE MONISM
We have discerned that morality is deontological, demanding complete constraint
from evil as humanity’s greatest responsibility. All persons and the societies to which
they belong must endure any sacrifice, rather than betray humanity through immorality.
As Kant intrepidly, if audaciously, stated, the duty of morality is to, “Let justice be
done even if the world should perish.”471
Next, as a principle means to vouchsafe morality, we reviewed honor, particu-
larly “sacred Honor” as it relates to that “charter of human liberty and dignity,”472 the
Declaration of Independence. The Founders declared that government is legitimate only
when it obeys the moral imperative to safeguard indispensable, deontological “un-
alienable Rights” that derive not from the will of human beings but, as the Declaration
states, from the “Law of Nature and of Nature’s God.”473 As such, the Declaration set
the fundamental rules for, was the precursor of and profoundly inspired the docu-
ment that constructs American law and American government, the Constitution.474 The
Founders solemnized their moral-political theory two ways: by pledging to sacrifice,
if necessary, the lives and property of persons under the jurisdiction of America, and
by dedicating the young Nation’s “sacred Honor” to the overarching principle of pre-
serving legitimate government.475 As progeny of the Founders—as inheritors of the
Declaration—we adopt those pledges as well if we are to be Americans476—such is the
sacrifice pledged by America’s “sacred Honor.”
To realize the ever-emerging arc of our duty to the Founders—to develop a firmer,
fuller concept of “sacred Honor” faithful to their moral philosophy of “unalienable
whole length of law as a single fiber that connects each part with every other part . . . .” Id.
at 481.
471 KANT, supra note 15, at 102 n.16.
472 Eisenhower, supra note 267, at 322.
473 “The connection between honor and natural rights in the founding generation marks an
important departure from traditional forms of honor. Democratic honor frequently (although
not always) is tied to universal principles of right rather than to concrete codes of conduct
applicable only to a particular group.” KRAUSE, supra note 224, at 107 (emphasis added).
474 See infra notes 539–86 and accompanying text.
475 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776) (“[W]e mutually pledge
to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.”).
476 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 14, supra note 306, at 88–89 (“[T]he leaders of the
revolution . . . pursued a new and . . . noble course. . . . They reared the fabrics of governments
which have no model on the face of the globe. They formed the design of a great confederacy,
which it is incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate.”); see also supra notes
304–12 and accompanying text.
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Rights,” we identified Kantian honor as a commanding expression of deontological
values. Kant’s dignity principle explicated by his three formulations of the CI pro-
vides the most compelling description of basic morality this author knows. Kant antic-
ipated where American morality should and, in large measure, has progressed: that
constitutional due process forbids government from violating the dignity principle
no matter what consequences stem from such faithfulness.
Accordingly, as this portion of the Article avers, Kantian morality under the
Constitution’s Due Process Clauses is the quintessence of constitutional honor,
America’s paradigmatic nondelegable, non-volitional governmental duty. One must
reject, therefore, the so-called Constitution of necessity—the proposition that security,
particularly as defined by the Executive, is the predominant constitutional duty—
because that theory permits any governmental conduct no matter how dehumaniz-
ing, no matter how degenerate, no matter how atrocious. Therefore, in faith with the
Founders’ plan under the Declaration, constitutional law should be understood pur-
suant to the ennobling principles of Kantian honor, not consequentialism. Because
governmental failure to act morally regardless of even the direst consequences is evil
per se, the sacrifice and “sacred Honor” of due process surpass any purported duty
of “necessity.”477 In that basic sense, the Constitution is, must be, and should be a
“suicide pact.”
A. The “Not a Suicide Pact” Metaphor and the Constitution of Necessity
Although entirely sensible, the link between Kantian honor and the Constitution
butts up against much scholarly sentiment, as well as the arguable letter of prevail-
ing jurisprudence. A quarter of a century ago, the United State Supreme Court stated
tersely, “We do not think the [Due Process] Clause lays down any such categorical im-
perative. We have repeatedly held that the Government’s regulatory interest in com-
munity safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty
interest.”478 As the italicized portion emphasizes, the Court allows itself a bit of
477 For that reason, we should reject the assertion of constitutional meaning noted by
Professor Waldron:
[T]o discover the Constitution, we must approach it without the assis-
tance of guides imported from another time and place. . . . We ask not
whether . . . the ethics of Kant or Rawls or Bentham or Mill or Hayek or
Nozick . . . is adequately grounded—but whether it is the best approach
for the contemporary American legal system to follow, given what we
know about markets, . . . about American legislatures, about American
judges, and about the values of the American people.
Waldron, supra note 15, at 1537 n.12 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
478 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (emphasis added) (holding that the
Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), permitting certain pretrial detentions without
bail is not per se unconstitutional); see also, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 591 (2004)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Comm. for Pub. Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646,
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maneuvering leeway, acknowledging the possibility that in “appropriate circum-
stances” safety and security will not overwhelm liberty. Even so, the best understand-
ing is that in response to at least significant security threats, liberty interests must fall.
Ironically, perhaps, courts so rule pursuant to their own long-standing dogmatic
categorical imperative: “It is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental interest
is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”479 This proposition unearths the
crucial companion judicial categorical dogma: “[T]he Constitution . . . is not a sui-
cide pact.”480 Despite the fervent invocation of the “security of the Nation,” precedent
reveals that much less than a national calamity will elicit the “not a suicide pact”
argument.481 Some courts assert that failing to enforce any compelling state interest
in any situation could render the Constitution a “suicide pact,” perhaps on the logic
that while one instance is not likely to jeopardize America’s survival, habitual failure
to enforce compelling state interests in the aggregate threatens the continued secu-
rity of the nation. Whatever the prevailing rationale, the “not a suicide pact” doctrine
envelops preserving safety in general, not solely avoiding utter catastrophes.482
662 (1980) (discussing the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence and noting that “[O]ur
decisions have tended to avoid categorical imperatives and absolutist approaches . . . .”); Mora
v. City of Gaithersburg, 519 F.3d 216, 222 (4th Cir. 2008).
479 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S.
500, 509 (1964)); see also, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion
Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889); United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 240 (4th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009). Similarly, Justice Holmes’s renowned legal realism led him
to conclude that “there are no nonderogable emergency rights at all. . . . There is nothing that
government cannot do in emergencies, if circumstances warrant.” Adrian Vermeule, Holmes
on Emergencies, 61 STAN. L. REV. 163, 183–84 (2008).
480 E.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) (“[W]hile the Constitution
protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.”); Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“There is danger that, if the Court does not tem-
per its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill
of Rights into a suicide pact.”).
481 E.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689,
746 (2008) (discussing cases involving and addressing al Qaeda to show that the “not a suicide
pact” argument will be used in circumstances that are not national calamities).
482 New Jersey, for example, argued that not being a suicide pact, the Constitution “permits
courts to consider exigency and public safety when evaluating the reasonableness of police
conduct.” State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359, 368 (N.J. 2003). Golotta specifically held that an
anonymous “911” call reporting that a vehicle was being driven erratically reasonably sup-
ported a police stop of that vehicle. Id.; see also Indomenico v. Brewster, 848 F. Supp. 1136,
1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Were the stop here to be held violative of the Constitution, virtually
no arrest for speeding would be permissible, with the result that carnage on the highways might
well escalate with few limits.”) Doubtlessly, unsafe drivers pose a significant danger, imper-
iling life, limb and property. But, I do not think people commonly equate traffic accidents with
national security threatening the continuation of American Constitutional society. New Jersey’s
invocation of the “not a suicide pact” theory to enforce “rules of the road” evinces how easily
that theory can engulf all relationships between individuals and government.
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The “not a suicide pact” metaphor (or anti-metaphor) underlies what is popularly
known as the “Constitution of necessity.” Professor Paulsen offered a concise summary
of the concept:
The Constitution itself embraces an overriding principle of consti-
tutional and national self-preservation that operates as a meta-rule
of construction for the document’s specific provisions and that may
even, in cases of extraordinary necessity, trump specific constitu-
tional requirements. The Constitution is not a suicide pact; and,
consequently, its provisions should not be construed to make it
one, where an alternative construction is fairly possible.483
Clearly, the Constitution of necessity is steeped in the pragmatism of survival, safety,
and security.484 Correspondingly, supporters of the Constitution of necessity are acutely
Somewhat similarly, courts have applied the “not a suicide pact” sentiment to serious
situations that raise apparent national security concerns, although hardly portending the ultimate
demise of the Nation. See e.g., Haig, 453 U.S. at 309 (holding that no pre-revocation hearing
is required to revoke passport due to holder’s activities purportedly threatening to national
security while in foreign countries); Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331
F.3d 918, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the First Amendment does not require the release
of information regarding post–9/11 detainees such as names, location and reasons for detention),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748,
754 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The Constitution would indeed be a suicide pact . . . if the only way to
curtail enemies’ access to assets were to reveal information that might cost lives.”) (citations
omitted), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003); Palestine Info. Office v. Schultz, 674 F. Supp. 910,
919 (D.D.C. 1987) (upholding the Secretary of State’s decision to close Palestine Information
Office of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Washington, D.C. to “further the foreign
policy interests of the United States” is a constitutional “compelling governmental interest” be-
cause “[t]he Constitution is not a suicide pact as the able former Supreme Court Justice Goldberg
once said.”), aff’d, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Heidbrink v. Swope, 170 S.W.3d 13, 16
(Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that under the Missouri Constitution, authorities can interrogate
a released felon who seeks a firearms permit).
483 Paulsen, supra, note 41, at 1257.
484 E.g., id. (stating that the Constitution “should not . . . be given a . . . self destructive
interpretation”); see Kutz, supra note 139, at 245 (asserting that the President can use “extra-
legal means” “to meet a military objective” because it preserves “the security of the United
States”); David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 302 (2010) (saying that the
Constitution’s interpretation should not lead to “legal outcomes that threaten the very existence
of the nation”). Because this Article emphasizes that the Constitution must be both appreciated
and confronted on its own terms, it is necessary to mention that some theorists eschew the
Constitution of necessity in favor of either extra-constitutionality or unconstitutionality. See,
e.g., POSNER, supra note 95, at 12 (advocating a moral and political but not legal justification
for dealing with emergencies); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism,
98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1428 (1989) (arguing that the Executive should openly state it is acting
extra-constitutionally); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justifying Wartime Limits on Civil Rights and
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exasperated by those who will not accept the supposedly unassailable logic that the
promises of liberty and justice are worthless if the liberty-based system is threatened
by enemies who almost certainly do not value and would not implement a similar
design.485 Judge Posner, for instance, derided with both palpable irritation and in-
censed disrespect civil libertarians who
deny that civil liberties should wax and wane with changes in the
danger level. They believe that the Constitution is about protecting
Liberties, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 675, 696 (2009) (discussing the Nation’s history of allowing
popular Presidents to make unconstitutional decisions when necessary).
Professor Crocker explicated, “[b]ecause a Constitution of necessity provides no clear
guidance as to when the principle of necessity trumps normal principles, we at least maintain
greater conceptual clarity by placing necessity outside the bounds of the Constitution.”
Crocker, supra note 97, at 246 (emphasis added). Despite Professor Crocker’s assurance of
“greater conceptual clarity,” one must wonder how banishing the Constitution in lieu of
enforcing a Constitution of necessity in any manner elucidates “necessity.” Deciding that due
to necessity a particular emergency is “outside the bounds of the Constitution” does not
explicate either the nature or extent of necessity any better than urging that pursuant to the
Constitution’s own implied necessity principles, the given emergency negates the application
of one or more constitutional liberties. Neither approach inherently defines the point at which
a dangerous situation crosses the threshold into applicable, liberty-nullifying necessity.
Nor is there any reason to suppose that the definition of necessity actually would differ
between the two approaches if one believes that the Constitution truly includes an implied
necessity doctrine. Negating liberty in favor of unfettered governmental discretion pursuant
to the Constitution of necessity is functionally equivalent to declaring that due to necessity,
the Constitution is inapplicable. Thus, identical exigencies would justify either approach, unless
by fiat one simply declared that a certain level of emergency invokes the Constitution of neces-
sity while a different level of emergency obviates the Constitution altogether.
Whatever their form, extra-constitutional arguments necessarily discredit the Constitution’s
essential character as the supreme expression of law, a tenet core to the very identity and meaning
of the United States as a nation comprised of, confined by, and devoted to law, rather than
anarchy or tyranny. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the Land . . . .”);
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942) (“Congress and the President, like the courts, possess
no power not derived from the Constitution.”); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 425 (1934) (“Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted
power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved.”).
Thus, the answer to difficult issues must be found in the letter, policies, and spirit of the
document that defines the nation, not by deceptively asserting that the Constitution is honorable
but charmingly naïve; therefore, necessity requires ignoring that document until it is convenient
to respect it again. If the Constitution’s purported simplicity is perilous, then either forthrightly
amend the document or rename it, as it is no longer a constitution, but rather, a statutory scheme
arguably of penultimate rank. If, alternatively, the alleged constitutional naiveté is no such thing,
but rather the sacrifice and sacred honor of morality, then we must have the courage to obey it.
485 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 41, at 1282–83. “The alternative is near-absurdity: . . . that
adherence to the Constitution might require destruction of the Constitution.” Id. at 1258–59.
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individual rights rather than about promoting community interests,
a belief some civil libertarians ground in a quasi-religious vener-
ation of civil liberties coupled with a profound suspicion of the
coercive side of government . . . .486
It appears inconceivable to these purported realists that morality’s dominion exerts
the highest duty, the noblest calling, the ascendency of humanity, which explains the
otherwise anomalous requisite that doing the right thing transcends doing the good
thing. They deride the courageous idea that the true victory, indeed the definitive con-
quest, comes from defying iniquity when immorality is most seductive and seem-
ingly sensible. They deny that understanding and undertaking the responsibility of
morality defines the singular decency, nobility and worth of humanity. Such is, of
course, the courage to accept the sacrifice and sacred honor of morality when every
arguably sensible impulse urges otherwise.
True, these consequentialists find more than a modicum of backing not only in
the aforementioned judicial precedents, but also in the words and deeds of some of
America’s greatest patriots. Candor requires citation to illustrative instances. Despite
the previously quoted, arguably deontological positions of Revolutionary War patriots
Patrick Henry and Thomas Paine,487 in an 1810 letter Thomas Jefferson offered:
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the
high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws
of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in
danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupu-
lous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with
life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them with us;
thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means.488
Consequentialists appeal as well to The Federalist,489 in particular Hamilton’s
Federalist No. 23 which addresses the President’s “war powers” noting, “circum-
stances which may affect the public safety are [not] reducible within certain determi-
nate limits; . . . there can be no limitation of that authority, which is to provide for
486 POSNER, supra note 95, at 41–42. In stark contrast, Judge Posner seems to harbor little
if any suspicion “of the coercive side of government.” His discussion of police powers does
not seriously consider the possibility that law enforcement might make willful or inadvertent
mistakes in the course of national security investigations.
487 See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text.
488 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), supra note 14, at 146.
489 In this regard, many scholars argue, as did the drafters of the Declaration, that the
Framers of the Constitution embraced the Lockean idea, likewise espoused by Montesquieu,
that individuals relinquish the freedom but danger of “the state of nature and [accept] the con-
sequent identification of the end of government as individual liberty, understood as individual
security.” Pangle, supra note 47, at 35.
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the defence and protection of the community, in any matter essential to its efficacy.”490
In Federalist No. 41 Madison arguably accepted Hamilton’s sentiment by posing an elo-
quent but doctrinaire rhetorical question, “With what colour of propriety could the force
necessary for defence be limited by those who cannot limit the force of offence?”491
The consequentialist recourse to The Federalist, however, is far from flawless.
Indeed, within his Federalist No. 41, Madison evinced deliberate ambivalence, noting
with deep caution that
Not less true is it . . . that the [civil] liberties of Europe, as far as
they ever existed, have with few exceptions been the price of her
military establishments. A standing force therefore is a danger-
ous, at the same time that it may be a necessary provision. On the
smallest scale it has its inconveniences. On an extensive scale,
its consequences may be fatal.492
490 THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 147–48 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(original emphasis omitted). FEDERALIST NO. 23 stated further, “[War] power[ ] ought to exist
without limitation . . . . The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite; and
for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care
of it is committed.” Id. at 147.
491 THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 270 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Correspondingly, Hamilton contended that “safety” knows no “constitutional shackles . . . [it]
is one of those truths, which to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence along
with it; and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning.” THE
FEDERALIST No. 23, supra note 490, at 147. FEDERALIST NO. 23 evokes an unacceptable, off-
putting, anti-intellectual dogmatism that only fools, dupes, and contrarians would demand an
actual justification for necessity’s primacy. Such chatter stands in sharp contrast with the
detailed logical and historical explanations commonly found in THE FEDERALIST.
492 THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 491 at 271 (emphasis added). Interestingly,
Hamilton broached a comparable argument as part of his admonition that all states must
embrace the Constitution lest, as often happens with unaligned neighbors who compete for
land, wealth and power, some states be in continuous war with other states. Hamilton recog-
nized the terrible threat to liberty inherent in perpetual military mobilization.
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national
conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to
its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war—
the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger,
will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and
security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and
political rights. To be more safe they, at length, become willing to run
the risk of being less free.
. . . .
. . . The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants
of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to fre-
quent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense
of those rights; and by degrees, the people are brought to consider the
soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition
from this disposition to that of considering them as masters, is neither
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Furthermore, Madison proclaimed in Federalist No. 51, “Justice is the end of
government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will be pursued,
until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.”493 Thus, even if he believed
that necessity might trump liberty,494 Madison emphasized as strongly that “justice”
is the paradigmatic reason for government, therefore “extensive” loss of liberty—of
justice—for the sake of safety is “fatal.”
Madison’s embrace of essential justice demonstrates his crucial agreement with
the Founders that a nation lacking liberty is no legitimate governor. We must remember
that it was Madison who unequivocally instructed future Americans to improve and
better the Founders’ precepts of government: “[T]he leaders of the revolution . . . pur-
sued a new and . . . noble course. . . . They reared the fabrics of governments which
have no model on the face of the globe. They formed the design of a great confederacy,
which it is incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate.”495 Perhaps for
that reason, Madison ended Federalist No. 41 with a detailed expression of confidence
that the proposed Constitution coupled with America’s dynamic spirit would accom-
modate both military necessity and liberty.496
Proponents of the Constitution of necessity fondly invoke another icon, President
Abraham Lincoln, who temporarily, but likely unlawfully, suspended habeas corpus
during the Civil War.497 Additionally, in violation of acts of Congress, Lincoln sub-
jected civilians far from actual combat to military trials and punishments for violating
remote, nor difficult: But it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under
such impressions, to make a bold, or effectual resistance, to usurpations,
supported by the military power.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, at 45, 48 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Certainly, life under the relentlessly militaristic government Hamilton described in
FEDERALIST NO. 8 would generate the very consequences that led to both the American
Revolution and the propounding of the Declaration of Independence. Just as it was in 1776,
it is the People’s duty to “throw off” such government and to restore liberty no matter what the
cost. Perhaps Hamilton sensed that even a Constitution in a time of necessity cannot forsake
what is right.
493 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 352 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
494 “A wise nation will . . . not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become
essential to its safety . . . .” THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 491, at 271.
495 THE FEDERALIST No. 14, supra note 306, at 88–89.
496 With regard to the adoption of the Constitution, as strongly urged by THE FEDERALIST,
possibly the greatest irony is that the Constitution is arguably the product of necessity theory.
The Framers’ mandate from Congress was to repair the Articles of Confederation, not to annul
that document and replace it with an entirely new framework for American government. In fact,
the Framers “ignored . . . the requirements of Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation that
any amendments be approved by the state legislature of every one of the thirteen states within
the Confederation.” Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 707, 727 (2009).
497 See Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, The Constitution of Necessity, and the Necessity of
Constitutions: A Reply to Professor Paulsen, 59 ME. L. REV. 1, 12 (2007).
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military orders.498 For what it is worth, Lincoln viewed his constitutional trespass as
very limited in both duration and reach,499 unlike the present “war on terror,” which is
worldwide in scope and of unlimited duration, potentially abridging, if not perpetually
undoing, constitutional liberties. Without a doubt, however, the proponents of the
Constitution of necessity enjoy considerable support from a range of respected sources.
B. The Constitution of Necessity’s Methodology
A word or two is appropriate regarding how this purported Constitution of neces-
sity actually works. Although proponents do not agree on every aspect of its application
and may differ on the precise philosophical-jurisprudential roots of its justification,500
498 See id. at 11–16. In his July 4, 1861 Special Address to Congress, Lincoln stated that the
President would violate his oath, “if the government should be overthrown, when it was believed
that disregarding the single [instance of constitutional] law, would tend to preserve it[.]” Paulsen,
supra note 41, at 1265; see also, e.g., Crocker, supra note 97, at 234 (stating that Lincoln’s
wartime precedent exemplified allowing extra-constitutional action when necessary to preserve
the state); Levinson & Balkin, supra note 496, at 724 (noting that Lincoln recognized that to
preserve the government political actors may sometimes ignore the Constitution).
499 E.g., Curtis, supra note 497, at 11. Interestingly, in one highly debatable, but fascinating,
regard some maintain that President Lincoln treated the Constitution as a suicide pact (although
for purposes starkly different than assuring due process). He could have sacrificed the extant
Union—let the South secede—rather than risk the Constitution by fighting a war which the
North might well have lost. After all, the presidential oath requires the Executive to preserve
the Constitution, not preserve the Union. Prakash, supra note 7, at 1305–06. Therefore, one
could argue that although he did not believe liberty was vital enough, Lincoln accepted that
at least one idea—specifically, to borrow post-bellum phrasing, “one nation indivisible”—is
so intrinsic to the Constitution that its preservation is worth risking the nation itself.
500 Scholars have noted four paradigmatic theories regarding constitutional emergency
powers, of which aspects, one, three, and four could support a Constitution of necessity:
(1) “Constitutional relativists [ ]” . . . believe that executive discretion dur-
ing emergencies is largely unbounded . . . ([although some proponents]
concede that the appropriations power and other legislative powers can
be used to check executive abuse. . . .).
(2) Theorists of “extralegal emergency powers[ ]” . . . believe that . . . [i]f
executives or other officials desire to take extraordinary measures, they
must deliberately step outside the legal system to do so, hoping for some
sort of ex post political ratification. . . .
(3) Theorists who praise “common law emergency oversight” hold that
ex post judicial review, under constitutions or statutes, can provide gov-
ernment with needed flexibility during emergencies while ensuring that
expanded powers are contracted again once the emergency has passed. . . .
(4) Finally, “emergency legal formalists [ ]” . . . propose ex ante statutory
and constitutional regulation of emergencies, rather than ex post judicial
regulation in the common law mode. Their main mechanisms involve
constitutional provisions and framework statutes that are supposed to
provide clear and specific limitations on governmental powers before an
emergency event occurs.
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the argument is usually expressed somewhat disingenuously as balancing costs and
values when security purportedly conflicts with liberty.
Understandably, proponents of the Constitution of necessity insist that striking the
proper balance is not based on empowering government for its own sake.501 Rather, the
ostensible balance is a means to protect the safety of the greater society (not necessarily
the safety of society’s citizenry as individuals),502 even if the price is allowing the gov-
ernment to abate or abolish liberty interests, possibly for an indeterminate duration.503
While its proponents employ soothingly reasonable rhetoric, balancing is not truly
the method. Rather, the imagery of balancing helps distract and distort the reality that
in the last analysis, as it must be, the Constitution of necessity is uncompromising. Al-
though coming to the opposite resolution, no less than Kantian honor, the Constitution
of necessity seeks the elementary unit, the value monism, the bedrock premise of the
Constitution that answers the ultimate question: Which takes precedence if you can
have only one, safety or liberty? The Constitution of necessity puts security above all.
To this end, most proponents predictably allow the Executive substantially unre-
viewable, if not absolute, authority to curtail or eliminate liberties during those emer-
gencies deemed sufficient to trigger the Constitution of necessity.504 Typical is the
proposition of Professors Adrian Vermeule and Eric Posner that:
executive officials [should take] aggressive action in response
to perceived security threats, and courts and Congress [should]
defer[ ] to or approve[ ] of the executive’s initiatives. . . . [I]t is
therefore desirable and indeed inevitable that liberties will be sacri-
ficed when security threats arise. . . . Because those of us outside
Vermeule, supra note 479, at 195–96 (quoting William E. Scheuerman, Emergency Powers,
2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 257, 258, 259–62, 270–73 (2006) (footnotes and citations omitted)).
501 “When it is said that liberty must be traded off for the sake of security, what is meant
by ‘security’ is people being more secure rather than governmental institutions being more
powerful.” Jeremy Waldron, Safety and Security, 85 NEB. L. REV. 454, 460 (2006) (emphasis
omitted).
502 “As Hobbes reminded us, governments have to design their security strategies in broad
terms, taking account of the overall impact of what they do. They cannot be expected to under-
take the detailed evaluations that this account requires, when they are addressing the safety of
a quarter billion people.” Id. at 492.
503 It is no answer to bootstrap by arguing that security is not an end in and of itself, but
rather a means to attain diverse goals such as liberty concurrent with safety from terrorism.
Id. at 462–63, 471–72. Of course, a society that holds liberty as the ultimate trump over life,
bodily safety, and property does not advocate a Constitution of necessity in the terms criticized
in this Article. By contrast, if we confess that we are not secure without liberty, yet are willing
to render liberty subject to necessity’s domination, then we live under a Constitution of neces-
sity with liberty, at best, winning only the silver medal in the competition for importance. See,
e.g., Brooks, supra note 10, at 128.
504 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 41, at 1259–63.
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the executive branch are unqualified to assess the balance struck,
our position must be one of outright deference.505
Similarly, an untouchable Executive is the pivot of the notorious memoranda pub-
lished by high ranking officers of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel
during the presidency of George W. Bush.506 Advocates urge that there is no reason
to doubt the Executive’s pragmatic assessment of danger, suspect its good faith, or
presume that it will overreach.507 Moreover, according to the argument, not entrusted
with the daily operation of the nation’s foreign affairs, the other branches of govern-
ment are prone to more and greater mistakes regarding the rarified realm of inter-
national relations and national security than is America’s constitutionally designated
expert, the President.508
C. The Constitution of Necessity—Consequentialist Rejoinders
Not surprisingly, opponents of the Constitution of necessity challenge that theory’s
empirical premises. For instance, Judge Posner expressed the typical consequentialist
505 Cole, supra note 11, at 1330 (discussing POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 136, at 12,
16). Indeed, according to Posner and Vermeule, the Executive may respond to security threats
by imposing torture, suppression of dissent, and other curtailments of due process. Id. at
1330–31; see also Crocker, supra note 97, at 238–40 (discussing the theory of the un-
reviewable Executive).
506 See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen. To Alberto R.
Gonzalez, Counsel to the President & William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of
Def., RE: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002),
available at http://news.lp.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/torture/powtorturememos.html [hereinafter
Bybee Memo] (discussed in David Schultz, Democracy on Trial: Terrorism, Crime, and
National Security Policy in a Post 9-11 World, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 195, 212–19
(2008)); Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to Timothy Flanagan,
Deputy Counsel to the President, RE: The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct
Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001), avail-
able at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm; see also Kutz, supra note 139, at
240–41 (noting that the Bybee Memo argued, inter alia, that no law binds the Executive
when exercising his war powers under the Constitution as Commander in Chief).
A subsequent memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Daniel Levin to Deputy
Attorney General James B. Comey repudiates the Bybee Memo regarding the definition of
torture, but declines to address the Memo’s micro- and macro-necessity theory of the Executive
because the George W. Bush Administration issued orders against torture and other forms of
inhumane treatment). Kutz, supra note 139, at 248.
507 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 11, at 1330. While some proponents would not fully exclude
legislative or judicial review, such oversight would be extraordinarily deferential, and thus
prone to uphold executive prerogative except in the unlikely event that the Executive acted
wholly irrationally.
508 Id.
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rationalization for torture-like interrogation, if not actual torture: if the situation “is dire
enough and the value of the information great enough, only a diehard civil libertarian
will deny the propriety of using a high degree of coercion to elicit the information.”509
The problem with the Posnerian approach is not that we can never know when the
situation “is dire enough.”510 Rather, the problem is we cannot always know when it
“is dire enough.” One empirical deficiency of the Constitution of necessity, then, stems
from “slippage”; that is, “the [necessity] defense must apply to conduct undertaken be-
fore the threat materializes. It is nearly always impossible to know whether the threat
really would have been realized . . . .”511
Thus, while supporters of the Constitution of necessity earnestly contend that the
Executive would employ extreme measures rarely and prudently, if for no other reason,
to avoid a public backlash (should governmental efforts at maintaining secrecy fail),512
theory and experience reveal that relativism, fear, and poor judgment encourage offi-
cials to err on the side of necessity, rather than liberty.513 Given the political realities of
a society esteeming justice, but nonetheless inclined to anxiety, edginess, and bigotry,
any official investigating a credible terrorist suspect will be tempted to take severe steps
lest some terrible event occur and an angered public demands to know why the sus-
pect who might have had crucial information was not subjected to every form of inten-
sive interrogation.514 Torture, torture-like conduct, and similar immoderate measures
would not likely be limited to the most certain instances under the “ticking time
bomb” scenario.515 Instead, society could learn to tolerate, even become comfortable
509 POSNER, supra note 95, at 81.
510 Id. Reasonable people could agree that certain situations unreservedly are “dire enough”
even if out of caution, the chosen demarcation excludes less egregious circumstances that almost
certainly are sufficiently “dire.” For instance, from a reasonable consequentialist perspective,
the situation is surely sufficiently “dire” if, beyond reasonable doubt, a captured suspect knows,
but will not reveal, the location of five “ticking” nuclear bombs, scattered among five different
major American cities. Id. The carnage wrought by fewer, even one, ignited nuclear weapon
may be calamitous enough, but surely the detonation of five nuclear bombs in five key cities
would decimate American society.
511 Kutz, supra note 139, at 243–44; see also, e.g., Crocker, supra note 97, at 255; Henry
Shue, Torture, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 47, 56–57 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
512 E.g., POSNER, supra note 95, at 83–84 (arguing that the government would not authorize
torture, except in extreme circumstances, because public knowledge of such techniques would
produce “political costs”).
513 “Indeed, most of human history teaches us that reliance on executive good intentions is
an insufficient safeguard against abuse of power.” Brooks, supra note 10, at 128.
514 Crocker, supra note 97, at 260. This is not to say that investigators will always succumb
to such temptations. Rather, the argument is that they will do so with sufficient regularity until
that regularity becomes customary, at which point, investigators might attempt increased incur-
sions into liberty to revise norms yet again. Each time, the chance of returning to pre-exigency
normalcy becomes less probable. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 11, at 1334.
515 POSNER, supra note 95, at 81.
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with, excessive measures in response to less than highly credible threats of significant
danger.516 Thus, arguments “that there is no reason to fear executive overreaching . . .
during emergencies and no reason to worry that emergency measures will outlast the
emergency . . . are blind to history, the social psychology of fear, and the extraordinary
pressures to safeguard security at all costs that executives inevitably experience during
emergency periods.”517
Another consequentialist critique warns that if security is the core principle
overwhelming all others, then the most depraved, horrific practices may be inflicted
on unlimited numbers of suspects—indeed upon unlimited numbers of entirely inno-
cent others—if those practices are what the restoration of national safety requires.518
Professor Crocker expressed that potential through horrific logic:
Then the loathsome idea arises—after failing to respond to the
usual methods, would the suspect respond to the threatened or
actual torture of one or both of his daughters? Would officials be
justified in perpetrating such harm? Under the standard justifica-
tion relying on necessity arguments, the answer must be “yes.”519
For similar reasons, society may well become more tolerant of less extreme, but
nonetheless inappropriate, liberty incursions for situations of ever decreasing exi-
gency.520 Thus, deprivations “quickly become routinized.”521 Rosa Brooks’s warning,
therefore, carries the ring of likelihood that “[w]ithout a clear and constantly reaffirmed
prohibition on torture, we will quickly become a society that accepts far worse.”522
Correspondingly, in theory at least, the Constitution of necessity could justify in-
validating every liberty, express or implied in that document. The appeal to Lincoln
avers that sometimes one must “sacrifice the limb to save the [tree]”;523 but, of course,
there comes a point where so many parts are removed or suspended that the tree dies.
“Nor is Lincolnesque preservation of the Constitution at all costs a worthy end, for
516 In fact, even if less oppressive interrogation yields reliable information, investigators
might indulge in torturous interrogation both to test whether the suspect retains any additional
guilty knowledge and to assure the public that nothing was left untried to safeguard lives, health
and property. The prospect of torture then becomes not a theory, but “an omnipresent, pressing
question.” Crocker, supra note 97, at 260.
517 Cole, supra note 11, at 1334.
518 See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 97, at 255–56.
519 Id. at 256–57; see also, e.g., Kutz, supra note 139, at 244.
520 See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 506, at 206–08 (discussing detention of suspects, warrant-
less review of bank records, and similar procedures).
521 Brooks, supra note 10, at 318.
522 Id. at 319; see also, e.g., Crocker, supra note 97, at 255.
523 Prakash, supra note 7, at 1304.
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that would suggest that we may suspend or discard every constitutional provision to
‘save’ the Constitution.”524
One other general retort merits very brief reference. Many commentators vig-
orously dispute not only the legality, but the wisdom of President Lincoln’s extra-
constitutional tactics.525 Should those analysts be correct, one might well conclude: if
America’s most revered president mistakenly assumed executive license to contra-
vene the Constitution, we cannot concede comparable authority to others who, even if
admirable, will almost certainly lack the sagacity of a Lincoln. If Lincoln was wrong,
others using the same power will likely be worse.526
D. The Constitution Must Be a Suicide Pact
The foregoing Section reveals that the Constitution of necessity is vulnerable to
many pragmatic criticisms.527 Nonetheless, let us assume that every practical critique
fails. Let us assume further that under the Constitution of necessity, all officials act
with perfect judgment and never make errors. Such results assuage only outcome-based
challenges. The foundational argument against the Constitution of necessity is that
it is consequentialist, not deontological, or if it elevates survival as a moral apex, the
Constitution of necessity does so erroneously.
Here is the deontological rejoinder to the Constitution of necessity. The Consti-
tution is the flowering of the Declaration of Independence’s pronouncement that
legitimate government must “secure” the deontological principles that the Founders
entitled “unalienable Rights”;528 thus, government exists to fulfill humanity’s prime
responsibility: to always be moral in the pursuit of happiness. Pursuant to the unpar-
alleled magnitude of that moral imperative, the Founders pledged their “Lives, . . .
Fortunes and . . . sacred Honor,”529 and expected all Americans then and thereafter
to do likewise for the sake of attaining and maintaining legitimate government under
law.530 As such, the Constitution is the legal component of our responsibility both as
a nation, and as individuals, to hone the Founders’ deep but imperfect understanding
524 Id. at 1305; see also, e.g., Brooks, supra note 10, at 128 (“Our security depends on our
liberty. In an open society we can separate good policies from bad, and correct our errors . . . .”).
525 See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 497, at 18–28.
526 Id. at 28.
527 Arguably, such pragmatic objections address only the matter of policy—that is, whether
the Constitution of necessity is a good idea, not whether it is an infirm legal theory. That is
because potential or actual misuse neither negates constitutional authority nor proves that such
authority does not exist, although the potential that abuses will overwhelm legitimate imple-
mentations may provide vital clues that the particular constitutional theory itself is fatally
flawed. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 41, at 1259. Disproving the bona fides of the Constitution
of necessity thus requires disproving its premises, not anticipating its possible abuse.
528 See infra notes 539–58 and accompanying text.
529 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
530 See supra notes 266–76 and accompanying text.
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of those moral principles that, borrowing a term from the presidential oath, govern-
ment must “preserve, protect and defend.”531 Indeed, that is precisely what the Founders
hoped and expected.532
This leads us back to the core of deontology. As earlier noted, within any system
of morality there must be a singular, controlling precept—the value monism—that
defines the moral paradigm, providing the point of departure from which all other ethi-
cal maxims and applications are understood.533 Writing shortly after the Revolution,
Immanuel Kant explained why Lockean survival theory cannot be human society’s
highest moral value. Rather, dignity comprehended by the CI is the value monism of
any moral system and regime of rights enforced by law.534 Kant explained why moral-
ity requires, as the old adage goes, death before dishonor.535 Abiding by the dignity
principle is more valuable than life itself because such abidance is morality’s para-
mount duty.
Therefore, despite its pre-Kantian origin, the Constitution must advance Kantian
ethics to be true to “sacred Honor’s” task that successive generations improve the
Founders’ principles through a deepening appreciation of what morality is. Anything
less fosters governmental immorality which, as explained above, is contrary to the
Declaration of Independence’s justification for the American Revolution.536 Kant re-
veals what the Founders did not fully comprehend: that morality requires the Govern-
ment to risk even the greatest sacrifice, to jeopardize its own existence rather than
betray what is right. In that essential regard, the Constitution is a suicide pact.
The concluding discussion of this Section shows that, exactly as Kant recog-
nized it should be,537 constitutional due process is the moral core, soul, and psyche of
American law that was promised by the Declaration. Indeed, as Felix Frankfurter ex-
claimed over sixty years ago, due process is “ultimate decency in a civilized society.”538
531 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
Before he enter[s] on the execution of his Office, he shall take the follow-
ing Oath or Affirmation:—“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will
to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution
of the United States.”
532 Id.; see supra notes 304–12 and accompanying text.
533 See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
534 See supra notes 416–37 and accompanying text.
535 See supra Part III.C.
536 See supra notes 434–35 and accompanying text.
537 See supra notes 437–60 and accompanying text.
538 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (holding that
the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination is not applicable via the Fourteenth
Amendment to state prosecutions), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). I should
note that although Justice Frankfurter was an outspoken proponent of the overarching moral
core of due process, he did state that “[t]he right of a government to maintain its existence—
self-preservation—is the most pervasive aspect of sovereignty.” Dennis v. United States, 341
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E. Consistent with Its Roots in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution
Embraces the Transcendence of Rights
It is long and well established that the Constitution’s concept of legitimate govern-
ment is derived from and loyal to the Declaration of Independence.539 The Framers
of the Constitution asked the fundamental question addressed by the very text of the
Declaration: What is good and proper government? They based their answer in signifi-
cant part on “self-evident truths concerning man’s natural rights and the origins and
purposes of government.”540 It is no surprise, therefore, that the judiciary steadfastly
has emphasized the logical, inextricable connection between the Declaration and the
Constitution.541 Nearly 140 years ago the Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins wrote,
“But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as
individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the
monuments showing the victorious progress . . . in securing . . . the blessings of civ-
ilization under the reign of just and equal laws . . . .”542 Identically, four decades after
Yick Wo, Justice Louis Brandeis famously summarized this idea, “The makers of our
Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.”543
Justice Brandeis’s conclusion, adopted by subsequent decisions,544 verifies the
Court’s turn-of-the-twentieth-century observation that, “[t]he first official action of
this nation declared the foundation of government” as the Declaration’s enumeration
U.S. 494, 519 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Therefore, I make no claim that Justice
Frankfurter would embrace the thesis of this Article; in fact, he likely would not.
539 Congress has so noted. Indeed, “the admission of territories as States into the United
States was often predicated on an assurance by the State that its constitution would violate
neither the Constitution nor the Declaration.” David Barton, The Image and the Reality, Thomas
Jefferson and the First Amendment, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 399, 451
(2003) (citations omitted). For instance, “The Alaska Constitution was ratified by Alaska’s voters
and approved by Congress, which found it to be ‘republican in form and in conformity with
the Constitution of the United States and the principles of the Declaration of Independence.’”
Kirk v. Carpeneti, 623 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L.
No. 85-508, § 1, 72 Stat. 339, 339 (1958)); see also, e.g., Larson v. Seattle Popular Monorail
Auth., 131 P.3d 892, 900–01 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) (Johnson, J. M., dissenting) (discussing
Enabling Act, ch. 180, sec. 4, 25 Stat. 676 (1889), which admitted the State of Washington to
the United States).
540 Epstein, supra note 219, at 77.
541 Recently, the Ninth Circuit noted, “The Declaration of Independence was the promise;
the Constitution was the fulfillment.” Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007,
1031 (2010) (quoting Chief Justice Warren Burger as quoted by Charles Alan Wright, Warren
Burger: A Young Friend Remembers, 74 TEX. L. REV. 213, 219 (1995)).
542 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
543 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing
the right of individual privacy), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
544 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 n.10 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
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of “unalienable rights.”545 Indeed, the Court frequently has reminded us of the
Constitution’s linkage with the Declaration.546 Cotting v. Godard elegantly explicated:
While [the Declaration’s] . . . principles may not have the force of
organic law, or be made the basis of judicial decision[s] as to the
limits of right[s] and dut[ies], and while in all cases reference must
be had to the organic law of the nation for such limits, yet the latter
is but the body and the letter of which the former is the thought and
the spirit, and it is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution
in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence.547
Contemporary justices as diverse as John Paul Stevens and Clarence Thomas em-
brace the longstanding judicial recognition that the Declaration substantially informs
the meaning and scope of the Constitution,548 a perspective steadfast with the under-
standing of America’s earliest patriots and leaders.549 For instance, The Federalist
No.39 explained:
The first question [regarding the proposed Constitution] . . . is,
whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly
republican[.] It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable
545 Cotting v. Godard, 183 U.S. 79, 107 (1901).
546 See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 94–95 n.1 (1979) (noting that “all of [Section]
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is already within the spirit of the Declaration of Independence”
(citation omitted)); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (“The liberty preserved from
deprivation without due process included the right ‘generally to enjoy those privileges long rec-
ognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.’”) (quoting
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 572 (1972)); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (“[T]he conception of political
equality from the Declaration of Independence,” as evinced in the Constitution’s Fifteenth,
Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments prescribes “one person, one vote.”) (quoting Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963)); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 651 (1948) (“The Constitution
was conceived in large part in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence . . . .”).
547 Cotting, 183 U.S. at 107 (emphasis added) (discussing Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356, 369–70).
548 See, e.g., Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2334 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
with Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (“The liberty protected by the Due Process Clause
is not a creation of the Bill of Rights. Indeed, our Nation has long recognized that the liberty safe-
guarded by the Constitution has far deeper roots.”) (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE,
para. 2 (U.S. 1776)); Adarand Constructors Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution”
is linked to the unalienable rights recognized in the Declaration); Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210, 238 (1990) (Stevens, J., with Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 207 (1986) (Blackmun, J., with Brennan,
Marshall and Stevens, JJ., dissenting), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
549 See, e.g., Larson, supra note 266, at 747–48 (noting that the Framers of the Constitution
referred to the Declaration as having established the American Government).
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with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental
principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination
which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political
experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government.550
John Quincy Adams likewise noted, “The Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution of the United States are parts of one consistent whole, founded upon one
and the same theory of government . . . .”551 Samuel Adams agreed, writing after the
ratification of both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, that “[t]his declaration of
Independence was received and ratified by all the States in the Union and has never
been disannulled.”552
Surely, for all the realpolitik and compromises of principle confirmed by historians
that explain the final document, the Constitutional Convention nonetheless hoped to
create the foundation that could not immediately, but ultimately would, kindle full faith
with the Declaration’s philosophy.553 In light of these precedents, Professor Larson cor-
rectly concluded, “the Declaration was . . . the declaration of one American people
declaring the existence of one American nation. It is therefore entirely appropriate to
date the legal existence of the American nation from July 4, 1776 . . . . The American
nation preceded . . . the Constitution, which ‘perfected’ that nation.”554
Accordingly, the Framers intended the Constitution to form not simply a posi-
tive governmental system, but also a moral basis for governing American society as
directed by the Declaration’s deontology that legitimate government must preserve and
protect the “unalienable Rights” derived from “Nature and Nature’s God.”555 They fos-
tered a political philosophy imbued deeply with “moral goals.”556 The Framers believed
the very nature of their Constitution would establish “a profound and lucid consensus
on the nature of ‘justice,’ the ‘general welfare,’ and, preeminently, the ‘blessings of
liberty.’”557 Indeed, urging the ratification of the Constitution, Federalist No. 43 ap-
plied the very reasoning of the Declaration, underscoring “the transcendent law of
550 THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 181–82 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003)
(emphasis added).
551 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, THE JUBILEE OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DISCOURSE 40 (1839)
(emphasis added).
552 Samuel Adams, Address to the Legislature of Massachusetts (Jan. 17, 1794), in 4 THE
WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 357 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1968) (1908).
553 “The variety of opinions and disagreements of 1787–1788 did not call into question the
fundamental political principles asserted in the Declaration of Independence.” Epstein, supra
note 219, at 78.
554 Larson, supra note 266, at 702; see also id. at 736–37.
555 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, paras. 1–2 (U.S. 1776).
556 For instance, Thomas Paine succinctly stated that the Revolution instituted “Government
founded on a moral theory . . . .” Pangle, supra note 47, at 10 (quoting Thomas Paine, Rights
of Man, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 148 (Willey Book Co., 1942)).
557 Pangle, supra note 47, at 9.
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nature and of nature’s God, which declares that the safety and happiness of society
are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and to which all such institutions
must be sacrificed.”558
In sum, though one may find some support for the Constitution of necessity in their
writings, the early Patriots embraced the Declaration’s affirmation of both the trans-
cendence of morality and the moral duty of government to be just above all else. The
earlier quoted Federalist No. 51 encapsulated the precept boldly, “Justice is the end of
government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued, until
it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.”559 Indeed, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals verified that Madison’s philosophy expresses “truths [that] are
immutable—they live—they govern us—and they compel our course of action . . . .”560
Indisputably, the belief in and quest for governance secured in deontological moral-
ity is a crucial, if not the fundamental basis for the Revolution and the Constitution.
Nonetheless, “the twentieth century has seen a decline in the faith in natural justice that
sparked the Declaration,”561 in favor of law unapologetically based on the partiality
of the American people arguably without regard to whether such preferences conform
with deontological moral principles.562 This newer judicial trend opines that to be
“fundamental,” a right must be “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty . . . or
558 THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003). Referring as well
to transcendent principles, John Jay reminded that although government is necessary to protect
liberty, “the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite
powers.” THE FEDERALIST No. 2 (John Jay) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003). James Wilson, signer
of both the Declaration and the Constitution, likewise believed in the application of eternal
principles: “we may infer, that the law of nature, though immutable in its principles, will be pro-
gressive in its operations and effects.” Bessler, supra note 277, at 321 n.907 (quoting WILSON,
supra note 224, at ch. III).
559 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 493.
560 Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 493); see also, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33,
81 (1990) (Kennedy, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor and Scalia, JJ., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); Haney v. Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 410 F.2d 920, 926 n.3 (8th Cir.
1969); United States v. Hamilton, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1259 & n.20 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 to support the proposition that “[i]t is the Court that is called upon to
make the hard decisions necessary to integrate Congressional mandates with the requirements
of justice . . . .”).
561 Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing
Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 524 (1986) (citations omitted).
562 Id. (“In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court recognized that its incorporation of Bill of Rights
provisions had reflected the partial abandonment of an earlier search for transcendent principles
of ordered liberty.”) (citing 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968)). The Duncan Court offered that the
concept of “fundamental fairness” animating due process relates to American values, conceptions
and principles. Id. The Supreme Court recently stated that Duncan’s approach is preferable to
imagining whether particular procedures are essential to the very definition of civilized society.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010).
2011] SACRIFICE AND SACRED HONOR 389
as we have said in a related context, whether this right is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition.’”563
563 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause requires the States to abide by the Second Amendment) (quoting Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Frankness requires the acknowledgment that the Duncan-McDonald stance finds some
gravitas in the celebrated estimation by the esteemed jurists Felix Frankfurter and the second
John Marshall Harlan that constitutional principles are informed by extant American traditions
and deeply rooted customs rather than immutable values. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J.). Nonetheless, the logic, if not the letter, of Frankfurter’s and Harlan’s writings, evinces at
least cautious appreciation of deontology that undercuts any anti-deontological posturing by
the Supreme Court.
Consider Harlan’s statement that due process addresses “those rights ‘which are . . .
fundamental; which belong . . . to the citizens of all free governments’ . . . .” Poe, 367 U.S.
at 541 (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230)).
Surely, customs and traditions cannot change what Harlan lauded as rights so “fundamental”
that they “belong to the citizens of all free governments,” not just to Americans. Similarly,
Frankfurter observed that, “the Due Process Clause embodies a system of rights based on moral
principles so deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed
fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole history.” Solesbee v. Balkcom,
339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), abrogated by Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). It is unlikely that, even if consistent with “traditions and
feelings,” any such “fundamental” rights demanded by morality are ripe for repeal simply be-
cause the accompanying “traditions and feelings” might change. Id. The more plausible under-
standing of Justice Frankfurter’s Solesbee quote is that happily, “the traditions and feelings of
our people” (1) have correctly recognized the basic “rights” demanded by the “moral principles”
encapsulated as “due process” and (2) have fittingly understood such rights as “fundamental
to a civilized society.” Id.
To illustrate via an example, surely Frankfurter and Harlan would not accept that a preva-
lent and extensive alteration of sentiment alone could metamorphose invidious racial prejudice
from immoral to moral. Likewise, such an unexpected but manifest change of preferences
would not be a legitimate basis to permit mandatory racial segregation of public schools, to
prohibit African Americans from serving on juries, to limit voting rights on the basis of race
or otherwise to resurrect any of the myriad appalling forms of race-based treatment rightly
prohibited by the Constitution. The alternative is that Frankfurter meant morality and rights are
proved not by their intrinsic nature, but rather because they have been embraced by sufficiently
broad and deep “traditions and feelings of our people.” Id. It is difficult to believe that intellects
as profound as Frankfurter’s and Harlan’s could accept that morality is defined by politics and
preferences alone.
As further support that they recognized, if not outright accepted, constitutional enforce-
ment of deontological moral-legal theory, Justice Harlan stated that understanding liberty is a
“rational process,” specifically, appreciating that due process is “a rational continuum which,
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints . . . .” Poe, 367 U.S. at 542–43 (citations omitted). Although offering that “[d]ue
process of law . . . is not to be derided as a resort to a revival of ‘natural law,’” Justice
Frankfurter similarly explicated that the process of comprehending liberty is “deeply rooted
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Regardless of some judicial timorousness to evoke eternal principles, modern
“substantive due process” decisions have not forsaken natural law, such as extolling
the enduring institution of marriage.564 Indeed, not ten years ago, the Supreme Court
reiterated that moral transcendence premises the Constitution. Invalidating state laws
criminalizing privately performed homosexual conduct between consenting adults,
Lawrence v. Texas identified the constitutional issue as “involv[ing] liberty of the per-
son both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.”565 The Court properly
accepted that more is at play regarding liberty interests than simple judicial consequen-
tialism, albeit consequentialism based on American tradition rather than unexpurgated
fiat. Abiding by its roots in the Declaration, Lawrence correctly identified the constitu-
tional principle that “liberty” is “transcendent”; that is, beyond human preferences.566
To the extent that it is incompatible with a deontological theory of the Constitution,
the Duncan-McDonald line of precedent is incorrect,567 as everything heretofore in this
Article attempts to prove. Accepting American traditions and applying concepts of
“ordered liberty” with no consideration of whether such are inherently decent in a non-
utilitarian sense betrays the sound and worthy principles of both the Revolution and
the Constitution. Whatever politically motivated unfaithfulness mars the birth of this
nation, the Founders’ invocation of deontological morality was neither a gloss, nor
hyperbole, nor a frivolous, cynical distraction. Rather, by pledging life, property and
“sacred Honor,” they established what would later be incorporated into the Constitution,
in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal profession.” Rochin, 342 U.S. at 171
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). The distinction Frankfurter drew means that reason—
what Harlan called the “rational process”—is markedly different from “compelling traditions
of the legal profession.” Id. The philosophy discussed in earlier portions of this Article dis-
closes that difference: traditions may be based on consequentialist preferences but reason seeks
transcendent principles. We plausibly may inquire whether a tradition comports with reason,
but we do not validate a precept of reason simply by noting that it comports with tradition; such
significance would not escape the incisive minds of Harlan and Frankfurter.
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter explicated that to avoid judicial consequentialism, judges must
perform “an evaluation based on disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science . . . .” Id.
at 172; see also, e.g., Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37, 46 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam denial
of rehearing en banc) (discussing Rochin); Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, No. EP-03-CA-411
(KC), 2005 WL 388589, at *22 (W.D. Tx. Feb. 2, 2005) (quoting Rochin). Certainly, the
“spirit of science” evokes impartial reason which cannot simply accept American custom as
self-proving due to its persistence. Rather, the scientific method seeks truth and surely is no
apologist for either consequentialist preferences or tradition qua tradition.
564 Alschuler, supra note 561, at 524–27 (discussing, inter alia, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), which invalidated, as applied to married couples, laws prohibiting the dissemi-
nation of and information regarding contraceptives). As Professor Alschuler aptly concluded,
“Old due process standards never die.” Id. at 526.
565 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (emphasis added).
566 Id.
567 See supra notes 524–25 and accompanying text.
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a “precommitment” to moral rectitude as a substantive command of the law, the very
formality of which would better induce compliance.568
Consequently, the Duncan-McDonald rationale either wrongly denies that deonto-
logical morality must premise legitimate governmental action or espouses the uncom-
fortable proposition that morality be damned, due process is no more than a political
device to serve consequentialist ends.569 It simply makes neither logical nor jurispru-
dential sense to envision a liberty interest that is fundamental to the United States but
nonetheless is immoral in either form or application.
F. Due Process Is the Constitution’s Value Monism, Thus Due Process Is the
Controlling Concept that Should Afford No Exceptions
It comes as no surprise that, although often expressed in terms of mores and be-
liefs, due process is the abiding morality of our society and, accordingly, the bedrock
of American law. As earlier quoted:
It is now the settled doctrine of this Court that the Due Process
Clause embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so
deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to
be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our
whole history. Due process is that which comports with the deepest
notions of what is fair and right and just.570
Three years earlier, Justice Frankfurter stated the idea in another earlier quoted
powerful line worth repeating: the Due Process Clause evinces “ultimate decency in
a civilized society.”571 Frankfurter’s references to fundamentals of “a civilized society,”
568 Under the theory of “precommitments,” the Constitution vouchsafes the nondelegable
duty to protect “unalienable Rights” as the dominant responsibility of Government. By so
doing, the Nation accepts as incontrovertible its precommitment so that it will not forsake its
duty in situations where faithful abidance is particularly painful—when “we will be tempted,
especially in times of stress, to fall short of those ideals.” Cole, supra note 11, at 1332 (discussing
precommitment theory); see also David Cole, The Poverty of Posner’s Pragmatism: Balancing
Away Liberty After 9/11, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1735, 1746 (2007).
569 Of course, there may be many different ethical ways to enforce substantive and proce-
dural due process. For example, perhaps a trial by a jury of one’s peers is not indispensible to
due process in civil cases, or, in certain instances might actually be counter-productive. Trial-
like administrative hearings with simple evidence rules may promote the dignity of claimants
who would otherwise be unable to afford costly, formal litigation. See, e.g., Wilkinson v.
Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–25 (2005); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
570 Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added), abrogated by Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
571 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), overruled
by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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reflecting “ultimate decency” and “the deepest notions of what is fair and right and
just” stem from the Supreme Court’s perspective that, consistent with its Declaration
of Independence origins, constitutional law, particularly liberty, is “a principle of
natural equity, recognized by all temperate and civilized governments, from a deep
and universal sense of its justice . . . .”572
Therefore, as the judiciary tells us, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments are the repository of America’s “deepest notions of what is fair and
right and just.”573 Indeed, although the Constitution, particularly its Bill of Rights, con-
tains many “enumerated rights” of somewhat greater specificity than the Due Process
Clauses themselves, constitutional law properly and wisely informs: (1) such ex-
plicit rights emanate from the overarching idea of due process, and (2) absent their
explicit enumeration within the Constitution, due process alone would be sufficient
to derive those rights. Due process is America’s value monism from which free speech,
freedom from unreasonable police conduct, the right to defense counsel in a criminal
prosecution, equal protection and every other fundamental specific constitutional
right derives.574
572 Chi. B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238 (1897) (holding that due process
prevents States from taking private property without just compensation). A century later, modern
jurisprudes likewise have noted “due process or equal protection contexts . . . embody deon-
tological concepts of fairness and morality.” Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis
Review of General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93, 119 (2007);
see also, e.g., Aya Gruber, Righting Victim Wrongs: Responding to Philosophical Criticisms
of the Nonspecific Victim Liability Defense, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 457 (2004) (noting that
fairness and due process are deontological ideas); Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural
Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2087, 2093 (2001);
Timothy P. Terrell, Turmoil at the Normative Core of Lawyering: Uncomfortable Lessons
from the “Metaethics” of Legal Ethics, 49 EMORY L.J. 87, 105 (2000) (explaining that due
process is deontological in that it evinces “structural values that must be respected in and of
themselves, . . . regardless of the social results any particular instance might produce . . .”).
573 Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 16. The Fifth Amendment applies to the federal government while
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to state government and localities. See, e.g., S.F. Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympics Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542 n.21 (1987); Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 n.9 (1985). Understandably, however, the definition of due process
is the same for both amendments. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638
n.2 (1975) (noting that implied equal protection component of due process under the Fifth
Amendment is identical to express equal protection and due process components under the
Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 107 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1622 (2011); United States v. Nagel, 559 F.3d 756, 760 (7th Cir. 2009).
574 In this regard, we again see that, within the realm of moral precepts, the metaphor of
balancing is inapt. Which right prevails does not depend on whether it somehow is more
important than some other right regarding the particular legal dispute. Indeed, rights are not
amenable to that type of comparison. Rather, depending on the particular situation under
review, one or more rights might apply while others simply do not.
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The value monism of due process is proved by Bolling v. Sharpe.575 Although the
Fourteenth Amendment contains both a Due Process and an Equal Protection Clause,
the Fifth Amendment enumerates only the former.576 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
ruled in Bolling, a companion case to Brown v. Board of Education,577 that mandatory
racial segregation of public school students in the District of Columbia—a federal
jurisdiction—violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which subsumes
an implied guarantee of equal protection under law.578 Within a remarkably short three
page opinion, the Court pithily stated its rationale in terms of overarching morality, “the
concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal
of fairness, are not mutually exclusive.”579 Understandably, the Court has not deviated
from Bolling’s holding and rationale.580 Nor is Bolling the only instance of “substantive
For instance, regarding free speech, the Supreme Court recently opined that the judiciary
does not employ plain cost-benefit analyses to support holdings that certain utterances, writings
and portrayals fall outside the First Amendment’s ambit due to their purported lack of speech
value. Rather, such determinations occur when a right other than the First Amendment better
applies to the particular case. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585–86 (2010) (holding
that a statute criminalizing creation, sale or possession of materials depicting animal cruelty
is facially overbroad under the First Amendment). Specifically, access to and possession of child
pornography are outside the First Amendment because the pornographic materials themselves
are “an integral part” of the crime of producing child pornography. New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982) (discussed in Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586).
Similarly, we may understand that physical gestures constitute First Amendment pro-
tected symbolic speech; however, that right does not control when the gesture is a battery.
As the famous adage goes, “Your right to swing your arms ends just where the other man’s
nose begins.” See, e.g., J. Harvey Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights: The Rhetoric and
Practice of Rights in America, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 319 (2010) (quoting Zechariah Chafee,
Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 957 (1919)).
It is not that bodily integrity is balanced against speech or that the expressive value of child
pornography is balanced against the harm such pornography engenders. Rather, the issue is
which right applies in the given case. As we will see from the text below, the answer derives
from applying the value monistic principle—herein due process—which reveals which sub-,
or more particular, right is applicable. Accordingly, and consistent with greater deontological
theory, when properly appreciated, rights never conflict; they always harmonize through the
primacy of the value monistic precept, herein due process.
575 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
576 Id. at 499.
577 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that mandatory racial segregation of state public school
students violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
578 Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
579 Id. at 499. Thus, a violation of equal protection may state an identical claim of due
process, because “discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.” Id.
580 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228, 234 (1979) (noting that Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment “forbids the
Federal Government to deny equal protection of the laws” (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted)).
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due process,”581 involving rights not expressly found in the constitutional text, yet
derivative of the “liberty” encompassed within both Due Process Clauses.582
Similarly, it is axiomatic constitutional law that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not fully incorporate—that is, it does not per se mandate
onto the states—the rights set forth in the Bill of Rights.583 Rather, through a right-by-
right review, the judiciary has applied to the States pursuant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment those provisions of the Bill of Rights that derive from the American “scheme of
ordered liberty and system of justice.”584 In other words, due process requires states and
localities to respect those rights essential to the very legitimacy of governmental con-
duct. As a result of this right-by-right evaluation known as “selective incorporation,”585
every discrete liberty under the Bill of Rights has been applied to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause except the Sixth Amendment’s right
to a unanimous jury verdict, the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of indictment by a
grand jury and the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.586
Together, the implied equal protection aspect of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, due process engendered rights unwritten in the Constitution’s text
and the “selective incorporation” doctrine evince the singular quality of due process
among all rights: fundamental constitutional rights need not be itemized within the
581 “It has been ‘settled’ for well over a century that the Due Process Clause[s] ‘appl[y] to
matters of substantive law as well as matters of procedure.’” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130
S. Ct. 3020, 3091 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
582 “Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to
pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper government objective.” Bolling, 347 U.S.
at 499–500. Unenumerated rights originating from the concept of “Liberty,” often understood
in terms of a general right to privacy, include: sexual conduct privately performed between con-
senting adults, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); access to contraception, Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); the right to choose abortion subject to appropriate restrictions,
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); the right of single adults to marry regardless of race,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); and the general right of parents to raise and educate
their children, Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
583 Justice Black is perhaps the most renowned proponent of the judicially discredited theory
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates every enumerated right
in the Bill of Rights, but has no other meaning—covers no other conceivable rights—other
than those expressed in the text. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71–72 (1947) (Black,
J., dissenting) (holding that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination is not
applicable via the Fourteenth Amendment to state prosecutions), overruled by Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black,
J., concurring).
584 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034 (citations omitted).
585 Id.
586 Id. at 3034–35 nn.12–13. In addition, the Supreme Court has yet to adjudicate whether
due process includes the Third Amendment (prohibiting mandatory quartering of soldiers in
peacetime) and the Eighth Amendment’s provision banning excessive fines. Id. at n.13.
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constitutional text because due process is applicable to American government on
any level. Consequently, adept jurists and other officials would have discerned as
specific constituents of due process discrete rights such as equal protection, free
speech, religious liberty, criminal defense counsel, freedom from self-incrimination
and freedom from unreasonable police conduct, even if such rights were not set forth
explicitly in specific portions of our Constitution. If the sole fundamental right in the
text was simply a Due Process Clause, study and reflection would generate a rich due
process jurisprudence spawning the very rights actually extant in the Constitution
along with those unenumerated rights derived from the meaning of the phrase “due
process” itself.587
Indeed, when originally interpreted under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Liberty
Clause, principles such as free speech were applied to restrict state action not through
an incorporation doctrine, but as derivations of the very notion of liberty itself.588 Due
process stands on its own as sufficient to reveal those fundamental principles.589 As the
Court unequivocally concluded, “Due process of law is the primary and indispens-
able foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social
compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the
state may exercise.”590 Thus, due process manifests what Justice Frankfurter called
an “independent function”591 that encompasses every enumerated and unenumerated
fundamental right. As such, due process is the Constitution’s elementary particle, the
value monism from which all other constitutional rights flow. Thus, a century ago
587 As Justice Harlan elucidated, “due process is a discrete concept which subsists as an
independent guaranty of liberty and procedural fairness, more general and inclusive than the
specific prohibitions [in the Bill of Rights].” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
One might additionally argue that, even absent a Due Process Clause, the understanding
that the Constitution is the legal enforcement of the Declaration of Independence’s recognition
of “unalienable Rights” should be sufficient to imply that what we understand as due process
is the Constitution’s pivotal function.
588 See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3092 & n.9 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing,
inter alia, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); id. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting));
see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
589 The presence of an enumerated right may itself be a strong indicator of that right’s funda-
mental nature. However, as just noted, enumeration is not per se proof of fundamentalism, nor
does a theory of enumeration limit the meaning of due process solely to those specific rights
that are set forth expressly in the Constitution. Rather, full due process analysis is required.
590 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1967) (footnote omitted). Similarly, a general source de-
duced, “It has been stated that no other phrase known to the American and English law com-
prehends so much that which is basically vital in the protection of human rights and the redress
of human wrongs as the phrase ‘due process of law.’” 16B AM. JUR. 2D CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 947 (2011) (citation omitted).
591 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), overruled
by Malloy, 378 U.S. 1.
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the Court correctly understood the categorical imperative of due process: “The funda-
mental guarantee of due process is absolute and not merely relative. . . . [T]he consti-
tutional safeguard as to due process [is] at all times dominant and controlling where
the Constitution is applicable.”592
G. The Controlling Principle of Due Process Is a Kantian-Like Perception of
Individual Dignity
Because it is America’s essential tenet of unalienable rights, it is neither a shock
nor a mystery that the courts understand due process to protect the inherent dignity of
individuals against even well-intentioned governmental excess. Certainly, there is no
doubt that “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
prevent government ‘from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of
oppression.’”593 Such protection from “oppression,” of course, is the very definition of
liberty memorialized in the Declaration and put into legal effect by the Constitution.
Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone was correct, therefore, when he wrote for the Court
in remarkably prescient prose that “the duty which rests on the courts, in time of war
as well as in time of peace, [is] to preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards
of civil liberty . . . .”594
Given that due process is not only government’s legal duty, but is also its moral
duty,595 we appreciate why the courts emphasize due process’s ethical breadth when
determining whether officials have abused their authority. The judiciary has named that
ethical breadth “fundamental fairness.”596 To be constitutional, challenged governmen-
tal conduct must at the very least comport with fundamental fairness.597 Official acts
failing to meet this minimum are beyond government’s constitutional competence.598
592 Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 350 (1909); see also, United States
v. Smith, 480 F.2d 664, 668–69 n.9 (5th Cir. 1973). Consequently, the judiciary has recognized
due process’s dominance over other portions of the Constitution. E.g., Sec’y of Agric. v. Cent.
Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. 604, 616 (1950) (“[N]ot even resort to the Commerce Clause can defy
the standards of due process.”); accord, e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th
Cir. 2006) (holding that due process applies to extraterritorial application of U.S. law), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 1343 (2007); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1976).
593 Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992) (alterations in original)
(quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)); see
also, e.g., Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998).
594 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942) (Stone, C.J.); see also, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557, 588 (2006) (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19).
595 See supra notes 554–58 and accompanying text.
596 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 177 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
597 See, e.g., Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169.
598 See, e.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007) (explaining that a prisoner
seeking a stay of execution is entitled to a fair hearing once he has made “a substantial
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The earlier discussed pivotal Bolling v. Sharpe confirmed that fairness is due process’s
integral quality: “[T]he concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming
from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive.”599 Accordingly,
while the courts insist that due process and equal protection challenges must fail if
the reviewing court discerns any rational basis to support the specific governmental
action,600 in fact the contested action is unconstitutional only if it offends integral
perceptions of fairness—that is, if it is immoral.601 It could not be otherwise because
threshold showing of insanity”) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 426 (1986)); Clark
v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 770–71 (2006) (holding that exclusion of evidence regarding mental
disease and incapacity to insanity defense, if supported by good reasons, satisfies fairness);
Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 460 (2001) (noting that the Due Process and Ex Post Facto
Clauses safeguard fairness); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746–48 (1987) (holding
that pretrial detention pursuant to Bail Reform Act does not violate due process). As noted
in the discussion of Kantian honor, see supra Part III, even persons ultimately wrongfully
convicted because of their actual innocence are not treated immorally if their arrests, con-
victions and sentences comport with the “fundamental fairness” intrinsic in due process of law.
See, e.g., McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984) (discussing
the harmless error rules); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 618–20 (1953) (upholding
restriction of admissibility of admission in conspiracy cases); Owens v. United States, 483
F.3d 48, 56–57 (1st Cir. 2007) (discussing bars on habeas corpus relief); United States v.
Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1352–53 (11th Cir. 2005) (discussing nonreversible errors for
motions for mistrial).
599 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (emphasis added).
600 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191–92 (1992) (holding retro-
active legislation constitutional because the purpose had a rational basis); Chapman v. United
States, 500 U.S. 453, 464–65 (1991) (noting that the due process and equal protection standards
are “essentially duplicates”). See generally, Bayer, supra note 54, at 1034–40.
601 That is why, although purporting to apply “levels of scrutiny” to judge the consti-
tutional merits of different types of governmental actions, ultimately the courts engage in a
general “rationality” analysis informed by concepts of fairness. Bayer, supra note 54, at
1036–40. Justice John Paul Stevens aptly observed that “[t]here is only one Equal Protection
Clause. It requires every [official office] to govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to
apply one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other cases.” Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 551–53 nn.1–4 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting
the “tiered” analysis method); Montgomery v. Carr, 101 F.3d 1117, 1122–24 (6th Cir. 1996)
(noting some judicial discontent with “tiered” analysis).
Classically, the courts purport three general “levels of scrutiny.” See, e.g., Northville
Downs v. Granholm, 622 F.3d 579, 586–87 (6th Cir. 2010); Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub.
Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009). The first level of analysis, “strict
scrutiny,” applies to governmental conduct regulating fundamental rights and to official
standards or conduct predicated on the “suspect classifications” of race and national origin.
Leib, 558 F.3d at 1306. Under strict scrutiny, the Government bears the burden to prove that
a “compelling state interest” justifies such presumptively unconstitutional governmental
conduct. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
720 (2007); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 105 (2001) (per curiam).
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every official act, no matter how offensive, promotes some reasonable goal or may
be shown to serve some rational purpose albeit a goal or purpose minor in nature and
overwhelmed by its resulting unfairness.602
The only remaining matter for resolution is identifying the moral element or ele-
ments that inform due process’s “fundamental fairness.” Even a cursory survey of
due process decisions confirms that the crucial moral constituent—the pivotal ethical
consideration—to determine constitutional sufficiency is whether the disputed official
conduct unduly offends the dignity of an individual, a group of individuals or an entity,
to which we ascribe the respect accorded to persons.603 Explaining the constitutional
Courts apply the claimed less exacting “middle level” or “intermediate” scrutiny standard for,
inter alia, regulation and conduct based on gender or illegitimacy. See, e.g., United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–33 (1996); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). The third
level, “rational basis” often referred to disparagingly as “mere rationality,” applies to all other
governmental acts and legislative classifications. Thereunder, the challenger must prove that
the presumptively constitutional government act lacks any rational basis. See, e.g., Romein,
503 U.S. at 191; Chapman, 500 U.S. at 464–65.
Yet regardless of the alleged level of analysis, a reviewing court’s decision that the chal-
lenged action or conduct violates due process or equal protection invariably pivots on argu-
ments that the government acted irrationally, that is, unreasonably, arbitrarily or otherwise
unfairly. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208 n.10 (1992) (distinguishing the
present case from other cases, which held that poll tax bore “no rational connection” to the
exercise of the fundamental right to vote); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982)
(“[S]uspect” classes “are more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than
legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective.”) (emphasis added).
Based on logic and experience, the three levels of scrutiny may provide a nice frame-
work to begin analysis. But, as Justice Stevens wisely told us, tiered analysis is a means to
help discern constitutionality vel non; it is not an end in itself. Craig, 429 U.S. at 211–12
(Stevens, J., concurring). Rather, the outcome depends on an overall assessment of the chal-
lenged standard’s rationality, meaning whether it is at a minimum fundamentally fair.
602 See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446–47 (stating that any legitimate governmental interests
that are too “attenuated” from the means and impact of the challenged conduct cannot render
the conduct constitutional).
603 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847–48, 851 (1992). The Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed, “Convictions based on evidence obtained by methods that are ‘so brutal and so
offensive to human dignity’ that they ‘shoc[k] the conscience’ violate the Due Process Clause.”
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 774 (2003) (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–74 (1952)); accord United States v. Brantley, 342 Fed.
Appx. 762, 769 (3d Cir. 2009) (shackling criminal defendant in courtroom before a jury absent
“a documented need . . . is hardly consistent with the court’s solemn obligation of ensuring
that those who come before it are treated with appropriate dignity and afforded due process.”),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1106 (2010); Kennedy v. Town of Billerica, 617 F.3d 520, 540 (1st Cir.
2010); Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2007).
Indeed, in one of the most significant dissents in Supreme Court annals, the first Justice
John Marshall Harlan enthused that the Fourteenth Amendment “added greatly to the dignity
and glory of American citizenship, and to the security of personal liberty . . . .” Plessy v.
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basis for the general right of women to choose to terminate pregnancies, the Supreme
Court clarified the inevitable relationship between due process and human dignity:
[C]hoices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart
of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under compulsion of the State.604
Thus, as Justice Stevens correctly summarized: “It is the liberty clause that enacts
the Constitution’s ‘promise’ that a measure of dignity and self-rule will be afforded
to all persons.”605
Reviewing precedents from the late-nineteenth and early-to-middle twentieth
centuries, Professor Alschuler explained that “[t]he Court’s view was tolerant of
diversity and experimentation but insisted that law must adhere at its core to immu-
table principles of human dignity.”606 Similarly, in her thoughtful review of decisions
involving fundamental constitutional rights, Professor Maxine Goodman demonstrated
that especially in contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, the Supreme Court appro-
priately “has repeatedly treated human dignity as a value underlying, or giving meaning
to, existing constitutional rights and guarantees.”607
As with the recognition of the deontological moral basis of due process, we cannot
be surprised that an astute, forthright judiciary realizes that dignity explains when gov-
ernmental conduct crosses an admittedly often indistinct boundary from rightful to
wrongful imposition upon one or more persons. Professor Castiglione correctly noticed,
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent). Of course we now under-
stand that the Fourteenth Amendment could not add dignity, but rather, memorialized and
vouchsafed Government’s duty to protect the inherent dignity of persons under the jurisdiction
and control of the United States. Nonetheless, Justice Harlan was correct to link fundamental
constitutional rights with the dignity of both America and those under its jurisdiction.
604 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (emphasis added).
605 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3092 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 847). Over a decade earlier, Justice Stevens similarly concluded,
“Whatever the outer limits of the concept may be, it definitely includes protection for matters
‘central to personal dignity and autonomy.’” Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 744
(1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
606 Alschuler, supra note 561, at 522.
607 Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence,
84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 743 (2006); see also, e.g., Edwin Baker, Outcome Equality and
Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933,
938 (1983).
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“Indeed, of all core constitutional values, dignity is perhaps the only one that cannot
be legitimately stripped entirely by the state under any circumstance.”608
With thorough analytical surveys, such as Professor Goodman’s, readily avail-
able for perusal, just a very few examples are required to illustrate herein that the
dignity which properly dominates constitutional rights jurisprudence is Kantian
dignity—Kantian honor. As earlier noted, Lawrence v. Texas ruled that government
may not criminalize per se homosexual sodomy performed in private between con-
senting adults.609 The Court carefully stressed that Lawrence’s due process issue con-
cerned consenting adults’ common right to enjoy non-injurious private relations of
which sexual acts may be an important part.610 “It suffices for us to acknowledge that
adults may choose to enter upon [an intimate personal] relationship in the confines of
their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”611
To be sure the point was not missed, the Court reiterated that “[t]he petitioners are
entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”612
In a similar manner, the Court has repeatedly and vehemently admonished that due
process and equal protection “must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm
a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”613
Applying equal protection implied from the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno struck 1971 amendments to the Food Stamp Act
of 1964 that limited eligibility to “households” consisting only of members of the same
family.614 The Court concluded that Congress unlawfully adopted the amendments to
prohibit “hippie communes” from receiving food stamps,615 a vindictive, callous enact-
ment to disadvantage a lawful faction that Congress happened to find repugnant.
Cleburne Living Center invalidated the City of Cleburne, Texas’s uniquely
burdensome zoning requisites regarding group homes for non-violent mentally re-
tarded individuals.616 Despite the arguable rational basis that such group homes might
depress the property values, the Court held constitutionally irrational the ordinance’s
overriding basis: “the negative attitude of the majority of property owners located
within 200 feet of the Featherston facility, as well as . . . the fears of elderly residents
of the neighborhood.”617
608 Castiglione, supra note 334, at 703.
609 See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
610 Id. at 578.
611 Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
612 Id. at 578 (emphasis added).
613 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973)).
614 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35.
615 Id. at 534.
616 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
617 Id. at 448.
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Romer v. Evans overturned a provision of the Colorado Constitution adopted by
popular referendum that: (1) required any law specifically protecting homosexuals to
be adopted solely through state constitutional amendment, and (2) repealed all statutes,
ordinances and state precedents specifically prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
“homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.”618
The Court discerned that homosexuals and bisexuals were not singled out for such
adverse status due to any actual threat they posed to others.619 Rather, the referendum
unconstitutionally promoted the “animosity” of a significant portion of the citizenry
who found homosexuality distasteful, unnatural or decadent.620
Perhaps the most well-known example of the judiciary’s ban of “a bare . . . desire
to harm a politically unpopular group”621 is Brown v. Board of Education, ruling un-
constitutional mandatory racial segregation of public school students.622 Recognizing
that children of minority races cause no inherent harm, the Brown Court famously
stated that “[t]o separate [students] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the com-
munity that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”623
Nearly a quarter century later, Judge Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit properly noted the
general societal applicability of the Brown Court’s sociology: “The racial stigma which
prevents segregated schools from offering equal educational opportunities is not felt
exclusively by children, nor is it felt exclusively in the educational context.”624
618 Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
619 Id. at 633–34.
620 Id. at 634–36.
621 Id. at 634 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
622 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
623 Id. at 494; see also, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485–87 (1992) (requiring that
a desegregated school “take all steps necessary to eliminate the vestiges of unconstitutional
de jure system”); Billings v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 807, 814 (7th Cir. 2001)
(holding a teacher’s seating arrangement process requiring African American and Hispanic
students to sit in pairs unconstitutionally discriminatory).
624 EEOC v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 511 F.2d 273, 278 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting cases
desegregating public parks, public buses and public benches), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994
(1975). Indeed, outside of the racial context, courts have recognized that imposition of undue
stigma is a violation of due process because it is an offense to personal dignity. See, e.g., Vitek
v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (noting that stigma of involuntary confinements for psychi-
atric treatment may “constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires procedural
protections”); see also, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971) (explaining
that a law allowing a governmental entity to forbid the sale or gifting of alcoholic beverages
to particular persons due to purported alcoholism must provide “notice and an opportunity
to be heard” because of the resultant “stigma or badge of disgrace”); Coleman v. Dretke, 409
F.3d 665, 668 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that requiring a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor
to attend “sex offender therapy” violates due process by stigmatizing the defendant with the
apparent legal “status” of a felonious sex offender), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 938 (2005).
Of course, stigma per se does not violate due process because the results of procedures that
comport fully with due process might result in legitimate stigma (“stigma plus”) such as proving
the defendant is a criminal. See, e.g., Wenger v. Moore, 282 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Some may argue that courts mention dignity a bit offhandedly, rather than develop-
ing a vivid exposition of that concept and its inextricable link to the Constitution.625
Yet, even if it never provides a thoroughgoing abstract definition, one need not have
the passion of a Felix Frankfurter, or the sagacity of a James Madison or the learned
inspiration of an Immanuel Kant to realize how in each instance the judiciary applied
Kantian honor—Kantian dignity theory—although nowhere is that philosopher cited
(nor would one expect to find such citations in past or future judicial opinions).
The core due process deficiency in each of the discussed cases is evident despite
the many and varied fact scenarios. In each instance, to promote its own discriminatory
purposes, some organ of government unfairly—immorally—infringed on liberty by
failing to regard the adversely affected persons as ends in themselves—as individual
human beings worthy of respect and dignity. The adversely affected persons posed no
actual harm—inflicted no true danger—rather than offending the immoral sensibili-
ties of intolerant others. Government treated these individuals merely as means for
some goal, usually illegitimately, such as by inflicting untoward discrimination or en-
forcing undeserved domination. Each time, government objectified the disadvantaged
individuals, treated them solely as instruments for the gratification of others, nullified
to some meaningful extent their humanity and deprived them, in some meaningful
degree, of their rightful pursuit of happiness.
In Brown,626 the racially segregated students were told that, due to their race, they
intrinsically were inferior and lacked dignity, not because somehow that is true, but
to convert them from persons into things to promote a racist social order. No rational
person would will as a general maxim that her value be assessed on race, a factor that
carries no inherent index of what one can do, what one will do nor what one is worth.
One’s race is not an immorality and to regard it as such violates dignity.
In Lawrence627 and Romer,628 Government criminalized the sexual behavior of
homosexuals and denied them the full opportunity to protect their dignity through
civil rights laws, not because gays, lesbians, transsexuals and bisexuals truly threaten
the health and safety of others, but because they were disliked by persons powerful
enough to turn their disdain into purported law. Distaste for the so-called homosexual
It is worth noting that the preeminence of dignity theory understandably covers as well
express fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights applicable to the States pursuant to the liberty
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. For example, regarding un-
reasonable searches and seizures, the Court accented that “[t]he overriding function of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion
by the State.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); see also, e.g., United States
v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (noting that threats to dignity are not as acute
in searches of automobiles). Similarly, explicating the protection against cruel and unusual
punishments, the Court stated that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment
is nothing less than the dignity of man.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
625 See, e.g., Castiglione, supra note 334, at 660–61.
626 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
627 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
628 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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lifestyle is not proof that homosexual conduct is immoral. Indeed, one would not will
a general maxim to lessen one’s social status based on one’s sexual practices so long
as such behavior does not offend the dignity of others as would, for example, rape.
Absent such proof, government cannot limit the pursuit of sexual happiness or reduce
homosexual individuals into nothing more than means to realize the discriminatory
predilections of others.
The City of Cleburne imposed special, difficult zoning criteria on group homes for
mentally retarded persons not because the occupants were a danger to themselves and
others, but because neighborhood residents found them unsightly and distressing.629
The mentally retarded were objectified and discarded because they were deemed ugly,
not because they were immoral. The same is true for the “hippies” in Moreno, whom
Congress attempted to disadvantage by rescinding their eligibility for food stamps.630
Smug disapproval of a given lifestyle cannot be the basis to degrade the humanity of
counter-culturalists by denying them largesse available to similarly situated others. The
hippie style pursuit of happiness is neither criminal nor otherwise dangerous. Thus,
legislators used hippies purely as means either for political gain, or to indulge their
misplaced hostile sanctimony, or likely both.
Granted, government might respond that minority children, gays and lesbians, the
mentally impaired and hippies each caused hurt by offending the sensibilities of some
powerful segment of society. Offended sensibilities, however, cannot be a legitimate
basis to exercise governmental authority, lest consequentialism prevail. Equating some
powerful person’s or group’s hurt sensibilities with compensable injury simply justi-
fies the raw consequentialist exercise of power or coercion for the sake of pleasing
the powerful. Rather, the question must be whether the hurt sensibilities at issue are
responses to objectively immoral conduct and, if so, governmental intervention may
be constitutional.631
This review demonstrates that due process is deontological, and thus must be
enforced according to the best available moral understanding: Kantian honor. Indeed,
Kantian dignity principles guide actual constitutional litigation, although courts are un-
willing to accord Kant his due regard. Consistent with the deontological imperatives
attendant to Kantian ethics, the United States cannot abandon the immutable duty of
due process even to forestall cataclysmic results. Because deontology cannot tolerate
consequentialist application, justice must be done under the Constitution even if the
heavens fall.
CONCLUSION
A compelling summation of this Article’s proposition comes from Abraham
Lincoln; not Lincoln the pragmatist, rather the Lincoln most worthy of admiration—
the theorist, the visionary, the idealist. During his August 21, 1858, debate with
629 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1984).
630 Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1972).
631 E.g., Wright, supra note 36, at 280–81.
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Stephen Douglas, addressing the extraordinarily contentious issue of slavery, Lincoln
announced with characteristic intensity and passion:
[Z]eal for the spread of slavery, I cannot but hate. I hate it because
of the monstrous injustice of slavery itself. I hate it because it de-
prives our republican example of its just influence in the world—
enables the enemies of free institutions, with plausibility, to taunt
us as hypocrites—causes the real friends of freedom to doubt our
sincerity, and especially because it forces so many really good
men amongst ourselves into an open war with the very funda-
mental principles of civil liberty—criticizing the Declaration of
Independence, and insisting that there is no right principle of
action but self-interest.632
Lincoln was impeccably correct. The core iniquity of slavery and indeed any other
practice in “an open war with the very fundamental principles of civil liberty” is not
its consequences such as “enabl[ing] the enemies of free institutions, with plausi-
bility, to taunt us as hypocrites,” as momentous as those consequences doubtless
are.633 Nor is it even the undeniably “monstrous injustice of slavery itself.”634 Rather
the fundamental treachery is “insisting that there is no right principle of action but
self-interest,”635 which betrays the foundational tent of legitimate society set forth
in the Declaration, enforced through the Constitution; for, it is through the negation
of a priori morality that every unjust and wrongful act flows.
Nearly a century and a half later, social critic William Bennett poignantly en-
capsulated that
in America, what brings forth our patriotism—our greatest
sacrifices—is our steadfast devotion to the ideals of freedom and
equality. American patriotism . . . is not based on tribe or family,
but on principle, law, and liberty. . . . [The Founders] had a new
idea—a country tied together in loyalty to a principle.636
Bennett’s words aptly recognize the vital American linkage of morality, honor and
sacrifice. However much some may fear it, resent it, lament it or wish it were otherwise,
the Constitution is a suicide pact.
632 Lincoln-Douglas Debates, supra note 279 (emphasis added).
633 Id.
634 Id.
635 Id.
636 BENNETT, supra note 155, at 26 (emphasis added).
